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Abstract
This ethnography tracks visualization and pedagogy in the burgeoning field of structural
biology. Structural biologists are a multidisciplinary group of researchers who produce
models and animations of protein molecules using three-dimensional interactive computer
graphics. As they ramp up the pace of structure determination, modeling a vast array of
proteins, these researchers are shifting life science research agendas from decoding genetic
sequence data to interpreting the multidimensional forms of molecular life. One major
hurdle they face is training a new generation of scientists to work with multi-dimensional
data forms. In this study I document the formation and propagation of tacit knowledge in
structural biology laboratories, in classrooms, and at conferences. This research shows that
structural biologists-in-training must cultivate a feel for proteins in order to visualize and
interpret their activity in cells. I find that protein modeling relies heavly on a set of
practices I call the body-work of modeling. These tacit skills include: a) forms of kinesthetic
knowledge that structural biologists gain through building and manipulating molecular
models, and by using their own bodies as mimetic models to help them figure out how
proteins move and interact; and b) narrative strategies that assume a teleological
relationship between form and function, and which figure proteins through analogies with
familiar human-scale phenomena, such as the pervasive description of proteins as
"machines." What I find is that these researchers are not only transforming the objects of
life science research: they are training a new generation of life scientists in forms of
knowing attuned to the chemical affinities, physical forces and movements of protein
molecules, and keyed to the tangible logic and rhetoric of "molecular machines." This
research builds on concerns in the feminist science studies literature on modes of
embodiment in scientific practice, and contributes to studies of performance in science by
examining visual cultures as performance cultures. In addition, I incorporate historical
studies of the life sciences to map the making of the protein-this intricately crafted entity
whose forms and functions, I argue, are recalibrating scientific expertise, reanimating
biological imaginations, and reconfiguring the very contours and temporalities of "life
itself."
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The gene and the cell are undoubtedly the central figures of twentieth-century biology.'
However, as structural biologists intensify investigations into the forms and functions of
biological molecules, it is the protein molecule that is coming into being as the star of the
early twenty-first-century life sciences. Today, journals such as Science and Nature are
publishing newly determined protein structures almost weekly, and as of May 2007 the
atomic coordinates for over 43,300 protein structures have been deposited online in the
Protein Data Bank (PDB). With the promise of novel insights into basic biological
processes, and major contributions to biomedical research and drug development,
biologists, chemists, physicists, engineers, mathematicians, and computer scientists are
converging on the field of structural biology, turning protein structures into objects of
multi-disciplinary interest and investment. In the process, their work is shifting the cusp of
visibility for scientific studies of life.
These researchers apply computationally intensive, multidimensional visualization
techniques to render the folds, forms and movements of otherwise "subvisible" (Sagan and
Margulis, 1988) biological molecules in elaborate detail [See Figure 1.1].2
1 See for example Keller (2000), Landecker (2007), and Franklin and Lock (2003).
2 Proteins are "macromolecules," large, complex biological molecules, often made up of thousands
of atoms. Reduced to their constituent parts, they are made up of small molecular subunits called
amino acids linked end to end to form long polypeptide chains. A protein may be made of a single
polypeptide, or several folded together. Amino acids themselves are small molecules made up of
varying amounts of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen and hydrogen and some contain other elements such
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Figure 1.1: A Ribbon diagram of a protein molecule. Used with permission
from an anonymous ethnographic informant.
They make use of high-energy forms of radiation, state-of-the-art interactive digital media,
augmented computer power, continually upgraded software and automated techniques to
craft atomic-resolution, three-dimensional models and animations of protein structures
onscreen. These techniques enable them to amplify protein structure data as interactive
digital models that they can manipulate and analyze. As they ramp up the pace of structure
determination, making visible the structural properties of a vast menagerie of proteins,
these life scientists can be seen turning from matters of code to matters of substance--that
is, from spelling out linear gene sequences to inquiring after the multidimensional
as sulfur. There are 20 different kinds of amino acids. While they all share a common carbon
backbone structure, each bears a different chemical side chain that confers different chemical
properties. Each species of protein has a unique sequence of these twenty amino acids, andpolypeptide chains can vary greatly in ength. For a peptide chain to acquire biological function in a
cell, or a test tube, it must be folded correctly. Proteins fold into secondary structures, such as alpha-
helices, and these secondary structures pack together to form the tertiary structures of the active
form of the protein. The active forms of some proteins are made up of 2 or more polypeptides, and
when these pack together, proteins acquire their quaternary structure, and fully functional form.
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materiality of the protein molecules that give body to cells. In the process, structural
biologists are not only collectively transforming the forms of data that populate life science
laboratories and databases; they are also crafting new ways of knowing, new forms of
expertise, and new narratives about what constitutes "life." In order to track these shifts,
this ethnography explores pedagogy and training in the lively visual cultures of twenty-first
century structural biology.
Currently, structural biology encompasses a number of distinct visualization traditions,
each with unique histories, disciplinary convergences, and practical cultures. Thes include:
X-ray crystallography; electron microscopy; nuclear magnetic resonance imaging (NMR);
studies of protein folding; and predictive modeling and protein engineering. X-ray
crystallographers build three-dimensional atomic resolution models of proteins from data
gathered from X-ray diffraction experiments with proteins that can be coaxed to form
crystals. Electron microscopists use high-energy microscopes to resolve low-resolution
models of larger protein complexes, such as the massive protein assemblages that form
membrane pores and channels. NMR researchers, on the other hand, apply their
techniques to produce high-resolution models of small, soluble proteins. Protein folding
researchers draw on a range of visualization techniques and biochemical analyses to map
the elusive pathways through which polypeptide chains fold into their active
conformations. Predictive modelers and biological engineers develop algorithms and run
simulations in the effort to predict unknown protein structures from known protein
sequences, to explore how molecules interact with each other, or to engineer new kinds of
protein molecules. Members of each of these diverse practical cultures are trained in the
full spectrum of scientific disciplines.
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In order to comprehend the import of molecular visualization for contemporary life science
research, I situate structural biology within the cultural milieu and practical horizon
anticipated and actualized by biological engineers. Protein structure data has particular
import for members of the biological engineering community. These investigators aim to
reengineer biological systems at the molecular scale. Once frustrated by the opacity and
recalcitrance of the gooey, proteinacious substances that constitute living systems,
biological engineers are now employing atomic-resolution molecular visualization to
produce protein models as physical objects they can measure, model, manipulate, and
redesign. In the hands of biological engineers, proteins are figured most frequently as
"molecular machines": like car parts, proteins become "biological parts," "components,"
and "devices"; mechanical objects that exert force and conduct "work" in order to "drive"
cellular life. As these twinned desires for visualization and intervention are actualized
through advances in structural biology, life science, as a practice and culture, is itself is
being re-engineered.
This ethnography is based on four years of ethnographic fieldwork among multidisciplinary
communities of structural biologists and their students. My primary fieldsite was a large,
private university on the east coast of the U.S. There, I conducted in depth interviews with
researchers working on projects in protein structure in the varied fields of protein
crystallography, biological engineering, protein folding, electron microscopy, and
mechanical engineering.3 Many of my interviews lasted for up to two hours, and I had the
opportunity to do follow up interviews with a number of informants, as well as observe
The present study does not include NMR researchers.
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them do laboratory work, and sit in on weekly group meetings. My informants were at
various stages in their training and they included principal investigators, research
coordinators, course directors, postdoctoral researchers, graduate students, teaching
assistants, and undergraduate students. I also observed full semester-long graduate and
undergraduate courses, including lecture courses on macromolecular crystallography,
biomolecular kinetics, protein folding, introductory biology and biological engineering
courses, as well as a hands-on laboratory for biological engineering majors. In addition, I
attended several professional meetings, numerous public lectures on structural biology and
biological visualization, and interviewed a number of structural biologists working at other
institutions on the east and west coast of the U.S.
This introductory chapter serves a number of purposes. First, I provide a brief history of
structural biology that locates contemporary practices in a history of inquiry into protein
molecules and structural studies of life. Second, I introduce-a very recent event that shook
the field of structural biology from its foundations: the retraction of five major structural
biology research papers after it was discovered that the models published were wrong. This
event serves to demonstrate how hard it is both to produce structural models of proteins,
and to train the next generation of researchers in the tacit and critical skills required for the
task. In order to situate the challenge of molecular model building in context, I locate
protein models within a history of three-dimensional modeling practices in the life
sciences. In this inquiry I pose the question: what kind of scientific object is a protein
model? In the process I aim to highlight how this study of protein modeling can contribute
to theoretical debates on visualization, representation, and practice in the science and
technology studies literature. I examine not just how protein modeling is reconfiguring the
13
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visual cultures of life science; I ask how an analysis of protein modeling can reorient the
STS literature on scientific visualization, and produce more lively accounts of life science
practice. Finally, I outline the methodological innovations this study makes for
anthropological studies of science, and provide an overview of the chapters that follow.
(Re)Folding the Threads of Life: A Brief History of Structural Biology
Today the world is messages, codes, and information.
Tomorrow what analysis will break down our objects to
reconstitute them in a new space? What new Russian doll
will emerge?
Francois Jacob, The Logic of Life, 1973
As historians and anthropologists of the biosciences have shown for the cases of genes and
cells, the identity and materiality of biological objects are transformed continuously with
shifts in the technical and discursive practices that constitute biological visualization and
interpretation.4 Such is the case with proteins: as models of proteins are amplified through
interactive digital media, and drawn into new stories about cellular life, the very nature of
these substances is currently in formation. This ethnographic study thus incorporates
historical studies of the life sciences to map the making of the protein-this intricately
crafted "material-semiotic actor" (Haraway, 1997) whose forms and functions, I argue, are
reanimating biological imaginations, and thus reconfiguring the very contours and
temporalities of "life itself."
Proteins are of course not new to the life sciences, and they never actually disappeared
from laboratories. Indeed, proteinacious substances have inhabited chemists' laboratories
4 See for example Keller (1995, 2002), Kay (2000), Haraway (1997), and Landecker (2007).
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and animated their imaginations since the late eighteenth century. Proteins have a
particularly rich history in the late-nineteenth and twentieth century life sciences." In the
1860s, TH Huxley popularized his "protoplasmic theory of life," proposing that the
unifying basis of all life-the vital material which united the plant and animal kingdom-
was the proteinacious substance of the cell that he called the "protoplasm" (Geison, 1969).
It was the irritable and contractile capacity of the protoplasm that demonstrated the vital
powers of the cell. Yet, Huxley was no vitalist: his protoplasmic theory proposed a
mechanistic view of life, in which the "vital forces" of the cell could be reduced to
mechanical, "molecular forces" (Geison, 1969: 280). By the late-nineteenth-century, the
protoplasm was already figured as a molecular substance that adhered to mechanical laws.
As Lily Kay (1993, 2000) has shown, by the 1930s Huxley's protoplasmic theory had given
way to a widespread view that proteins were the "principal substances" of life. Indeed,
through the 1930s and 1940s, and up until the determination of the structure of DNA in
1953, proteins were thought to be the material basis of heredity, and intensive effort was
invested in determining their elemental composition, chemical specificities, and cellular
activity (see Kay 1993).
Structural studies of life are also not new. Life scientists have long been interested in the
forms and structures of living bodies. Historically, structural studies of life have included
anatomy (e.g. Foucault, 1973, Kuriyama, 2002; Klestinec, 2004), developmental biology
and embryology (e.g. Keller, 1996; Hopwood, 1999, 2002), systematics and evolutionary
s See for example Abir-am (1987, 1992), Kay (1993), Cambrosio, et al. (1993), Rheinberger (1997),
Creager (2002) and de Chadarevian (2002). Tanford and Reynolds' (2001) Nature's Robots, is a
"scientists' account" of this history, and while problematic in its presentation of particular figures in
the history of this field (particularly their scathing, gender stereotyping account of Dorothy Wrinch),
it provides some valuable insights into the history of proteins in the life sciences.
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biology (e.g. Bowler, 1989; Star, 1992), and more recently, the study of cellular
"ultrastructure" with electron microscopy (Rasmussen, 1997). In ways similar to their
predecessors, contemporary structural biologists understand visualization as the key to
knowledge. Tethered to this understanding is their adherence to a mechanistic vision of
molecular life in which a protein's function is given by its form. An enduring example of
this mechanistic logic is Emil Fischer's 1885 lock-and-key model, which predicted that
enzymes performed their chemical reactions and acquired their functional specificity by
achieving "intimate contact" with substrates that had similar geometrical configurations
(Fischer quoted in Clardy, 1999: 1826; see also Cambrosio, et al., 1993). Indeed, even
today the lock-and-key model has conceptual currency in the field. As biological chemist
Jon Clardy put it in a relatively recent issue of PNAS, "No analogy has so profoundly
influenced our thinking about the joining of biological molecules as Emil Fischer's lock
and key. After a century, it still serves as an appropriate introduction to the exquisite fit that
small molecule keys have for large molecule locks" (1999: 1826). Visualizing a three-
dimensional molecular structure is thus considered to provide the access to knowledge
about its function, and the key to predicting how it "works" in the cell.
Studies that aimed to visualize protein structures were first initiated in England in the
1930s. These structural studies initially dominated the field of "molecular biology"; named
as such by mathematical physicist Warren Weaver to designate an area of research that
would bring physics to the study of life at the molecular scale (see Kay, 1993; Law, 1973).
W.T. Astbury, a biophysicist and member of the growing "protein community" in the U.K.
(Law, 1973), was among the first to popularize the field (Stent, 1968). In 1951, Astbury
insisted that "molecular biology" was to be understood as the "predominantly three-
16
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dimensional and structural" study of the biophysical and chemical properties of molecules
(cited in Stent, 1968: 390). By 1967, however, the definition of molecular biology had
already begun to change. In his widely cited lecture "That Was the Molecular Biology that
Was," Gunther Stent (1968) forecasted the decline of the structural school of molecular
biology. While Stent defended the structural school's "down-to-earth," "physical"
approach, which promoted the "idea that the physiological function of the cell" could be
understood "only in terms of the three-dimensional configuration of its elements" (1968:
391), at that time Stent did not see how these contributions could be "revolutionary to
general biology." After all, by 1967, it had taken over twenty years to determine the
structures of merely two "respiratory proteins": hemoglobin and myoglobin (ibid.). The
revolution was, according to Stent, going to be led by the "one-dimensional" or
"informational school," whose "intellectual origin" in the emerging computational cultures
of cybernetics and cryptography in the1950s and 1960s was "diametrically opposite" to
the physical understandings of molecules championed by the structural school (Stent 1968:
391; see also Kay 2000).
While structural biology did not disappear, the contributions of this field did lose traction
during the sequencing craze of the molecular genetics and genomics revolutions (see for
example Kay, 2000; Keller, 2000). During the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, a kind of
"genetic fetishism" swept over the life sciences (Haraway, 1997). The "molecular vision of
life" that took root in the wake of the determination of the genetic code was a vision that
flattened life into thin threads of genetic "information" (see Kay, 1993; 2000). However,
since the late 1990s, with the completion of the genomes of humans and other organisms,
and the ramping up of post-genomic investigations, researchers are coming up against the
17
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limitations of genetic sequence data for accessing the multi-dimensional problems that
biology poses (Kirschner, 2000).
Structural biology research is fueled by the techniques, databases, and economies (Sunder
Rajan, 2006) generated through the genomics and bioinformatics revolutions.6 Yet
proponents of a structural approach to the study of life are critical of the late-twentieth
century obsession with genes. Encouraged by biologists' almost embarrassing admission
that genes don't actually do anything in the cell,' structural biologists have invested
intensive effort in delineating forms and functions of protein molecules-the substances
genes are supposed to "encode". From a structural perspective, proteins are the enzymes
that catalyze life-sustaining chemistry; the substances that transduce signals within and
between cells; and the molecules that organize, transcribe, translate, and rewrite DNA to
produce more proteins; and the dynamic-continually cycling, growing, and retracting-
architectural support for cellular life. As structural biologists shift molecular biology
research agendas to the elucidation of protein forms and functions, they challenge gene-
centric conceptions of life, and recast the principal actors in the cell. For this new
generation of researchers, it is proteins, rather than genes, that are the key agents enacting
the story of life.
6 Large scale "proteomics" projects, modeled on the high-throughput, industrial scale technologies
and logics that organize genomics research, have been launched to facilitate biomedical research
and efforts in the area of rational drug design. See for example Abott (2000), Jones (2003), Smaglik
(2000), and Wadman (1999).
' This assertion comes from several different camps: from practicing scientists based in major
research institutes, see for example Coen (1999), Lewontin (2000), Kirschner (2000), and Harrison
(2004); as well as from a group of scientists who no longer work in laboratories, but are dedicated to
developing critiques of genetic centrism in the life sciences (see for example Goodwin, 1994;
Holdrege, 1996; Ho, 1998).
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Reconfiguring these narratives of life has required new visualization technologies to help
flesh out the story. There is, however, a yawning gap in visibility between well-articulated
DNA sequences and the pulsing vitality of protein-packed cells. Genes can be "decoded"
as one-dimensional strings of information, and cells and their substructures can be brought
to light through multidimensional microscopic techniques and genetic marker
technologies.8 However, the configurations of the large majority of the dynamic molecular
events in the cell still remain largely subvisible. Molecular forms and interactions can be
accessed indirectly through a vast array of in vitro biochemical assays and genetic
dissection techniques. Protein forms and movements, however, have for the most part been
conjectured indirectly, with the result that they are frequently rendered as amorphous
blobs in cartoon diagrams that depict hypothetical scenarios for protein activity in the
invisible depths of the cell. No longer satisfied by a reliance on genetic sequence data, or
on microscopic images to interpret biological processes, contemporary life scientists want
to visualize molecular events in the cell at atomic resolution.9
Diane Griffin,1o a young and energetic, tenured professor of chemistry at the large, east-
coast university where I conducted my research, is the head of a structural biology
8 See Keller (2002) and Myers (2005) on three- and four-dimensional cellular visualization through
confocal microscopy.
9 David Goodsell (1993, 2004) is a structural biologist employed at the Scripps Research Institute.
He has published a series of illustrated books that flesh out his vision of the "molecular machinery"
inside cells. He is also employed by the Protein Data Base to illustrate the "Molecule of the Month"
(see http://pdb.org ). Jacques Dubochet at the Universit6 de Lausanne (AI-Amoudi, et al., 2005) and
Wolfang Baumeister at the Max Planck Institute (Sali, et al., 2003) are electron microscopists who
are independently attempting to develop new techniques to render proteins visible in cells at the
atomic scale.
10 I have changed the names of all participants in this study. Others whose work I have encountered
in the literature or in public talks are named and cited.
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laboratory that solves protein structures using the techniques of X-ray crystallography. In an
interview exploring her choice to pursue a career in X-ray crystallography, she justified her
pursuit of molecular visualization-in spite of the massive technical challenges it presents
for researchers-as her desire to see into and make sense of molecular realms:
I really liked the idea of trying to understand how enzymes formed. What
did they do? How did they catalyze this reaction? What was the detailed
mechanism involved? ... I figured out that I couldn't think of working on a
project if I didn't understand what it looked like. I needed that first ... You
have to have some kind of concrete thing to start with, even if its just one
picture. At least there is something more tangible involved there. It was just
that it seemed to me that that was the starting place for science. The first
thing you ask is "What does it look like?"
According to Diane, making invisible protein structures visible turns them into "tangible,"
"concrete" entities with which she can think and work. Molecular visualization becomes a
means of interpreting the role and significance of a particular molecule in a narrative of its
biological function in the cell.
During one of her lab's weekly group meetings in the fall of 2006, Diane practiced a talk
she was about to give at an upcoming Harvard symposium on a field of research the
organizers called "chemical biology." Animated in front of her group of fifteen graduate
and undergraduate students, and postdocs, she recounted a comical experience she'd had
preparing for the talk. She knew the first thing that she had to do was to figure out what
was this thing they were calling "chemical biology". She told the group what she found
when she visited the website of a new journal, ACS (American Chemical Society) Journal
of Chemical Biology, and looked at their mission statement: "So, it said, 'If you want to
know what chemical biology is,' and I thought, yes I do! So I kept reading. But then it said,
'Well then, go to the Harvard symposium and hear the thirteen people at the leading edge
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of chemical biology talk.' And I thought, 'Oh! This isn't good!'" A huge burst of laughter
erupted from the group. Indeed, having been identified at the leading edge of this field, it
became quite clear to her that it was actually her job to define its vision.
As she began her talk, she stood facing her students at the head of a long conference table,
and gestured across the room towards a half-finished power-point slide. As she walked
through the points she would make in her talk, she laid out her approach to the
"incredible" chemistry that "nature has tailored" in living cells. Undeterred by the serious
technical challenges X-ray crystallographers like herself face in visualizing molecular
forms, she told the group that she wants to "think bigger about what we can accomplish":
Instead of solving the structure of one enzyme from a pathway, we [want
to] solve the structures of all the enzymes in the pathway, alone and in
complexes. Instead of solving the structure of one protein from a
superfamily, [we want to] solve structures of multiple members of that
family-because in the comparison you can often figure out what is truly
important in those molecules ... [We also want to use] what I call
mechanistic crystallography to solve many structures of one enzyme and
capture states as it proceeds through its reaction cycle.
Completely mapping the molecular events of even one reaction pathway for an enzyme
would be no small feat. Indeed, it is only recently that such a dream could even have been
imagined: it had taken Nobel Prize winner Max Perutz twenty-two years to determine the
atomic structure of just one protein; and when the Protein Data Bank was first founded in
1971, fewer than a dozen protein structures had been deposited. Today the PDB houses
tens of thousands of structures, "snapshots" of protein molecules at single moments of
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time, and the number is growing at an exponential rate." It offers what could be thought of
as a rich "atlas of observables" (Daston and Galison, 1992) that life science researchers
can use to compare and contrast protein structures within and between species; offering a
powerful medium through which they can train their sensibilities around protein form and
begin to piece together dynamic visions of molecular processes. But while automated
techniques, faster computers, and other technologies have now made it possible to solve
protein structures on the timescale of a PhD students' tenure in the lab, the work is still
daunting.
In this sense, Diane's message was not meant just to inspire and delight the audience at the
following week's symposium; this was a rallying call directed to the students in her
laboratory, whose shoulders will carry the weight of these ambitious goals. If this field is to
produce profoundly new visions of molecular life, Diane and her colleagues must invest
their energies in training a new generation of scientists in the skills and practices of
molecular visualization and interpretation. With this shift from reading and writing one-
dimensional genetic codes to modeling and interpreting the functions of three-dimensional
and temporally dynamic protein molecules come new practical and conceptual hurdles for
researchers and their students. Thus, it is not just the objects of biology that are being
reworked in structural biology laboratories; the scientists who constitute these objects must
also be reconfigured.
" For an inquiry into the production of models as "snapshots" and the narrative of "capture" in
structural biology discourse, see Chapters 5 and 6.
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The Great "Pentaretraction"
I approach this study from the premise that the production of protein models, and the
training of body of experts who can build and interpret them, are remarkable
achievements.'2 It is my aim to examine precisely how, in the rapidly shifting and multi-
disciplinary terrain of life science research, structural biologists are finding new ways to
"see into" molecular realms; and how they are teaching a new generation of scientists how
to see what they see, work with multidimensional data forms, and interpret their findings.
A recent scandal, characterized as "one of protein crystallography's greatest blunders" (C.
Miller, 2007: 459), helps to illuminate just what kind of an achievement it is to produce
and propagate sound structural knowledge of protein molecules.
In December 2006, Geoffrey Chang, a young and stunningly successful PI heading a
protein crystallography lab in the Department of Molecular Biology at The Scripps
Research Institute, published a letter in Science retracting five high-profile research papers
in which he and his lab had presented novel structures of a series of membrane-bound
proteins (Chang, et al., 2006: 1875). Three of the papers had been published in Science
(one in 2001, two in 2005), one in Nature (in 2006), and another in The Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences (in 2004). These retractions were in response to a paper
12 I use the term "achievement" in the sense that philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers attributes
to the notion (Stengers, n.d.) In a constructivist reading of Whitehead's philosophy, Stengers
approaches the study of science with a kind of care that recognizes the profound and particular
achievements of scientists, resisting attempts to debunk or deconstruct their approaches or findings.
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published in September 2006 in Nature by a team of Swiss researchers who provided
evidence that strongly suggested that the structures that Chang's laboratory had produced
were wrong. When Chang investigated, he was "horrified to discover" that a "homemade
data-analysis program" had "inverted" two columns of data, skewing the data and
massively contorting the structures his lab had built. This piece of software, which had
been "inherited" from another laboratory, had been used on four of the other structures he
had published (G. Miller, 2006: 1856).
Three of the protein models Chang's group had botched belonged to an "ancient family"
(G. Miller, 2006: 1856) of membrane proteins whose biological function-the active
(energy dependent) transport of molecules across cell membranes-was the object of much
scrutiny by biochemists. These proteins, in the MsbA family, are referred to as membrane
pumps, because they pump unwanted molecules out of the cell. These molecular pumps
are of "great clinical interest" (G. Miller, 2006: 1856) because they enable cells, like
bacterial and cancer cells, to continually clear unwanted substances, like anti-cancer drugs
and antibiotics, which pose a hazard to their viability. Drugs that can disable these
membrane pumps, and prevent cells from clearing these potent toxins, thus have potential
therapeutic applications for cancer treatment and for preventing the evolution of antibiotic
resistance in bacteria (see Cowen 2002, 2005 for the role of these pumps in the evolution
of drug resistance in fungi). As such they are targets for much pharmaceutical
development. Getting the structure of these proteins right is clearly a high stakes game.
When Chang published the first MsbA structure, it caused a stir among the biochemists
who had already been studying its biochemical mechanisms: the structures did not jive
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with the available biochemical evidence. But the allure of Chang's visualizations blinded
Chang's group and the reviewers in high-profile publishing industry to the "careful
[biochemical] studies published in unglamorous workaday journals" (459). As reported in
a news article that appeared with Chang's retractions in Science, Christopher Higgins a
biochemist at Imperial College London admitted that: "When the first structure came out,
we and others said, 'We really don't quite believe this is right.' It was inconsistent with a
lot of things" (G. Miller, 2006: 1856-7). Others reportedly experienced difficulties
"persuading journals to accept their biochemical studies that contradicted Chang's
structure" (1857). David Clarke at the University of Toronto had served on funding panels
were "Chang's work was influential." He suggested: "Those applications providing
preliminary results that were not in agreement with the retracted papers were given a
rough time" (ibid.). It appears as though when set next to a flashy visualization of protein
structure, claims that challenged Chang's models were "dismissed as just old-fashioned
biochemistry" (C. Miller, 2007: 459). Chang's peer-reviewed publications demonstrate the
power of a "beautiful" picture to silence even expert critics. Once published and affixed in
the literature, his structures stood unchallenged as the models of these proteins for six
years.
In January 2007, Chris Miller (2007) published a letter in Science in response to what he
called Chang's "Great Pentaretraction." He turns Chang's "devastation" (G. Miller, 2006:
1856) into a cautionary tale presenting a tough lesson in pedagogy and training for
students in the seductive arts of molecular visualization:
[W]hile an embarrassment to the authors, [it] nevertheless provides the rest
of the field with some small measure of comfort beyond mere
schadenfreude. The mistake so clearly illustrates two lessons that we aging
baby boomer professors ram down the throats of our proteomically aroused
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graduate students: (i) that those lovely colored ribbons festooning the covers
and pages of journals are just models, not data, and (ii) that you invite
disaster if you don't know what your software is actually doing down there
in the computational trenches. Students have a hard time subsuming these
dicta into their souls for two reasons: the tyranny of authority (the vanity
journals occupying the vanguard) and the inherent beauty of the
macromolecular models that emerge, as if by magic, from the user-friendly
crystallographic software accumulated over decades through the generous
labor of the field's talented reciprocal space-cadets13 ... (C. Miller, 2007:
1875).
Miller points to two key challenges crystallographers currently face in training their
excitable, easily enchanted students: how to teach them to be wary of the awesome and
dangerous beauty of the visual "facts" produced through molecular modeling; and how to
get them to think critically about how their labour-saving computer software helps them
craft these structures. In this brief manifesto, Miller tethers the problems of visualization to
problems in pedagogy and training and locates this knot at the central matter of concern
for the future of his field. I think Miller has his finger on the pulse of what is at stake in
structural biology today: how in the face of increasingly alluring graphics and augmented
automation are crystallographers able to keep their critical, craft skills alive?
A generational transition is underway in structural biology labs today. Miller and his
"aging" colleagues grew up in an era when they had to write their own codes: from the
1970s through to the late 1990s protein crystallographers developed their own algorithms
to process and visualize crystallographic data. Though she looks quite youthful, Diane
Griffin is also part of this generation: her students call her "an old school crystallographer,"
and she proudly dons this moniker. As a graduate student she wrote her own code using
13 "Reciprocal space" is a technical term for the space into which crystallographic structures are
built.
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FORTRAN: as such, she knows how her programs work, can anticipate the kinds of bugs
that are hard to avoid when writing programs, and so understands how easy it is to
introduce errors into crystallographers' massive data sets and iterative calculations. Like
others of her generation, she does not trust software to handle the data correctly: she insists
that crystallographers must be vigilant and constantly keep computed processes in check.
Today, many of the crystallographic model-building programs have been standardized and
entire suites of software have been made available to crystallographers to process and
visualize their data. Master crystallographers' (who Chris Miller refers to as "reciprocal
space-cadets") skills and labour have been "generously" given over to the software; once
embedded, they are effectively hidden and can no longer play a pedagogical role in
training future crystallographers. Working only on the surface of the user-friendly interface,
students can no longer "dig in" to the "guts" of the code,14 and thus have no idea how the
models get churned out of their computers.
Diane, like Miller, is also concerned about the seductive potential of the "inherent beauty
of the macromolecular structures," which seem to overpower students' critical faculties,
making them forget that the structures they produce are just models, not the thing itself. In
an interview about protein crystallography as a visualization practice, Diane and I
discussed how crystallographers assess the truth claims of images, given the context of a
culture in which they are constantly bombarded with visual facts. I asked her: "How do
they become critical readers of images? How do they develop the skills to be able to assess
something they are really interested in?" To this she responded:
14 See Turkle et al. (2005) for how researchers in a number of fields describe codes as the "guts" of
the computer.
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Yes, yes. That is very, very important. And I've found too that people will
take a picture as a fact in a way that they really shouldn't. Because it is just
one image, and it can move and it can change. And people come and say,
"But I thought this distance [between amino acids] was 3 angstroms' s
period." And like, that's the end of the world! "It's three point zero, zero."
You know, a structure can be incredibly valuable, but it is a model! A
model of something that moves! And that really you need to think about it,
and think about where the data came from, the quality of the data and all
these other things. And it sometimes can be too powerful, and kind of stops
people from thinking about something that they still should be thinking
about.
The seduction of visualizations was one of many themes that myself, Sherry Turkle, Joseph
Dumit, Susan Silbey, Hugh Gusterson, Yanni Loukissas, and David Mindell explored in our
collaborative NSF-funded study on computation, visualization, and changing professional
identity across fields in science, engineering, and design (see Turkle, et al., 2005). In May
2005, Diane Griffin attended one of series of meetings that we had organized for this
project. These meetings brought together life scientists, architects, nuclear weapons
designers, materials scientists, and engineers in the fields of biological, aeronautical,
astronomical, and marine research. We were interested in hearing from them how their
computer-intensive technologies were transforming visualization in their respective fields,
and where practitioners in these different fields were experiencing similar problems. In
ways that resonated with the nuclear weapons scientists and others now relying on
computer modeling, Diane expressed much anxiety over the "pretty pictures" that people
in her field could generate so easily, with all their new, "fancy" software.
The way that we usually present our X-ray data is by making Ribbon
drawings of the protein structure [see Figure 1.11, just traces the backbone
of the structure. It used to take a long time to make those pictures. If you
were presenting the initial structure, say at a meeting, where it wasn't
is An angstrom is the measurement of the distance between atoms. One Angstrom is equal to 1.0 x
10-10 meters.
28
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
published yet, it was kind of the original model and you weren't quite sure
of everything yet. The picture you would show would represent that it
wasn't really done. It wouldn't be a fancy picture yet because it would take
such a long time to make it. Now you can make it in 2 seconds, you
know...the program spits out pretty pictures and when you show that the
people go "Oh! It's all done!" And you can stand up there and say, "These
are sort of the distances but don't believe them. Big error bars! Not finished
yet! Just a rough idea!" And they'll just hold on to it and go "This is done
because look how pretty it is!" So we now on purpose make ugly figures to
show its not really done yet. Because they don't listen to you: they see it
with their eyes. [Laughing in the background] You have to show them
something ugly if you don't want them to set on this and have it be the truth
forever.
Here she spoke directly to Miller's concern with the students' seduction by the authority of
visual images presented in "vanity journals." As she recounted, it "used to take a-long
time" to make pictures. Automated software now enables crystallographers sitting at
computers to "spit out" "pretty pictures" at high speed. Once the labour of model and
image making is hastened through the fast graphics capacity of contemporary computers,
and pretty pictures are a dime a dozen, members in this field must recalibrate how they
assess visual claims to truth.
The skills Diane Griffin and Chris Miller are trying to cultivate in their students is what
could be called a critical epistemology of visualization (see Turkle, et al., 2005). Diane, for
one, has put extensive effort into educating members of her laboratory and graduate
students across her campus how to exercise their critical judgments over the data and
images that computers churn out. She wants to make sure that structural biologists-in-
training know the "dark dirty secrets of crystallography," so they can see "where structures
can go wrong." As she told me in one of our first interviews:
I do a recitation on how you evaluate a structure. And so I tell them all the
ways that they can cheat. You know, what are good statistics, and how can
you make your statistics look better when they are not good. And so, I go
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through this whole lecture on how to really evaluate a paper. And what are
the important caveats in the structures? And, you know, how do you know
what's real? How do you know what to believe? You know, part of me is on
sort of a little bit of a crusade, because I think there is a lot of wrong
information out there.
It is worth noting that it is not just the students who have to be trained to be critical
visualizers. The reviewers of Chang's papers were apparently equally seduced.
So how are protein models built? And what precisely does a crystallographer contribute to
the model building process to ensure its accuracy and prevent such blunders? It is in
attempting to build their first structures that students begin to discover just what it is they
have to bring to their data. Dehlia a fourth year PhD student in Diane's lab whose first
structures were already published in Nature, told me: "And one thing I didn't realize when
I started building is the extent that ... you have to start making executive decisions." Her
lab-mate Amy, a fifth year PhD student who had been having incredible difficulty solving
the structure of a new protein she was working on, confirmed this in a separate interview.
She emphasized that:
A lot of guesswork goes into [building a structure]. And guesswork isn't the
best word to use; maybe subjective would be the best word to use to
describe it. And that's not something you can understand until you actually
have a structure that you have done yourself, or are in the middle of doing.
The first structure I did was an easy one. I was really surprised that it was up
to me to put in [amino acid] residues. It was up to me to put the
[polypeptide] backbone in. I was just really surprised...That it was
something that I could make a mistake and no one would know. Its kind of
scary, and it makes you really wary about other structures sometimes.
Not only do they need to be able to discern where and when the computations are off,
they need to make "executive decisions" about where amino acids go in the structure,
which confirmations of atoms are energetically feasible, and which defy allowable bond
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angles or inter-atomic distances. To do their work well students must cultivate sound
judgments that demonstrate a respect for protein forms. This situation thus presents a very
steep learning curve for crystallographers-in-training, and students often make mistakes
when attempting to build their first structures. Producing sound structures requires what
Diane calls "manual thinking," set of skills that can't be relegated to computers. As such
she resists automation of what she sees as the crystallographer's irreducible contribution to
model building (see Chapter 2). In other fields of visualization, such as PET (Dumit, 2004),
automation is seen the best way to remove bias and produce objective results. In protein
crystallography however, where the automated software can't be trusted, the only way to
ensure quality data and prevent error is through constant human intervention with the
computing processes. Thus for Diane and the students she trains, crystallographic model
building continues to rely extensively on human labour. She has actually banned the use of
some automated software in her lab. Angered when she discovered that one of her students
had used this software to help build part of a model, she made the student repeat the
modeling work by hand. Her mistrust of automation was vindicated when the student
discovered that the computer program had indeed gotten the structure wrong. Automation
amounts to cheating in some ways for Diane because it sidesteps the laborious training
process necessary for crystallographers to cultivate this kind of "manual thinking," and to
develop and exercise expert judgment (see also Turkle et al., 2005).
Where Chris Miller aims to tame naive students' thirst for labour-saving automation and
their appetite for stunning visuals, he stops short of identifying precisely what the skills are
that these novices need to cultivate in order prevent bungling further structures. For me,
the Chang debacle confirms what I have found repeatedly in my research: that
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crystallographers' expert knowledge depends on a range of craft skills and tacit knowledge
that have not been successfully automated. Chang's mangled models also show that
cultivating these skills in a new generation of scientists actually constitutes a quite a
significant achievement. It is the primary aim of this study, then, to identify precisely what
these skills are, and to determine how they are propagated within structural biology
communities.
Before I introduce my approach to the formation and transfer of tacit knowledge within this
field, in the following sections I situate this ethnography within the context of an emerging
literature on models in the visual cultures of science, and studies of pedagogy and training.
Models and the Visual Cultures of Science
Philosophers and historians of science Nancy Cartwright (Cartwright et al., 1995;
Cartwright, 1997), Evelyn Fox Keller (2000b; 2002), Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison
(1999) have made vocal and well-heeded contributions to the literature on a wide array of
scientific models, including two-dimensional diagrams, flow charts, and analogical
models, among others. This work builds on movements in the history, philosophy, and
sociology of science to reorient long entrenched assumptions about science as a theory-
driven activity. These scholars aim to overturn a "semantic" view of theories which identify
models as iterations of and therefore dependent on theory. This literature, thus joins forces
with a larger body of work in the social studies of science that brings to the fore the tacit
knowledges, social negotiations, moral economies, work cultures, and figural vocabularies
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
of scientific practice."'
If it is possible to make a generalization about scientific models, it is that they are
ambivalent objects that are hard to pin down. Hacking suggests "models are doubly
models": they are both representations of theories and of phenomena (1983: 216).
Morrison and Morgan describe this dual function of models as their capacity to set up a
"relation" to their two referents: both theories and the world (1999: 25). Yet a model can
be a theoretical elaboration, an empirically informed abstraction, a "conceptual
hallucination" (Gilbert and Mulkay quoted in Lynch, 1990), or all of these at the same
time. Sergio Sismondo (1999) suggests that models and their kin (simulations) occupy a
"messy category," one that we should not try to clean up (1999: 258). Models spread out
across a "continuum" of possible forms and functions and "cut across boundaries of pure
categories": they are "monsters necessary to mediate between worlds that cannot stand on
their own, or that are unmanageable." (1999: 247).
Three-dimensional models are another species entirely. More than visual traces, marks or
inscriptions, three-dimensional models explicitly blur the boundaries between automated
machinic productions and the skilled work of scientists. Counter to the myths of
disembodied "mechanical objectivity" that tend to pervade scientists' accounts of
visualization practices (Haraway, 1991; Daston and Galison, 1992), three-dimensional
modeling practices make explicit scientists' creative and embodied contributions to
visualizing life. They also disrupt assumed binaries between the intellectual and physical
16 See for example: Collins (1985), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Lynch and Woolgar (1990), Kohler
(1994), Galison (1997), Haraway (1997), Mol (2002), Prentice (2005), and Suchman (2007) among
many others.
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labour of research: in practice, three-dimensional models are improvised, handcrafted
artifacts that articulate scientists' intuitions and observations; they are recursively made and
remade in attempts to conceptualize and actualize new hypotheses and new modes of
inquiry. Moreover, three-dimensional models-whether physical or virtual--are malleable,
interactive objects. In other words, these models demand corporeal engagement; and it is
in a modeler's entanglements with a model that both the model and the modeler's
imagination are subject to continual transformation. I argue that modeling practices
challenge narrow conceptions of "thinking" as a cerebral activity, and make visible how
craftwork, creativity, and modes of embodiment are central to scientific reasoning. As I
examine more closely below, models also open up new insights into the foundational role
of teaching and learning in the making of both science and scientists.
Pedagogy and Cultures of Model-making
The problems of pedagogy and training in structural biology are salient at this moment
when educators and researchers in this rapidly expanding field struggle to find ways to
introduce protein structures into classrooms and innovate molecular visualization
techniques in the laboratory. They are involved not so much in the task of "generational
reproduction," as in a kind of generational innovation-training students in a body of
knowledge and skills, and through pedagogical regimes that are distinct from those that
characterized their own disciplinary formation.
Until recently, historians have largely regarded three-dimensional models as "mere"
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"memory tools" or "mneumotechnical devices" 17 that aid in teaching and learning, with
little to offer scientific research. The low status of models in the historical and social
studies of science literature reflects a general lack of interest in pedagogy and training in
science.1" In an attempt to recuperate a lost history, recently several scholars have
endeavored to resuscitate models as lively objects in research contexts."1 These scholars
have shown how scientists rely on models as objects-to-think-with: models are the skilled
craft products of scientists' observations and intuitions; they are continually built and
rebuilt in attempts to produce new insight and new ways of knowing.
And yet, with the notable exception of David Kaiser's (2005a) study of the dispersion of
Feynman diagrams in postwar physics, few studies have cultivated an interest in the lives
of models as pedagogical tools. With Kaiser, I assert that physical and virtual models,
diagrams, analogies and animations are essential tools, not only for research, but also for
teaching; and that pedagogy and training are vital to the scientific enterprise. There is
much to learn from analyses of how life scientists teach each other how and what to see,
and how to apply techniques and technologies to model and remodel life. It is insights
17 The term "mneumotechnical device" is used in Cambriosio, et al. (1993: 681), to describe models
as tools used to aid the memory.
18 For notable exceptions see Kaiser (2005a, b) and Warwick (2003). Other studies have shed much
insight into this arena. In the STS literature, pedagogy studies have focused on various themes,
including: trajectories of training (e.g. Traweek, 1988); the "moral economies" of laboratories and
apprenticeship training (e.g. Kohler, 1994); disciplinary formation (e.g. Bourdieu, 1990; Fleck, 1979;
Foucault, 1995; Kuhn, 1996; Keating et al., 1992; Maienschein, 1991); the stabilization and
dispersion of knowledge and tools through pedagogical and institutional networks (e.g. Clarke and
Fujimura, 1992; Kaiser, 2005a; 2005b); the physicality of scientific training and theoretical work
(e.g. Kaiser, 2005a; Warwick, 2003); the inculcation of tacit and craft knowledge (e.g. Bourdieu,
1998, 2004; Collins, 1985; Latour, 2004; Olesko, 1993; Polanyi, 1958; Warwick and Kaiser, 2005);
and the problems of generational reproduction (e.g. Gusterson 2005).
19 See for example Francoeur (2000), Hopwood (1999), de Chadarevian and Hopwood (2004),
Cambrosio, et al. (1993), and Keller (2002).
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into pedagogy and training that can help shed light on the formation of the visual and
practical cultures that give body to science.
In an illuminating analysis of the varied cultures of modeling in twentieth century biology,
Evelyn Fox Keller (2002) demonstrates the historical instability of models as explanatory
systems that aim to account for biological phenomena. She explores a number of model-
making traditions in the history of biology, and shows how members of this diverse
research community distinguished themselves by their use of particular kinds of models
and explanatory frameworks. Her analysis shows that models have been at the center of
debates among scientists struggling to assert the legitimacy of their techniques. Through an
account of variations in modeling practices, she poses the question: What kinds of
evidence could count as an explanation of a phenomenon at different points in the history
of biology? She situates the wide diversity of models within the context of shifting
explanatory frameworks that governed which kinds of models were accepted, contested or
ignored. For Keller, it is the variability in the criteria of what could count as an explanation
that is of historical and philosophical interest. For her, these criteria are determined by the
specific "needs" of scientific communities, and it is this set of needs that circumscribe what
she calls "epistemological cultures." For her, an epistemological culture is made up of
"the norms and mores of a particular group of scientists that underlie the particular
meanings they give to words like theory, knowledge, explanation, and understanding, and
even to the concept of practice itself" (2002: 4). Epistemological cultures are then, distinct
communities who share practices and knowledges, including visualization techniques and
criteria for the adjudication of scientific evidence.
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
It is at this juncture, the branching off of distinct epistemological cultures, that questions of
pedagogy and training gain import for social studies of science. What is the process by
which researchers-in-training become oriented with an epistemological culture? In the
present study of structural biology communities, I am interested in the formation of
epistemological cultures and the forging of professional identities through training regimes
that inculcate students in particular ways of seeing and knowing. In the present study, I
examine the formation of epistemological cultures-cultures of seeing and knowing-
around protein modeling techniques. I draw on Kaiser's (2005a) study of the introduction
of new theoretical tools in physics as a guide for examining the introduction and
disciplinary installation of new visualization practices in structural biology. As Kaiser
shows, Feynman diagrams depended on pedagogical "dispersion" before they could attain
wider use and consistent interpretation; and in the context of institutional expansion in
cold-war physics education, science educators were actively involved in stabilizing and
relaying these visual theoretical tools through pedagogical networks. Writing with historian
of science Andrew Warwick, Kaiser proposes that Michel Foucault's (1973, 1995) insights
into "institutional gazes, bodies, gestures, architectures, routines, incitements,
examinations, and punishments" can be extended to examine regimes of training in the
making of scientists (Warwick and Kaiser, 2005: 402-3). Foucault's articulation of the
productivity of power makes it possible to track the "positive economy" of training and
discipline-that is, how regimes of "institutionalized training" shape both the students'
bodies and the very grounds of knowledge taught (399). New subjectivities and new
knowledge, as well as new institutional forms, are produced in the process. My study in
turn examines how protein visualizations and discourses are propagated and stabilized in
classrooms and laboratories at a unique moment, when-enticed by the promise of drug
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discovery and biomedical innovation, and fueled by a post-genomic funding regime that
has boosted interest and investment in the life sciences-a multi-disciplinary group of
researchers are converging on protein structures. As they render protein forms through
multidimensional interactive digital media, they are also producing a new generation of
scientists with a new vision and feel for molecular life.
Modeling Bodies:
Three-Dimensional Models in the History of the Life Sciences
What kind of scientific object is a molecular model of a protein? I begin this inquiry by
locating protein models in a growing literature on three-dimensional models in the history
of the life sciences. Contemporary practices of molecular modeling can be included
among older traditions of three-dimensional model-making which have thrived throughout
the history of the life sciences. This long and varied history of the construction and use of
three-dimensional models has recently captured the attention of scholars tracking the
material cultures of the sciences (e.g. See for example Haraway, 1989; Daston, 2003; de
Chadarevian and Hopwood, 2004; Hopwood, 1999; Francoeur, 1997; and Star, 1992).
Three-dimensional models are essential visualization tools for teaching, learning and
research in the life sciences. Familiar examples of these include models of animals and
plants preserved in natural history museums, and those used for teaching and research in
anatomy, embryology, and evolutionary biology. The enduring materiality of these models
(and their stabilization through the institutional structure of museum culture) ensured
maximal access to specimens not otherwise available. In the domain of natural history, the
scientific purpose of these models was the precise characterization and display of natural
forms in reproductions that could demonstrate taxonomic classification schemes, theories
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of evolution, and morphological specificity. The kind of representational accuracy sought
in such models of animals and plants was descriptive. It is assumed that it is by virtue of
their power to replicate or simulate the likeness of a given phenomenon that these models
functioned as scientific models. However, as I shall suggest below, it is also their
representational power that rendered their status as scientific objects vulnerable.
Many of these three-dimensional models can be seen to fit within a tradition that some
have called "mimetic modeling." In Image and Logic, Peter Galison (1997) describes how
the "image tradition" in particle physics originated within a practice of "mimetic"
experimentation. Physicists brought the "morphological sciences" of cloud formation into
the laboratory through attempts to mimic the properties and processes of atmospheric
phenomena, reproducing them in cloud chambers in the laboratory (1997: 80-91). In this
particular permutation of physics culture, "seeing" and "believing" were intimately
entwined. Providing what Galison calls a "homomorphic" representation of the process,
these mimetic models evoked in the viewer a sense of equivalence between the model and
phenomenon (106). Within the mimetic tradition that Galison describes, the measure of an
effective model was its verisimilitude, its likeness to the phenomenon under investigation.
Thus, the explanatory force of the cloud chamber experiments was bound up in its
capacity to successfully mimic natural processes (69): it was in this "similarity relation"
(Morrison and Morgan, 1999: 29) between world and model, that the cloud chamber
could produce evidence for theories about cloud formation. As other examples of mimetic
models show, it was the similarity relation of the model to the thing modeled that provided
experimental proof of the theory in question (see also Keller, 2002).
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In her study of the shifting institutional organization of natural history museums, Susan
Leigh Star (1992) quotes a turn-of-the-twentieth-century taxidermist attesting that his task
was "not to depict the mere outline of an animal on paper or canvas and represent its
covering of hair, feathers or scales." This would imply a reduction or abstraction of the
phenomenon. Rather, it was his work "to impart to a shapeless skin the exact size, the
form, the attitude, the look of life" (quoted in Star, 1992: 262). Taxidermy is a good
example of what James Griesemer calls "remnant modeling," where the skins of the very
animals modeled are stuffed and posed to mimic lively bodies. He suggests that such
models are able to "serve certain sorts of theoretical functions more easily than abstract
formal [models] by virtue of their material link to the phenomena under scientific
investigation" (1990: 80).
Lorraine Daston includes taxidermy in a larger modeling tradition she calls "extreme
mimesis" (2003: 31), a tradition which, for her, is best exemplified by The Glass Flowers,
an extensive set of exquisitely crafted botanical models produced by glassblowers Leopold
Blaschka (1822-1895) and his son Rudolf Blaschka (1857-1939) between the years 1886
and 1936 under commission from Harvard University. As replicas of botanical forms, these
models were nearly flawless. Daston, admiring their craftsmanship, remarks "though the
actual deception of appearance taken for reality lasts only for a moment, the pleasure of
potential deception lingers long" (2003: 8). It was this ability to deceive the viewer into
believing that the model was the thing it represented that seems to have defined the
potency of such models as scientific objects. However, these were also objects whose
status as works of science had been most difficult to defend. Models that embody such
extreme mimesis have tended to get caught between traditions of art and science, between
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the designations of artisanal objects and scientific tools. Daston suggests that there was
indeed a time in the history of biology when "the verisimilitude that is called illusionism in
art" could become "scientific accuracy" (2003: 8). As I discuss below, it is partly because
of their association as works of art, that mimetic models such as these now occupy the
most ambiguous category of scientific models.
For Morrison and Morgan, effective models are "renderings," not mimetic "reflections" of
phenomena (1999: 27). As their examples from physics and economics demonstrate, the
measure of a model is not its approximation of reality: its legitimacy is derived from its
usefulness, by how it "performs" in its applied context (1999: 28). Thus it is the use of a
model as a tool in scientific research that determines its status as a scientific object; for
them, the usefulness of a model is derived from its function of abstraction, its ability to
eliminate extraneous details, to pare down the phenomena to its essential features.2' As in
physics and economics, examples of such renderings can be seen in wide use through the
history of biology in the form of mathematical models, diagrams, flow charts, and cartoons.
Such renderings are effective, in their view, because they balance representational and
instrumental features. Thus as "realistic," multi-dimensional forms, mimetic models doubly
defy the kind of abstraction, efficiency, and ease of movement that would make them
useful as scientific tools. They do not conform to Bruno Latour's "immutable mobiles," that
range of flattening inscription practices that promise efficiency in their movement through
networks, and deftness in mobilizing allies to resolve arguments over scientific claims. 2 1
20 See for example Lynch (1991); Morgan and Morrison (1999); Rheinberger (1997).
21 For analyses of how the widespread practices of three-dimensional modeling in biology opens up
a critique of Latourian analysis, see Hopwood (1999) and Francoeur (2000).
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Mimetic modeling thus introduces a mutation into our contemporary expectations of the
function of models. It would seem that a model as complex as the phenomena it stands in
for would be counter-productive to the analytical work of science.
Indeed, mimetic models did not perform well under such demands. Star's exploration of
taxidermy shows that the American life sciences underwent a dramatic shift at the turn of
the century towards experimental, physiological research, moving "away from realist
representations of nature, and away from concrete instantiations of nature's panopoly"
(Star, 1992: 261). Because mimetic models could not parse phenomena into abstract
elements, they were assumed to function primarily as memory devices or teaching aids.
The models were deemed less useful as heuristic devices or tools in research; they worked
better as demonstrations of preexisting theory or as physical instantiations of classification
schemes. As such, they came to be seen as ineffective mediators within the context of
experimental biology, and were relegated to the status of pedagogical objects for public
instruction. Today they are more readily seen as curious objects of art. Star suggests that
one of the reasons for this was the institutionalized division of labour between
professionalized scientists and amateur modelers, a division of labour that rendered the
producers of these models craftspeople and artisans, rather than scientists (1992: 261).
While such divisions of labour may have represented the institutionalized status quo, they
also served to elide the artisans' contributions to science.
How is it, then, that protein models have such high status in the life sciences today? Are
structural biologists not merely glorified artisans caught up in the scientifically useless task
of producing yet further instantiations of "nature's panopoly"? How can a model depicting
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the precise location of thousands of atoms--a model as complex as the molecule it is
supposed to represent-be used to do analytic work? I suggest that the answers to these
questions require examining how model-building practices are themselves a kind of
scientific work. I am particularly interested in what shifts when concerns about the
representational status of these models are held in abeyance. Rather than adjudicating
models according to their representational power, that is, how well they represent nature, I
want to examine what else, other than likeness, is generated in the process of building
models. How do these models do more then represent nature? How do they animate
imaginations, and generate knowledge in their very construction and use? I propose
approaching models through the idiom of "enactment" (see Mol, 2002; Barad, 2003) to
explore what forms of life are brought into being in the process of building and using
models. I do this by paying attention to how three-dimensional models are crafted, and the
forms of knowing that are conjured in the process. My first step however, is to take a look
at how discourses of representation tend to elide the work of the modeler, by focusing on
the end product, rather than what is produced in the modeling process.
Representations or Renderings of Nature?
[Tihe term "model" is probably best understood as a verb,
with the authors as subject, and the experiments and the
conceptual schematic as a single, unparseable, composite
object. Only at the end of the process do we have a separate
entity-a model as a noun...
Evelyn Fox Keller22
Is an atomic-resolution model of a protein also a mimetic model? Like the mimetic models
22 See Keller (2000b: S82).
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described above, molecular models are supposed to represent the precise configuration of
atoms in a protein molecule. There is, however an important distinction: unlike the other
three-dimensional models, protein models lack a visible referent. The atomic structures,
textures, and other physical qualities of protein molecules are not visible in the same ways
that macroscopic or even microscopic phenomena are available for inspection and
corroboration. Even high-powered electron microscopes don't offer "direct" views of
protein molecules.23 Thus, there is no available visible referent, no tangible molecule
against which the likeness of the model can be measured. Molecular models are thus, in
many senses, "made up." 24
Max Perutz, a Nobel Prize winning crystallographer recounted a fascinating moment of
slippage when a molecular model was interpreted as a mimetic representation of
molecular worlds. He recounts a story about how he and his colleagues from the
Laboratory for Molecular Biology in Cambridge presented their famous molecular models
of DNA and proteins to the Queen of England. "When we proudly showed [the models to]
the Queen and her party, one of her Ladies-in-Waiting exclaimed: 'Oh, I had no idea we
have all those little coloured balls inside us!' "25 Seduced, this unwitting "Lady" mistook the
models for life-like representations, as if they were true-to-life amplifications of the very
material substances in her body. Perutz narrates a comedic scene that pokes fun at-and
simultaneously solidifies-anxieties about the risks involved in producing models that
23 Direct vision, is of course a ruse. Ian Hacking (1983) for one insists that you can't actually see
through a microscope: you see with it. Keller's (1996) essay "The Biological Gaze" develops
Hacking's thesis of representation as intervention further for the field of biological microscopy.
24 See Hacking's (1986) essay "Making Up People".
25 Perutz (n.d.) "The Medical Research Council Laboratory of Molecular Biology."
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could seduce unwary viewers into believing that they are mimetic representations. The
Ladies-in-Waiting are like the naive students and peer-reviewers that Miller wants to
educate against the seductive power of visual facts. What he attempts to "ram down the
throats" of his "proteomically aroused" students is that a protein model is only ever just a
model. It is at its barest a set of atomic coordinates, points in space that are overlaid by a
range of colourful diagrammatic conventions that instruct the viewer in how to look and
how to interact with the data in different ways. So, while a protein model is supposed to
accurately define the atomic coordinates of a molecular structure, it does not provide
viewer seamless visual access to molecular realms.
Thus, where a mimetic model of an animal of plant could produce what Daston refers to as
the "pleasure of potential deception" (the moment where a viewer might mistake the glass
flower for the thing itself), this is not the case for molecular models of proteins. The
pleasure is curtailed by rampant anxieties among members of the structural biology
community about the dangers of potential seduction: their primary concern is that, like the
Ladies-in-Waiting, nal've viewers could be seduced into believing that molecules actually
resemble the model. Evaluating protein models within the idiom of representation thus
leads invariably to a discourse bound up with anxieties about how molecular
representations (including notational conventions, and the particular media used to model
proteins) can overdetermine the look and feel of otherwise subvisible molecular worlds.
Though their status as research objects has been questioned, the mimetic models described
above are indeed powerful representations of nature: they could, as proxies, stand in for
otherwise absent living bodies, and re-present the artful forms of nature. Yet as
45
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
representations, they are what Keller calls "models as nouns", "separate entities" at the
"end of the process" of modeling. In my view, protein models are more than
"representations of" molecules, and more than "representations of" scientific knowledge.
My aim is to theorize models outside of the idiom of representation, so that they can be
seen, not just as objects that stand in for phenomena, but as forms of knowing, as
knowledge in-the-making. I am interested in the way that three-dimensional models do not
represent things, as much as enact them, and in the process produce new forms of
knowing for the modeler. My first move, then, is to reexamine "models as verbs" rather
than as end-state representations. One way to effect this move is to shift from a discourse
of representation-which too easily slips into the realm of "model as noun"-to one of
rendering, an idiom which can gather up the modeler and their media, and make tangible
the very activity of modeling.
Thus, my sense is that if protein models are regarded merely as end-stage representations
of molecules, then they certainly do have the power to seduce uncritical viewers.
However, I'd like to re-read Perutz's account of his presentation of his models to the
Queen outside of the idiom of representation. While his script perpetuates gendered roles
for the uncritical, impressionable (female) viewer, and the expert (male) scientist, there is
an important difference between the expert modeler and the novice viewer that deserves to
be explored further. Where the Lady-in-Waiting mistook the model for the thing itself, it
should be noted that "no chemist" worth their mettle "would propose that models, even in
their more elaborate forms, are about what molecules 'really' look like" (Francoeur, 1997:
12). As historian of chemistry, Eric Francoeur (2000) suggests, in the hands of expert
crystallographers, molecular models operate through "homology" rather than
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"homomorphy" (64)26; that is, they indicate forms and relations between elements, rather
than replicating the look and feel of the object. How, then, is it that these models can
operate so differently in the hands of their makers? What might account for this difference?
I propose that seen as verbs, as visualizations-in-the-making, models are not necessarily
dangerous seductions, but powerful "lures" that can entangle and entrain their modelers'
bodies and imaginations, and entice them into new visions of molecular worlds.27 As such
models are potent training devices; and modeling practices become, then, means for
training novice researchers how to look, how to feel, and what to care about in the
molecular realm. 28
As my dictionary reminds me, the term rendering is multivalent. A rendering can indeed be
a representation of something, as in a translation, a work of art, or a detailed architectural
drawing. But a rendering is not just an object that can stand in for something else;
rendering as a verb is also the activity of producing these representations. In this active
sense of the term, a rendering can be a performance, as in the rendering of a play or
musical score. In this sense, renderings can carry the mark of the artist, such that as the
performer enacts it, a musical score is inflected with unique tones, textures and affects.
Another use of the term is in the field of computer modeling, where a rendering is "the
processing of an outline image using colour and shading to make it appear solid and three-
26 Francoeur develops Peter Galison's terms "homomorphy" and "homology" in relation to the
representation function of molecular models. See Francoeur (2000).
27 On abstractions as "lures" see Isabelle Stengers (1999; n.d.). For a fuller description of models as
lures, beyond of the representational context of deception and seduction, see Chapter 2 of this
study.
28 See Maria Puig de la Bellacasa (forthcoming) on how "thinking with care" can transform feminist
ethics and politics. I am particularly interested in tracking how scientists think and work with care,
and how this approach can transform ethnographic accounts of their practice.
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dimensional" (Oxford American Dictionary). In this sense, a rendering is the modeler's
elaboration, addition, or augmentation of a simpler thing. To render is also to provide,
hand over, or submit (as in to render up a verdict or a document), each of which are
performative gestures that pass an object or communication from one person towards
another. Heard in a different register, to render is also to tear, or rip things apart. In a lively
discussion about rendering practices among an interdisciplinary gathering of life scientists,
architects, engineers and anthropologists, Sherry Turkle interjected: "My grandmother used
the term rendering to describe what she did to chicken fat!" Indeed, to render is also to
"melt down," to process and separate, as in rendering fat from bone, and extracting
proteins, and other usable parts from an animal carcass. What holds all of these diverse
uses of the term together is that each refers not just to the object that is rendered, but also
to the subject, the one who renders, and the activity of rendering.
As the skillful productions of highly trained craftspeople, mimetic models do more than
just represent nature: they are renderings that refer back to their modelers. In this regard,
Leigh Star (1992) is careful to document the intense and "messy" work involved in the
production of the "look of life" in dead animals; and like Star, Daston (2003) also
emphasizes the labour, artisanal skills and craftsmanship that went into constructing the
Glass Flowers. Yet, precisely how does the modeler interact with their media? What kinds
of insights and what kinds of learning are generated as the modeler works between objects,
theories, modeling media, and machines in the model-building process? I ask: If a modeler
who renders nature in three-dimensions aims to conjure likenesses of natural form, what
else do they engender in the process?
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Nick Hopwood's (1999) treatment of the history of late-nineteenth century embryological
modeling practices provides a key to this question. Hopwood documents embryologist
Wilhelm His's (1831-1904) techniques for sculpting scale models of embryos in wax. In
defense of a mechanical theory of embryological development, His had developed a
method for precisely reconstructing the form of embryos from the details derived from
microscopic examination of tissue slices. Using a microtome (the invention for which His
is most renowned), projective drafting techniques and freehand wax sculpture, His worked
the sectioned images into exquisite three-dimensional form. This was a craft that
demanded much artisanal skill. His promoted embryological research as active work that
enlisted the scientist's eyes, mind, and hands. His scale models aimed for a "more direct
bodily apprehension of form" (1999: 482); this would enable the modeler to build up a
"three dimensional mental image," and the value in this for His was that "the pictures in
the memory that have once made their way through the hand stick much more firmly in
the head" (quoted in Hopwood, 1999: 483). Hopwood sees His's commitment to modeling
as "a passionate argument for doubly embodied knowledge" (1999: 482). In Hopwood's
reading, His's insight into the mechanical processes of embryogenesis was gained through
the physicality of building models. His "had first to make his problem, to use his fingers",
and it was by this method that he was able to "'to give body' to his views". In giving
material form to the embryos he also "gave body" to his theory. In the process His
developed an embodied knowledge of the phenomenon in the practice of making models,
such that that the problem of development became familiar to his body. As Hopwood
argues, it was "the experience of modeling" that was "the most compelling evidence of the
importance of mechanical principles in development" (Hopwood, 1999: 466). His thus
learned the mechanical forces of embryogenesis by working with the forces of physical
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materials, and with the physics of his body.
Caught up in the interactive physicality of model building, His became entangled in the
modeling media: he worked over the wax to sculpt embryological forms; and the media, in
turn, worked over his body and his imagination. As Hopwood demonstrates, three-
dimensional model building is a kind of corporeal and imaginative performance that trains
the modeler's body. In this sense, His's models were not merely representations of
embryos, or representations of knowledge; his models were performances as knowledge. In
other words, His's models were enactments, which, in-the-making, engendered new forms
of knowing.
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists:
Forms of Knowing in Structural Biology
Hopwood's insights into His's three-dimensional wax modeling techniques have import for
thinking through the skills and knowledge structural biologists gain building protein
models through interactive computer graphics. In this study I argue that protein
crystallography, and structural biology more generally, are exemplary fields for tracking the
formation and transfer of tacit knowledge and craft skills in science. The task of
constructing models, and interpreting the structures and functions proteins is not
straightforward. In interviews, structural biologists have emphasized that it is "hard" to
"learn how to think intelligently about structure," and to acquire the skills to "see what the
structure is saying." This kind of expertise is especially difficult to cultivate in novice
students. While formalized chemical and physical laws do inform their work, structural
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biologists must also draw on a realm of knowledge that has not been codified in order
build and interpret structures. In addition to understanding how computer algorithms are
crunching their data, students must learn how to visualize and analyze biochemical
structures as objects that take up space and move in time. They have to learn how to make
sense of these structures and hypothesize what it is proteins are up to in the cell: how it is
that they perform their chemistry and physically interact with each other and with other
molecules. This is a daunting task; these "massive," dynamic molecules are made up of
thousands of atoms. Therefore, in their classrooms and laboratories, structural biologists
must find ways to cultivate a feeling for the protein in their students (see Chapter 2).
In the present study, I explore how structural biologists acquire this feeling for molecular
form. I examine three intertwined processes: the forms of knowledge generated as
researchers build models of protein molecules; the modes through which this knowledge is
propagated between and among researchers and their students; and the formation of
professional identities around the construction and interpretation of these models as visual
facts. I show how classrooms and laboratories are becoming sites for training a new kind of
scientist whose forms of knowing are attuned to the chemical affinities, physical forces,
and movements of protein structures, and keyed to the tangible logic and rhetoric of a
mechanistic, though surprisingly lively vision of molecular life. I argue that protein
visualization and interpretation relies heavily on a set of practices that I describe as the
"body-work" of modeling in structural biology. I explore how researchers' bodies become
key resources in producing knowledge about protein structure, and in propagating such
forms of knowing between and among researchers and students. Several modes of body-
work are at play in structural biology. They include forms of kinesthetic knowledge gained
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in the process of building and manipulating molecular models through various media,
including physical and virtual forms. Researchers also use their bodies as experimental
media, performing not only thought experiments but what could be thought of as "body
experiments": their bodies become mimetic media to help them figure out how proteins
move and interact. A third mode of embodied reasoning includes researchers' application
of narrative strategies that assume a teleological relationship between form and function,
and which figure-and so give form to-proteins through analogies with familiar human-
scale phenomena. Narrated and visualized within in the realm of physical, embodied
experience, proteins take form onscreen, in language, and in experiment in two distinct,
though often overlapping registers: as both "lively bodies" and as "machines." The body-
work of modeling in structural biology, then, is an entwined "material-semiotic" practice
(Haraway, 1997) for producing and propagating knowledge about molecular forms. By
examining protein models as renderings, I can track the production of new forms of
knowing and regimes of training to shed light on both the making of a new kind of science,
and a new kind of scientist.
Ethnographic Forms of Knowing:
Accounts of Gesture and Affect Among Protein Modelers
If ideas cannot be comprehended without a history of the
gestural knowledge and the objects through which they
came to be expressed, and to which the terms of their
expression most directly refer, then history of scientific ideas
is a poor history indeed.
James Griesemer, 2004
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Philosopher and historian of biology James Griesemer (2004) notes that accounts of three-
dimensional modeling practices must include a history of the "gestural knowledge"
through which models are made and used. Studies of scientific representations, then, need
to take into account the enactment of models: the "gestural as well as symbolic knowledge
and the variety of means and modes of making, experiencing, and using models" (435).
This concern with the kinesthetic knowledge generated by building and using three-
dimensional models poses a methodological challenge for studies of pedagogy and
visualization in structural biology. Protein structures and functions not only can't be
reduced to metaphors of code for the scientist, their production and deployment can't be
fully captured in the texts scientists write. Accessing the visual cultures of structural biology
thus requires attending to the dynamics of researchers' bodies engaged in the enactment of
molecular models.
I argue that visualization in structural biology is inherently performative.2 9 Structural
biologists communicate the fine structures of three-dimensional and temporal objects to
their colleagues and students in several ways: by animating their models onscreen using
interactive computer graphics; and by pulling the models off the screen and animating
them through gestures and affects, using their bodies as mimetic models to articulate and
relay the forms and movements of the molecule. Such extra-textual descriptions of
molecules come alive in formal talks, class lectures and informal communication between
researchers within and outside of the laboratory. These modes of body-work facilitate
communication, and at the same time they provide a means by which researchers can use
29 On performance in science see Barad (2003), Doyle (2003), Mol (2002), Latour (2004), Pickering
(1993), Herzig (2004), and Prentice (2005).
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their bodies to "figure out" and hypothesize how proteins might fold and interact with each
other (a practice that is both enabling and constraining for how they imagine molecular
worlds). I suggest that molecules can become visible-and, indeed, palpable and
thinkable-when structural biologists build and use models. Thus, structural biologists not
only "do things with words," in the sense that Austin (1975) defined "the performative,"
they craft expert modes of communication and reasoning through gesture and body-work
(on performativity see Butler, 1993; Goffman, 1959; Phelan, 1993; Rotman, n.d.;
Sedgwick, 2003). Moreover, they enroll a new generation of life scientists in these forms of
knowing, by tacitly and explicitly training their students in these subtle modes of
communication through body-work.
This study offers a contribution to methodological innovations in the growing body of
literature in the anthropology of scientific practice30. The central objects of life science
research are no longer flat or static. As the objects in life science change, so must the
methods of the analyst. Geertz's (1973) call to attend to the many layers of expression and
communication in cultural practice, is especially salient for this study which aims for a
"thick description" of the interpretive practices of structural biologists. For Bourdieu
(1977), studies of practice require going beyond an "objectifying standpoint which grasps
practices from outside, as a fait accompli" (1977: 4). He aims, rather, to develop an
ethnographic technique that can emulate the "generative principle" of a practice by
"situating" the ethnographer "within the very movement" of its "accomplishment" (ibid.).
30 See for example Downey and Dumit (1997), Dumit (2004), Franklin (1998), Franklin and Lock,
(2003), Gusterson (1996), Hayden (2003), Heath (1998), Helmreich (1998, forthcoming), Knorr-
Cetina (1999), Latour (1986, 1987), Lock (2002), Rabinow (1996), Sunder Rajan (2006), Thompson,
(2005), and Traweek (1988).
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Refusing "second order" abstractions that elide temporality and turn practice into an
analytic object, such methods aim to account for the strategies, improvisations, and slips,
and the rhythms, tempo, and orientations of practice "on the ground" (ibid.: 5-8). Such
methods attune my attention to the performance or enactment of scientific knowledge in
practices of teaching, learning, and visualization.
This study proposes a new approach for STS analyses of the performance of scientific
knowledge-a method that can document and analyze the body-work of visualization,
interpretation and communication among practicing scientists. Tracking the performance
of models demands methods that can document the dynamic interplay of models, bodies,
and imaginations. To communicate their multi-sensate molecular knowledge, structural
biologists (including X-ray crystallographers, protein folding researchers, and biological
engineers) often perform the structures and movements of their proteins through elaborate
gestural forms. Using their entire bodies, including hands, arms, shoulders, head, neck,
torsos, and even legs, they can articulate and relay their intimate knowledge of molecular
forms and movements. Erving Goffman (2001) has suggested that conducting such a study
would demand that the ethnographer "tune" his or her body "in" to the daily activities and
practices of those they study; a practice that requires subjecting one's own body to gain a
richer interpretation of the plays of affect, gesture and language in the field (154-155). In
order to tune myself into and parse the dense thicket of "figural vocabularies," gestural
knowledge, and tacit practices, I draw on over 25 years of training in classical and modern
dance. This expertise gives me the skills to attend closely to others' corporeal techniques,
and enables me to draw on my own affinity for movement in order to detect, recall, and
relay researchers' subtle bodily affects, including the tempos, rhythms, and tones that
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propagate through their performances of protein models. As a situated knowledge practice,
my analysis thus makes no attempt to mask the ways in which I move with and am moved
by the life scientists I study.
Chapter Overview
This study is laid out in six chapters, each of which builds on ideas fleshed out in the
others, to address a range of themes on pedagogy and visual cultures in structural biology.
Each chapter approaches the topic from a different angle, diffracting my ethnographic
fieldwork in structural biology through a different crystalline array of histories and theories
of modeling, embodiment, practice, and performance in science.
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 "Molecular Embodiments and the Body-work of
Modeling in Protein Crystallography,"31 builds on both ethnographic observations of
contemporary protein crystallographers and historical accounts of early molecular
modeling techniques to examine the body-work of crystallographic model building. In this
chapter, I pay special attention to the media used for building crystallographic models and
the corporeal practices through which modelers learn the intricate structures of protein
molecules. I show how, in the process of building and manipulating protein models,
crystallographers also sculpt embodied models alongside the digital renderings they craft
onscreen. I explore how crystallographic modeling at the computer interface is thus not
only a means of producing representations of proteins; it is also means of training novice
3' This chapter is forthcoming as an article in Social Studies of Science. See Myers (forthcoming a).
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crystallographers' bodies and imaginations. I examine how protein crystallographers'
molecular embodiments offer a site for posing a new range of questions for studies of the
visual cultures and knowledge practices in the computer-mediated life sciences.
Chapter 3, "Performing the Protein Fold: The Pedagogical Lives of Molecular Models," 32
explores the relations among teaching, learning, and imagination in science. I examine
how structural biologists approach teaching as a means to articulate their students'
embodied imaginations of molecular forms. Moving from the emphasis on
crystallographers-in-training in the laboratory (Chapter 2), this chapter shifts to examine
pedagogical practices in the setting of an undergraduate classroom. In this chapter I am
concerned with the formation of molecular imaginaries in those who have not yet gained
access to expert knowledge. As an ethnographic observer in an undergraduate lecture
course on protein folding, I show what the instructors must do in order to communicate
their tacit knowledge of protein forms and movements to their students. I examine several
pedagogical techniques, including: the instructors' use of human-scale analogies to lure
students into molecular worlds; their performance of physical models in order to teach
students what they must do with their bodies in order to learn how proteins fold; their
projection and play with interactive computer graphics media; and their elaboration of
molecular forms through the medium of their bodies. I develop the concept of gestural
modeling as a form of mimetic modeling; by becoming molecular, I show how instructors
can perform nuanced models of protein folding for their students. This chapter serves then,
to show how pedagogy and training in science require that instructors remodel their
32 This chapter is accepted for publication as an article in Sherry Turkle's edited volume, The Inner
History of Devices: Ethnography and the First Person, forthcoming with MIT Press. See Myers
(forthcoming b).
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students' bodies, not just inspire their minds.
Chapter 4, "Modeling Molecular Machines: Structural Biology, Biological Engineers, and
the Materialized Refiguration of Proteins,"33 makes the shift from the context of biology
classrooms, to examine how structural knowledge of proteins is refigured within the
cultural milieu of biological engineering education. In this chapter I explore how proteins
have been figured and refigured in the historical and contemporary scientific literature and
in current pedagogical discourses in biological engineering. In Chapter 3 I observed an
oscillation between proteins figured as lively bodies and proteins figured as molecular
machines. By contrast, in Chapter 4 I examine how, for whom, and in what contexts,
structural biologists clamp down on the metaphor of molecular machines. I draw on
Donna Haraway's cyborg feminist (1991; 1994; 1997) theory of "materialized
refiguration," and treat the metaphor of molecular machines as an adept visualization
technology that can render proteins visible, tangible, and workable as machines and also
as an enticing lure that can to recruit biological engineers-in-training. Yet, I show how the
material and semiotic labour structural biologists invest in constructing an amazing array of
different kinds molecular machines inside the bodies of cells gets elided when the
metaphor of machines is conflated with the molecule itself. Building on Haraway's (1997)
elaboration of "genetic fetishim," I show how a kind of "machine fetishism" is operative in
contemporary structural biology. And yet, by treating "materialized refigurations" like
molecular machines as renderings, that is as forms of knowing that are enacted and
performed, I show how the tropes that these investigators are constructing produce a kind
" This chapter is accepted for publication as an article in Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi's NatureCultures:
Thinking with Donna Haraway, forthcoming with MIT Press. See Myers (forthcoming c).
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of molecular machinery that is undeniably lively.
Chapter 5, "Animating Mechanism: Animations and the Propagation of Affect in the Lively
Arts of Protein Modeling,"34 is a sustained mediation on the performance of molecular
mechanisms, and the nature of the media structural biologists use to animate their
hypotheses about how proteins move and interact. Where mechanical models of life may
seem, on first glance to parse living bodies in ways that deaden lively processes, I build on
feminist contributions to the science studies literature to show how, rather than spelling the
"death of nature", mechanistic reasoning in the life sciences can become a site for feminist
inquiry into modes of embodiment and the role of affect in the performance of scientific
knowledge. I re-read the interactivity of protein modeling through Karen Barad's
formulation of "intra-action" to show how bodies, media, and machines are entangled in
the production of animations of proteins in both virtual and embodied media. I
demonstrate how, through their embodied animations of molecular movements, structural
biologists enliven molecular mechanisms as a means to open up the mechanisms to
understanding, and then propagate this lively knowledge among their colleagues and
students in pedagogical and professional contexts. I argue that this mode of embodied
animation is not an extra-scientific phenomenon, but an experimental practice that
supports the work of mechanistic modeling. Though structural biologists may boast that
they have captured "life itself" in the form of molecular machines, this chapter examines
how their narratives of capture slip and slide into narratives forms that simultaneously
express their affective entanglements, their passions, and desires that arise in responsive
34 This chapter has been published in a special issue on the Future of Feminist Technoscience in
Science Studies. See Myers (2006).
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relation to the proteins they lovingly model. In the conclusion to this study, I examine
much more closely my own investments in transforming stories that script science as a
practice geared towards the "capture of life itself"; and show how this study aims to
transduce life scientists' narratives of liveliness by hitching a ride on the excitements and
passionate forms of knowing structural biologists engender in their modeling work.
Chapter 2
Molecular Embodiments & The Body-work of
Modeling in Protein Crystallography
Introduction
X-ray crystallography is one of the primary techniques used to generate structural data from
which molecular models of proteins are constructed. Protein crystallographers use
interactive computer graphics technologies to build three-dimensional, atomic-resolution
models of the intricate molecular structure of proteins. I ask Diane Griffin, a professor of
chemistry and biology, who heads a protein crystallography lab, about the challenges her
students face learning to model proteins in three-dimensions (See Figure 2.1). She tells me
that it is hard to learn how to "think intelligently about structure." She points to the steep
learning curve her students face trying to master X-ray crystallographic techniques, and
enumerates the challenges of building molecular models and interpreting the functions of
proteins from molecular forms. Acquiring the skills to "see what the structure is saying" is
"hard to do, and it takes time," she tells me, but eventually "you do get better at it." She
describes what often happens when her graduate students show her computer graphic
renditions of their molecules in the early stages of the building process. "Look I connected
it!" they proudly declare, presenting their model to her. Yet, when she examines their
models in detail, looking closely at the bond angles between the amino acids and the
direction of the polypeptide chain that winds through the protein, her response is often
anguished: "What did you do to that side chain? No! No! Let me move it back!"
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Figure 2.1: Ribbon diagram of a protein molecule. Close up
detail shows the active site of the protein. Used with
permission from an anonymous ethnographic informant.
As she tells the story, she contorts her entire body into the shape of the misfolded protein.
With one arm bent over above her head, another wrapping around the front of her body,
her neck crooked to the side, and her body twisting, she expresses the strain felt by the
misshapen protein model. "And I'll just get this pained expression," she tells me. "I get
stressed just looking at it... It's like I feel the pain that the molecule is in, because it just
can't go like that!" She feels compelled to fix the model. She mimes a frantic adjustment of
the side chain by using one arm to pull the other back into alignment with her body,
tucking her arms in towards her chest and curving her torso over toward the core of her
body, demonstrating the correct fold. With a sigh of relief she eases back into a
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comfortable position in her chair. The comically anguished look on her face relaxes back
into a warm smile.
Apparently, the students in her story had not yet acquired a feeling for the proper
molecular conformation. In a mode evocative of what Evelyn Fox Keller (1983) has
described as Barbara McClintock's "feeling for the organism," Diane expresses her feeling
for the molecule. As her gestures and affects convey, corporeal knowledge appears to play
a key role in her ability to "think intelligently" about protein structure. What she
demonstrates here is that structural biology is a craft-practice that demands embodied
knowledge.
This chapter examines how practices of protein modeling rework conventional
understandings of the relationships between model and modeler, and mind and body. Ian
Hacking (1983) makes a distinction between "models you hold in your hand"-material
models made with "pulleys, springs, string and sealing wax"-and "models you hold in
your head," conceptual models and mental images which function through analogy and
imagination (Hacking, 1983: 216). Yet, if we take seriously Diane's experience of the pain
of the misshapen molecule, such a distinction between "models-in-the-hand" and
"models-in-the-head" does not hold. While Hacking draws these two kinds of models
apart, I would argue instead for a deeper entwining of material and conceptual models in
the embodied imagination of the modeler. Diane carries more than a "mental image" of
what a molecule should look like in her head"3 : seeing, feeling, and moving with the
3s The term "mental image" is widespread, and is often used to think through notions of the
scientific imagination. See for example Meinel (2004) and Trumpler (1997). See also Sacks (2003)
63
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
chemical constraints of the molecule, she has embodied molecular forms. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty's (1962) phenomenology of perception argues that sensation and
movement are intimately tied to visual understandings of form. Diane demonstrates well
how this coupled nature of seeing and feeling is played out in crafting structural
knowledge.
As life scientists increasingly "give body" (Hopwood, 1999) to molecular biology, the
methods of the ethnographer must keep pace. Diane's acquired feeling for the molecule
clues us in to some of the complex corporeal practices that are involved in "thinking
intelligently about structure." Crystallographic protein modeling is a time-consuming
process of constructing models from experimental data using interactive materials, both
physical and virtual. This chapter aims to show that it is through the "body-work" of
crystallographic model-building, that is, through the labour of constructing, manipulating,
and navigating through protein models onscreen, that researchers are literally able to come
to grips with-and so make sense of-molecular forms and functions. In addition to the
intensive labour required to conduct X-ray crystallographic experiments,36 or the other tacit
knowledges involved in the wet lab work of protein biology, three modes of body-work are
brought into relief in the field of protein crystallography.37 I term these the body-work of
for an elaboration of the diversity and complexity of mental images.
36 From the arduous calculation and analysis of crystallographic data, to the physical labour of
operating the machinery of experimentation, crystallography is labour intensive practice. Diane,
describing the intensely physical experience of conducting experiments and gathering data at
synchrotrons, jokes that researchers need to train at the gym to ensure that they're fit enough to
handle the heavy doors that protect them from the high-intensity X-ray beams. On the issue of the
intensive labour of crystallographic calculation, and the allocation of this work to women in the
early history of crystallographic computing see de Chadarevian (2002).
37 On tacit knowledge see for example Collins (1985), Polanyi (1958), and Rheinberger (1997).
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incorporation, communication, and reasoning, in order to foreground the role of
researchers' bodies in learning, relaying and interpreting the specificities of protein forms
and functions.38 As I demonstrate in this chapter, the slow, reiterative, interactive work of
crystallographic modeling enables researchers like Diane to incorporate molecular models
into their embodied imaginations. Once embodied, these models come alive in
researchers' performative gestures as they communicate the fine details of protein
structures. They use this mode of body-work in conversations within and outside of the
laboratory, and in conference presentations and classroom lectures. Throughout the
chapter, I draw on Diane as an exemplar and as a guide to help pose new questions about
the role of researchers' bodies in life science practice. While Diane may appear to be an
exceptional case-she could be construed as an "expressive" scientist, having studied
drama in addition to chemistry as an undergraduate at Vassar College in the 1980s-
interviews with her male and female students and colleagues, and among researchers
within the wider field of structural biology show that her "feeling for the molecule" is in no
way exceptional, and, indeed, participates in a significant and wider phenomenon among
experienced protein modelers. That a "feeling for the molecule" is widespread among
experienced modelers raises significant questions for social studies of pedagogy in science,
as the transfer of the tacit knowledges through modes of body-work in protein modeling
pose challenges for training a new generation of structural biologists.
38 This is of course, an artificial parsing of what is a much more entwined process. My observations
suggest, for example that the body-work of communication, the elaborate gestural expression of
molecular form is intimately involved in the process of reasoning. In Chapter 4 I show how
researchers conduct "body-experiments," much like "thought-experiments", where they use their
bodies to work through and reason through such dynamic phenomena as intra-molecular forces or
inter-molecular interactions. In Chapter 2 I show how these performative practices are also a mode
that enables incorporation, a way for the modeler to learn possible molecular forms and
movements.
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Though the history of structural biology is rich with accounts of model-building, limitations
in the historical record make it difficult to study model-building in practice. In addition to
providing insights into contemporary protein crystallography, this ethnography offers a re-
reading of historical accounts of early protein crystallographers. In historical and
contemporary cases, I examine the role of corporeal knowledge in crystallographic
modeling in both physical and virtual media, attending to how early developers of
interactive molecular graphics sought to preserve the tangibility of virtual models.
Throughout, I pay attention to what protein researchers have to do with their bodies in
order first to acquire and then communicate this embodied knowledge of molecular
structure. What I find is that crystallographic model-making is not only a means of building
molecular models: it also offers a training ground for the modeler-a means of
reconfiguring researchers' embodied imaginations with knowledge of protein forms and
movements. Working with and building multidimensional models of proteins are practices
that rearticulate researchers' bodies. Exploring the nature of such molecular embodiments,
this chapter offers a contribution to the history and anthropology of science, with insights
into the role of researchers' bodies in the visual cultures of the computer-mediated life
sciences.
Fleshing out the Folds of Molecular Forms of Life
This shift in attention from reading and writing DNA sequences to modeling protein forms
has methodological implications for social studies of scientific practice and visual cultures.
Tracking the movements of the metaphor of code closely, analyses of molecular biology
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have tended to focus their interpretations at the level of the language that scientists deploy
in their texts (see for example Doyle, 1997). However, social and historical studies whose
methods map too closely to this metaphor, and rely entirely on text-based readings of the
rhetoric of code, miss out on a wider range of practices that have contributed to the
making of molecular biology. The current intensification of protein structure research, with
its elaborate modeling techniques that draw on intuition and trial and error, and which
demand performative modes of body-work, makes it clear that an exclusively rhetorical
analysis is inadequate to the task. The production and deployment of protein models by
life scientists resist reduction to text for both scientists and social scientists. Accessing a
"thick description" (Geertz, 1973) of the representational forms and practices in molecular
biology thus requires more than decoding the textual productions of scientists; in addition
to the semiotics of models, it requires attending to researchers' corporeal and affective
entanglements with available concepts and modeling media, and with the visualization
machinery they entrain on living substances. 39 Taking embodiment seriously in protein
modeling demands the ethnographer attend to the subtle enactment of models in the
process of building, using, and reasoning through their forms. In this sense, the
ethnographer must, in turn, develop a feeling for scientists' movements, gestures, and
affects, for how structural biologists work with their objects. These are practices that can be
difficult to record and relate, and so to convey the subtler dimensions of the craftwork,
tacit skills, and creativity of scientific practice ethnographers and historians need to
develop new competencies for tracking bodies and embodiment. To remedy analyses that
3 Donna Haraway's (1991, 1997) theory of "material-semiosis" comes closest to an analytic
modality that can account for the conjoined material and semiotic processes through which
researchers combine words, gestures and materials to give body and meaning to proteins in their
construction of molecular models.
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flatten both molecules and practices, this chapter aims to flesh out the "liveliness,"
(Haraway, 1997: 137) and "body-fullness" (Haraway, 2001) that structural biologists
perform through their work.
The Body-work of Molecular Model-Making: A Brief History
Some of the most striking features of the wide range of three-dimensional models used in
biology are their tangibility, manipulability and amplification to a human scale. This is
perhaps most apparent in the case of molecular models, those playful ball-and-stick
"Tinker-toys" representing atomic structures familiar from high school chemistry
laboratories (see Francoeur, 1997). Structural biologists have built and used models of
protein structures from crystallographic data since the late 1950s (de Chadarevian, 2002;
Francoeur, 1997). Eric Francoeur (1997, 2000, 2001; Francoeur and Segal, 2004) has
documented the history of molecular models in chemistry and biochemistry, detailing how
they have been improvised, standardized, and disseminated. Made from metal, plastic,
cardboard, Styrofoam balls and toothpicks, balsa wood and elastic bands, three-
dimensional models have amplified the molecular world to sizes and forms, and in styles,
manageable and imaginable for their users and admirers (see also Bassow, 1968). And
beginning in 1963, structural biologists produced molecular models that flickered on
analog computer screens, creating an entirely new medium for molecular visualization
(Levinthal, 1966; Francoeur and Segal, 2004).
While the media in which molecular models have been built has changed significantly
over the years, modeling materials have consistently been selected for their tangibility and
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manipulability. Francoeur shows that a special feature of molecular models is that that they
"embody, rather than imply, the spatial relationship of the molecule's components" (1997:
14). Such models can be manipulated and analyzed:
Like many other types of object handled by scientists in the
field or the laboratory, they can be touched, measured,
tested, dissected or assembled, and tinkered with in many
different fashions. In other words, they act as a material
analogy (14).
Building physical analogues of molecules thus requires handling and a mode of thinking
and working that is spatial. As Francoeur notes, the "working out" and "sorting out" of
structures with physical models is a kind of "thinking with the hands" that has long been
an integral part of the work and knowledge of chemists and biochemists (2000: 6). This
practice of "thinking with the hands" is well exemplified by a canonical story often told in
the history of structural biology. Linus Pauling is remembered for his exceptional skills
modeling proteins in three-dimensions: his "discovery" of the structure of the alpha-helix,
while lying in bed with the flu in Oxford in 1948, has become legend (see also Nye, 2001).
In an obituary for Pauling, Max Perutz, who was then competing to determine the same
structure, describes how Pauling figured out the alpha-helix, "amus[ing] himself by
building a paper chain of planar peptides" while laying in bed, until he "found a
satisfactory structure by folding them into a helix" (Perutz, 1994: 670). This process of
"discovery" required him to improvise with ready-to-hand materials. "Giving body" to
molecular form; he fleshed the molecule out in order to figure out the spatial organization
of atoms (see Hopwood, 1999).
In the history of three-dimensional modeling practices, such work has not been easy.
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Molecular modeling in three-dimensions requires concerted effort and great patience. In
his account of the "discovery" of the helical structure of DNA in the early 1950s, Watson
(1969: 62) reminisced that his and Crick's "first minutes with the models" were "not
joyous." "Even though only about fifteen atoms were involved, they kept falling out of the
awkward pincers set up to hold them the correct distance from one another" (62). Indeed,
he had to keep "fiddling" with the models to get them to hold together (122). As he and
Crick got closer to determining the structure they sometimes spent whole afternoons
"cutting accurate representations of the bases out of stiff cardboard" (123) to produce
models of nucleotide pairs that could be shuffled in and out of different pairing
possibilities. This was an improvisational practice that eventually enabled them to give
form to the DNA molecule and figure out how the nucleic acids adenine and thymine, and
guanine and cytosine could pair to form the double helix (ibid.). Molecular model-building
with physical materials is thus a time consuming, trial-and-error ridden process that
requires physical engagement and exploratory interaction with often finicky materials.
The models themselves were built in a range of different media, each of which afforded
particular kinds of bodily interaction and manipulation. Some of the materials even
revealed the work of their makers. In 1957, John Kendrew's laboratory in Cambridge,
U.K., produced the first model of a protein. Made out of thick tubes of black Plasticine and
supported on wooden pegs, it was nicknamed "the sausage model" (see Figure 2.2). As this
frame, shot from an "in house" movie of the making of the sausage model at the Laboratory
for Molecular Biology (LMB) reveals, the model builder appears not to have been Kendrew,
Modeling Proteis, Making Scientists
but one of the many women who were employed in his laboratory." In addition to
providing what was a shocking and "visceral" view into the molecular realm, 41 this model
also offered a record of the performance of the modeler. That is, the pliable Plasticine
medium recorded the movements and gestures of the modeler's handiwork.
Figure 2.2: Building the "sausage model" of myoglobin. A
screen-shot of the making of the first model of a protein
molecule from a movie produced in Kendrew's laboratory at
the LMB. Used with permission from the MRC Laboratory for
Molecular Biology.
4 In Designs for Life, Soraya de Chadarevian (2002) examines the history of women in protein
crystallography laboratories, in particular the women technicians, or "computors" who, before the
advent of computer graphics, were responsible for most of the labour of computation in
crystallographic experiments, measuring crystallographic data by hand and using punch-card
computers. As this frame-shot shows, these women were apparently also involved in the craft of
model-building.
4' After the model had been built, people who viewed the model marveled at the "visceral" quality
of the model. Kendrew and others expressed surprise at "unexpected twists the protein chain was
performing" (de Chadarevian, 2002: 142). In Chapter 3, I explore further how biophysicists had
expected proteins, substances that could form regular crystalline arrays, to be simple, symmetrical
structures.
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When attempting to build his earliest models of haemoglobin in the early 1960s, Max
Perutz also tried Plasticine, but when this material proved too unstable for his more
complex molecule, he resorted to cutting thermo-setting plastic into topographical sections
that he stacked one on top of each other, baking the model to set it permanently into shape
(de Chadarevian, 2002: 143) (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: Max Perutz's low-resolution model of
hemoglobin made with thermo-setting plastic. Used with
permission from the MRC Laboratory for Molecular Biology.
However, this rather clunky, low resolution, model could not articulate the fine detail of
hemoglobin's atomic structure, or be used to demonstrate the subtle movements of
hemoglobin's molecular mechanism. Perutz was later able to produce atomic-resolution
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models of hemoglobin using standardized, machined ball-and-stick parts (Francoeur,
1997). The adjustable links between atoms along the polypeptide chain made possible
through such modeling kits provided the opportunity for the modeler to manipulate the
model. The mechanical properties of these models could be engaged dynamically, and
performatively, as a means to make arguments about molecular function.42 In a video
interview conducted towards the end of his life, Max Perutz can be seen moving a ball and
stick version of his haemoglobin structure in and out of different conformations,
demonstrating with delight the effect of oxygenation on the structure of the heme group
(see Figure 2.4)43
42 It is significant that different levels of resolution and different materials rendered proteins in very
distinct ways. The sausage model portrayed the myoglobin as a "rather vulgar" (Perutz, 1968) body,
with an anatomy that could be "dissected" (see de Chadarevian, 2002). High-resolution models
built from standardized machined parts made proteins look much more machinic, with clean lines
and movable parts, and made them available to be manipulated as chemical mechanisms. As I
show in Chapter 3, this shift has made it possible for proteins to be figured through the now
pervasive metaphor of "molecular machines."
43 See interviews with Max Perutz online. "Face to Face with Max Perutz" Vega Science Trust
<http://www.vega.org.uk/video/programme/1> Also shown alongside Perutz and his mechanical
model is a video clip of an interactive molecular graphics screen animating the same movements
onscreen. Perutz's handling of the model is also described in de Chadarevian (2002).
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Figure 2.4: Stills from a video of Max Perutz demonstrating
the chemical mechanism of the oxygen binding heme group
of his atomic-resolution model. Used with permission from
The Vega Science Trust. Interviews with Max Perutz can be
viewed at: http://www.vega.org.uk/series/facetoface/perutz/
Thus, it is important to take into consideration the various media used, not only to
understand how modelers represented protein molecules-what they were fashioned out
of and what they looked like--but also for understanding how as renderings, these distinct
media engaged modelers bodies in different ways. Different materials afforded different
modes of interaction and manipulation, and different kinds of insight into the molecular
realm.
The Digital Materiality of Interactive Molecular Graphics
The contribution of researchers' bodies to model-building has not been lost with the
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transition to virtual media. Indeed, interactive computer graphics aimed to facilitate modes
of embodiment more conducive to model-building. As crystallographers improved their
techniques, acquiring higher resolution data, and modeling increasingly complex proteins,
the use of physical materials for molecular modeling became more difficult. Material
models became far too large and cumbersome to build, subject as they were to the
unfortunate effects of gravity and mechanical stress. This was a lesson learned by one
group of molecular modelers based in Manchester, U.K. in the early 1960s. After their
elaborate model of a protein made of balsa wood and elastic bands collapsed in the dry
and dusty basement in which they were working, they went so far as to contemplate
building their model underwater in a swimming pool to cancel the effect of gravity (see
Francoeur and Segal, 2004: 412). Following his failures to model proteins in balsa wood
at Manchester, C. David Barry, one of the members of this group, joined MIT biologist
Cyrus Levinthal at Project MAC to help develop the first interactive computer graphics
work station for visualizing, manipulating and predicting protein structures (Francoeur,
2002; Levinthal, 1966). Between 1963 and 1967, Levinthal, in collaboration with Barry
and others, developed an interactive molecular graphics machine they jokingly nicknamed
"The Kluge" (see Francoeur and Segal, 2004). This interface made use of a "crystal ball"
(an early mouse) and light pen to enable control of rotation and the selection of specific
coordinates of the structure. Offering an improvement over the swimming pool option,
interactive graphics can be thought of as the first practical zero-gravity chamber for
molecular modeling.44
"44 Thanks to Stefan Helmreich for this analogy. Interactive graphics does seem to offer a gravity-free,
buoyant environment for protein modeling. Indeed, as Donna Haraway reminds me, interactive
computer graphics may in some ways reproduce the watery worlds that support protein structures in
their cellular environments.
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Once interactive graphics had already begun to take hold of the molecular modeling
community, Robert Langridge, a key supporter of Levinthal's work at Project MAC,
articulated the benefits of molecular graphics over working with physical models. In a
1981 paper reviewing advances in computer graphic modeling he wrote:
Space filling or wire models are satisfactory up to a certain
level of complexity, but purely mechanical problems cause
serious difficulties since the model on the bench and the list
of [atomic] coordinates in the computer are not necessarily
closely related (especially after the model is degraded by
many curious hands). Particularly difficult is the restoration
of a structure after simple modifications. With computer
graphics, the display and the data are directly related,
storage of prior configurations is simple, and pieces do not
fall off (Langridge et al., 1981: 661, emphasis added).
As it turns out, it was the very pliability of physical molecular models that was both their
greatest virtue and greatest limitation as working tools. The haptic dimension involved in
the manipulation and handling of physical materials was key for the production of models
that could give modelers a sense of the structure and dynamics of the molecule, and
offered a means for researchers to use their bodies to incorporate structural knowledge.
However, once available to "curious hands," these toy-like structures tempted continuous
reworking and tweaking, eventually leading to conformational distortion. Motivated to
overcome the challenges faced in working with physical models, while inspired by the
tangibility they offered, crystallographers and computer scientists collaborated to develop
interactive computer graphics technologies for building protein models onscreen.
Early researchers' accounts of the development of computer hardware and software in
76
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
interactive molecular graphics reveal how they approached the problem of preserving the
tangibility and manipulability of models in making the transition from physical to virtual
modeling. What becomes clear from their accounts is that an intimate relationship
between user and computer had to be engineered into a workstation interactive enough to
keep the modeler physically engaged in model-building. With interactive computer
graphic techniques the crystallographer is intimately coupled to the computer screen
through an array of input devices that aim to mimic some of the aspects of physical model-
building. Eric Francoeur and Jerome Segal's (2004) history of the emergence of interactive
molecular graphics makes it clear that while this interactive technology offered a medium
distinct from the physical models previously used to investigate structures, these tools
preserved the tangibility of other media used in protein modeling. The embodied nature of
this early interactive graphics technology was not, however, immediately obvious to the
uninitiated. At a Gordon conference in 1965, Robert Langridge presented the Kluge system
to an unenthusiastic audience. As he recalled, one crystallographer "objected that a
graphics display would simply not do as a substitute for physical models, since he had to
have his hands on something, something physical, so that he could understand it." For
Langridge, "standing up at a conference and showing 16mm movies, in the early days, was
really not a good substitute for sitting in front of the computer and actually using it. When
you first got your hands on that crystal ball at Project MAC and moved the thing around in
three dimensions it was thrilling. There was no question" (Langridge quoted in Francoeur
and Segal, 2004: 418).
The early developers of these programs sought to generate the "smooth handling" of
graphic models in "real time" on the computer screen. They aimed "to produce an illusion
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
(a hand-eye correlation) strong enough that the operation required to manipulate the
model via the computer" could become "instinctive" (Barry, et al. 1974: 2368-9). In this
way the molecular graphics "map and model" could be "manipulated almost by hand"
(Tsernoglou, et al. 1977: 1379) For Langridge "smooth rotation of three-dimensional
objects is one of the most important elements in making use of the display seem "natural"
to persons used to handling "real" molecular models (Langridge, 1974: 2333). He
explained that at the time there was, however, "no precise definition of the terms real-time
and interactive": "The difference between interactive and noninteractive uses of computer
graphics depends on how long you are willing to wait to see a result" (Langridge, et al.,
1981: 666). "Satisfactory" interactions demanded advancements in the speed of computer
processors, but also patience on the part of the user (ibid.).
In the hardware systems that emerged later, a whole new array of input devices were
developed and used to enhance the human-computer interface in the simulation of a "real-
time," interactive modeling experience.45 Switches, knobs, joysticks, tablets-and a range
of apparatuses to generate the experience of "3D vision" through stereoscopic
technologies-connected the user to the maps and models they could manipulate on
screen. By the early 1980s, a number of different technologies were available to produce
these stereo effects. Robert Langridge and his co-workers (Diamond, et al., 1982) describe
one stereovision system, where "left and right perspective views are presented alternately.
45 In an article called "The Human Interface," M.E. Pique (1986) writes: "Ideas spreading from Xerox
PARC and Atari, through the Apple Macintosh and the Commodore Amiga, will reach molecular
graphics during 1986: pop-up windows, pull-down menus, more than one thing going on at a time.
During the next 5 years, users and builders will make molecular systems more like video games,
with mice and trackballs, some joysticks that are specialized by function, and the working system
easier to use and more fun."
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When they are viewed through a synchronized shutter, each of the observers' eyes sees
only its associated image, and the result is perceived as a stereoscopic image with a strong
sense of depth of field" (286). Creating the three-dimensional effects and the "illusion" of
depth through stereoscopic techniques, however, assumes that the user has binocular
vision. So attentive to the interaction between users' bodies and the graphics hardware,
and convinced that "a good ten percent" of the population has difficulty seeing in stereo, a
group of researchers at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge devised an
elaborate optical system to simulate three-dimensional perception for "one-eyed guys."
Reworking the physiology of vision for one- or two-eyed researchers, such innovations of
stereoscopic techniques attest to their inventors' recognition of the embodiment of seeing.
Remarkably, what interactive computer graphics developers achieved was more than "an
illusion" of connection between modeler and model: the interactive graphics workstation
became a prosthetic extension of a physically engaged modeler into a very tangible world
of graphic molecules. Ensuring that protein researchers experienced the physicality they
had come to expect from their molecular modeling work, interactive molecular graphics
developers offered a successful alternative to modeling with physical materials. In the
process they also produced a new kind of tangibility for virtual objects.
In 1977, Tsernoglou and his collaborators (Tsernoglou, et al., 1977) reported the successful
modeling of a protein entirely through interactive graphics technologies. The complete
transition from physical to digital models did not however, take place overnight. Physical
models retained pedagogical value. In the early days of protein crystallography,
crystallographers like Perutz, Kendrew and Dorothy Hodgkin built large-scale three-
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dimensional electron density maps out of physical materials. They would trace slices of
electron density on transparency paper, and stack these between Plexiglas sheets, building
up a physical model of the electron density map layer by layer (see Kendrew 1964; de
Chadarevian, 2002; see below for a description of electron density maps).46 In the 1960s,
Diane's advisor Susan Fielding participated in building the first model of an enzyme using
these early techniques. Diane trained in Susan's lab in the 1990s. At that time interactive
computer graphics programs were already readily available for constructing three-
dimensional electron density maps onscreen, 47 yet Susan insisted that her graduate students
first learn how to build physical models of electron density using Plexiglas sheets. Diane
explained Susan's rationale for this pedagogical exercise: digital graphics could only
46 Kendrew describes modeling from such stacks of electron density as a process of "dissection,"
such that "from the map it was possible to "dissect out" a single protein molecule" (Kendrew, 1964:
681). According to reviewers assessing developments in the field by 1975, this method proved
"almost unbelievably cumbersome" (Collins et al., 1975: 1049). This is particularly true since many
different maps would have to be constructed and compared. Collins and his colleagues (Collins et
al., 1975) outlined how, in1968 at Yale University, Frederic M. Richards came up with an
innovation that radically transformed the work of mapping and modeling. The Richard's "optical
comparator," "Richard's box," or "Fred's Folly" as it came to be known, "revolutionized the
interpretation of protein electron density maps" (1049). The device projected an optical illusion,
making it appear as if a wire model was "embedded" within the three-dimensional electron density
map through the use of a half-silvered mirror (ibid.). The model could then be manipulated until its
projected image fit within the electron density. The coordinates of the atoms would then have to be
measured and calculated from the model itself. And while this "arduous work" was both "highly
tedious and inherently inaccurate," it was a step up from the method Kendrew first employed (ibid.).
See also de Chadarevian (2002).
47 Novel systems of interactive computer graphics overcame the practical limitations of the solid
structures generated by Plexiglas electron density maps and wire models. For example, they enabled
the "fitting" of a digital model directly into the electron density map, rather than having to "dissect
out" a structure from a solid object (Collins, et al., 1975: 1049): "Electronic Richard's boxes"
allowed variously sized volumes of electron density to be displayed on the computer screen in
stereo, enabling the user to "superimpose" stereo images of atomic models "in such a way that the
latter [could] be translated and rotated until an optimum fit of the model to the map [was] achieved"
(ibid.). As such, "fitting model to map...can be far more convenient and faster than the mechanical
operations in the Richard's box" (ibid.). An added benefit, and indeed what the developers saw as
the most important feature of this interactive system, was that the coordinates of the constructed
model could be recorded automatically. Replacing the time consuming and completely error prone
work of trying to measure the atomic distances from scale models, the grid logic of the computer
screen could accurately identify the location of each atom in the structure.
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present small pieces of the map at a time, so that physical modeling was the best way to
get a feel for the map and molecule as a whole. At the same time, this pedagogical training
practice served to provide a material reference for novices just beginning to work in the
digital medium, so that when the students went to use the virtual tools, they already had a
sense of the physicality of the electron density topographies they were navigating onscreen
(see Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Digital electron density map. Note the model that is being built
into the regions of electron density. Used with permission from an
anonymous ethnographic informant.
While digital models are the primary medium for model-building today, physical models
are still present in some labs. In her office, Diane shows me one small molecular model
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she sometimes uses to make a particular argument about a chemical interaction. But the
primary modeling media remains interactive graphics. Fernando, a fifth year PhD student
in Diane's lab mourns this loss of physical models, which he sees as the best means to
provide modelers-in-training with a tangible object that could stand as the primary referent
for the graphics media. He would prefer that a culture of physical modeling be maintained
alongside the computer graphics to help crystallographers-in-training gain experience
manipulating three-dimensional objects. He has observed that molecular modeling kits are
also less prominent in chemistry classrooms and tutorials in his department, and he sees
this as the product of an intellectual culture that devalues physical models, treating them as
"playful" tinker-toys rather than as serious tools.4 8 His colleague Brent, for example is not
so familiar with the use of physical models in his work. Brent, who is a postdoc in Diane's
lab, expressed surprise when he saw his friend Tim, a skilled protein crystallographer,
carrying around physical model. Brent pretended to be Tim and acted out how he was
using the models: "See. It can only happen like this. I can't fit my active site here because
my density is this big!" Brent called him a "dork" and told me that was "just funny to
watch him thinking like that," playing with his models. He qualified his surprise with the
explanation: "Well, he is a chemist." Brent, who was trained in microbiology before he
moved into protein crystallography, tells me that he "thinks differently."
In some senses, interactive graphics reconstitute what it means for a virtual object to be
tangible. In pedagogical contexts, novices do have a hard time experiencing this kind of
48 My observations of lecture courses and teaching laboratories in structural biology do show
evidence of the use of some physical models, though these are often ancient artifacts and they are
used in conjunction with interactive graphics, two-dimensional renderings, and rich rhetorical
analogies (see Chapter 2).
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tangibility. However, over time and with the experience of constant interaction with virtual
objects they eventually acquire a feeling for the tangibility of interactive objects. Katherine
Hayles (1999) argues against the prevailing assumption that users are drawn out of their
bodies, or disembodied, in interactions with virtual media. What I have seen suggests that
rather than "dematerializing" the molecule into some body-less virtual reality space, over
time the interactive graphics workstation used for crystallographic model-building enables
a particularly effective kind of handling for molecular models. Digital models acquire a
materiality and tangibility through their manipulation on-screen. Diane makes the
embodied nature of computer modeling work clear when describing her experience
building crystallographic models onscreen. She invokes the same language and gestures
one might use to describe model-building with physical materials:
And physically you are sitting at your computer, often with
the stereoglasses on. And you are physically dragging pieces
of protein structure, like amino acids, and sticking them in.
You drag it in and you stick it there. And then with your
dials or your mouse, you are adjusting it, moving the pieces
to get it to fit. So you are physically building with the
stereoglasses and the mouse. You are physically building in
a model into this electron density.
As Diane describes building the model, she stretches her arms out in front of her and
reenacts the activity of modeling. She uses her hands to mime her work at the computer.
Through elaborate gestures she carves out the space of the computer screen, the amino
acids and the shape of the electron density map that she rotates in her hands. Her hands
clasped and pulsing around invisible objects, she conveys the density and textures of the
molecules, and their intermolecular associations, while in the open, gestural space in front
of her she builds a model "onscreen" (see Figure 2.7 for an example of a model building
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screen). Through this elaborate body-work she expresses how tangible the graphic model is
for her.
When I observe crystallographers building protein models onscreen, the protein model is
never left hovering in virtual space: it is kept in motion through rapid and restless gestures
of the mouse and the quick paced, and sometimes clumsy, tapping out of keyboard
commands that pull up new windows and views. In one window, data will be streaming
up the screen, and in another, the crystallographer holds the skeleton-like interactive
rendering of a model. She keeps it alive in space and depth, rotating it on screen and
zooming in and out, keeping it visible at multiple angles, constantly shifting her visual and
haptic relationship to it. This dynamic practice of seeing in motion appears to offer a
means for the modeler to keep the three-dimensionality of the model visible and tangible.
But more than the crystallographers' hands and eyes are in play. Though more subtle than
their hand movements, their entire bodies become affectively entangled in the task of
manipulating the model onscreen: with movements initiated at the head and neck,
crystallographers move as they rotate the model, leaning in, pulling away, and even
peering around behind obstructions in order to see and feel their way through the intricate
structure. Moreover, as they parse the thicket of this dense visual field for another witness,
either for a curious, novice onlooker or another expert viewer, they pull the model off the
screen through elaborate gestural choreographies that animate the structure's intra-
molecular forces, functional mechanisms and movements. Thus, for experienced users,
virtual models become tangible interactive objects. For novices, who haven't experienced
the embodied interactivity of the graphics interface, these models can be fleshed out and
relayed through modelers' gestures and movements, which give body to otherwise virtual
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objects.
The Human-Computer Lens
Protein crystallographers make use of an elaborate set of computer-mediated techniques in
order to build atomic-resolution models of proteins. This practice is intensely time
consuming, and physically and intellectually demanding. 49 According to Diane, to be a
crystallographer you have to be "a molecular biologist and a protein biochemist, you have
to be a little bit of a physicist, you have to be a computer jock, and you have to be an
artist." The model-building process is itself a rite of passage towards becoming a protein
crystallographer. The common lore in the lab is that even if well versed in the theory of
crystallography, a crystallographer remains a novice until they have fully built their own
structure. Working in the tangible medium of interactive computer graphics, modelers-in-
training learn how to see, feel, and build protein structures through the embodied
interactions with the data. Model-building is thus a kind of training ground for
crystallographers to acquire their "feeling for the molecule," to develop the tacit skills and
craft knowledge required to visualize proteins and "think intelligently about structure." As I
show below, the well-trained crystallographer's molecular intuitions form an integral part
of the technological "lens" that draws proteins into view.
Approaching crystallography as an optical system, that is, a technology for visualizing
molecules, crystallographers often compare and contrast X-ray crystallographic techniques
to microscopy (see Glusker, 1981; Glusker and Trueblood, 1985). Diane adapts this
49 For example, it took Max Perutz twenty-two years to produce a high-resolution model of
hemoglobin.
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canonical analogy in her introductory lecture to graduate students in her macro-molecular
protein crystallography class, and presents a hand-drawn schematic on an overhead based
on Glusker and Trueblood's diagram (see Figure 2.6 a and b).
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Figure 2.6 b: Crystallography. The Human-Computer Lens.
Glusker and Trueblood (1985) use this diagram to create an
analogy between microscopy and crystallography. Note the
"crystallographer" and "computer" form a lens that can, with
the aid of "Fourier synthesis" recombine the diffracted X rays
into an electron density map, and produce a molecular
model. Glusker and Trueblood's caption reads: "With X rays
the diffraction pattern has to be recorded electronically or
photographically...because X rays cannot be focused by any
known lens. Therefore the recombination of the diffracted
beams that is done by a lens in the microscope must, when
X rays are used, be done mathematically by a
crystallographer with the aid of a computer" (1985: 5). Used
with permission from Oxford University Press.
As their diagram outlines, in contrast to the optical systems of microscopes that make use
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of visible light, X-rays cannot be focused with the aid of lenses. In place of a microscope
lens, crystallographers have devised an intricate system to couple the modeler with an
assemblage of computer technologies and mathematical functions. This assemblage
simulates the function of a "lens" that can actively resolve models of protein structure. This
human-computer lens in effect provides the resolving power for an "X-ray microscope."
Crystallographic Vision: Getting Lost and Found In the Model
Imagine sailing for years through uncharted water, and then
suddenly you see land rising on the horizon. And this model
emerging was like this. So one morning in September in
1959, our results came out of the computer at the
Cambridge Mathematical Laboratory, thousands of numbers,
which we plotted on sheets of paper. And then we drew
contours round them, and there emerged a landscape of
peaks and valleys. So, I built this model. And then, suddenly
saw this thing, you know, which I'd been working on for
twenty-two years. And it was a fantastically exciting
moment. I always say it was like reaching the top of a
mountain after a very hard climb and falling in love at the
same time.
Max Perutz50
In the many steps required to transform a protein from its in vivo form into models and
animations of its structure and molecular movements, protein crystallographers make use
of an array of computer-mediated visualization techniques including X-ray imaging,
electron-density mapping, molecular modeling, and tools for producing publishable figures
and generating animations. First protein molecules must be purified from cells, and
50so From an interview with Max Perutz by the Vega Science Trust, 2001. "Face to Face with Max
Perutz" Streaming video of the interview available at
http://www.vega.org.uk/series/facetoface/perutz/. Perutz was an avid mountain climber.
http://www.vega.org.uk:8080/ramgen/face2face/perutz_haemoglobin_story.rm
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crystallized. Forming viable crystals is often a major rate-limiting step, sometimes taking
years in itself."' X-rays are then used to generate diffraction patterns of the crystal. The
series of patterns that are produced as the crystal is rotated in the X-ray beam correspond
to the positions of the atoms within the proteins packed into the crystal. In ways similar to
other three-dimensional visualization systems like the Visible Human Project, PET scans,
and confocal microscopy,52 there is a "tomographic" logic to this X-ray imaging system
which builds up a three-dimensional image by slicing through the object at precise
intervals and stacking these slices. As the crystal rotates in the apparatus, detectors pick up
images of the scattering of X-ray at every degree of rotation. Each spot on the diffraction
pattern, and each X-ray image, itself a slice through the molecule, becomes a data point for
generating a map of the approximate position of the electrons in the molecule.
As Dorothy Hodgkin recounted in her 1964 Nobel lecture (the award was given for work
done in the late 1940s and 1950s), while the techniques of structure determination can be
5s These steps of protein purification and crystallization deserve careful ethnographic observation.
According to Diane, even with today's technology, which greatly expedites the process, a graduate
student may start a project and after four years still not have successfully crystallized a protein or
built a model. In the history of protein modeling, particularly during wartime years, protein
purification was a messy task. Slaughterhouses provided some of the cheapest and most abundant
sources of tissue. Currently, most proteins are purified from bacteria that have been genetically
engineered to over-express the gene for a protein of interest. Crystallization poses serious challenges
for crystallographers as some proteins are notoriously difficult to crystallize, or just do not form
crystals. Crystallographers regularly joke that protein crystallization is a practice requiring "voodoo
magic." They develop all kinds of rituals to ensure that once they find the "magic potion" that can
coax their protein to form crystals, they can reproduce their results. From playing techno music
while they mix their biochemical media; to donning a special sweater; to not shaving one's beard;
or to talking to their crystals: they will do anything they can to get them to grow.
52 On the generation of three-dimensional images in confocal microscopy and the Visible Human
Project, respectively, see Keller (2002) and Waldby (2000). Joseph Dumit's (2004) analysis of PET
scans calls for detailed descriptions of the apparatus of visualization to facilitate understanding of
the kinds of mediation that an object, such as a brain, must undergo in order to render images that
can travel as facts beyond the laboratory.
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"formally" represented as a cycle of mappings followed by "rounds of calculation" and
modeling, "the outline hardly gives an accurate impression of the stages of confused half-
knowledge through which we passed." (Crowfoot Hodgkin, 1972: 75-6). A key problem
that the crystallographer faces is that the pattern of light scattering is extremely cryptic.
Each spot on the diffraction pattern is a product of the interaction of every atom in the
molecule, and every molecule in the crystal. The diffraction patterns produced must be
analyzed and transformed through a series of complex mathematical functions, including
Fourier transforms, in order to translate them into a form that is legible and interpretable.
These conversions generate three-dimensional electron density maps of the molecule that
indicate the approximate positions of the atoms within the proteins. These maps are read
almost like three-dimensional topographical maps, where "peaks" of electron density mark
the approximated positions of atoms (see Figure 2.5).
Indeed, working in between maps and models over the long duration of model-building is
an elusive and piecemeal practice, involving much trial and error. Crystallographic models
are built slowly through a recursive and iterative interplay between increasingly refined
electron density maps and models. Moving back and forth between different kinds of
electron density maps that correct for various errors, crystallographers actively cycle
between techniques of mapping and modeling. As they build more amino acids into the
electron density, they use the model as a means to generate more refined electron density
maps. Calculating backwards, they can construct hypothetical electron density maps of the
models they are building, as a means to test the model against the observed data. Thus
they move through rounds of mathematical refinements, recalculating the density peaks,
re-fitting the model, and continuously comparing calculated electron densities with
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observed electron densities. Layered into this process is the corroboration of their model
with the known sequence of the protein. Gradually a clearer and clearer image of the map
and model emerges.
Much of the difficulty in this work lies in the fact that the model is never self-evident from
the map. Faced with an electron density map, the crystallographer has very few clues as to
which parts of the protein fit into which parts of the electron density. As Dehlia and Amy
made clear to me in interviews with them, the crystallographer must make "executive
decisions" (see Introduction). It is up to the crystallographer to recognize what amino acids
fit into particular configurations of electron density: According to Diane, one can use what
she calls "known knowledge" to "interpret what otherwise would be completely un-
interpretable." Sculpting a best-fitting model into the map through a wayward and intuitive
process, the crystallographer must draw on embodied knowledge of allowable molecular
geometries, including the distances and bond angles between atoms within the poly-
peptide chain, and intra-molecular forces that hold the whole molecule together. For
Diane, model-building requires the modeler to be comfortable with the experience of
meandering through the electron density map, never really knowing for sure "where you
are." As crystallographers build, they must first get lost in the map, and feel their way
around familiar and unfamiliar forms in order connect up the model atom by atom, doing
work that the computer alone cannot achieve (see Figure 2.7).
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n
Figure 2.7: A screenshot of an interactive computer graphics
interface used for building a model into the electron density.
Used with permission from an anonymous ethnographic
informant.
Best known for his articulation of the role of tacit knowledge in scientific practice,
philosopher of science Michael Polanyi (1958) offers insight into crystallographic model-
building. Indeed, as a physical chemist who had used X-ray crystallographic techniques in
his experiments, he developed elements of his thinking about tacit knowledge with
reference to crystallographic practice. Drawing on Gestalt psychology, Polanyi found
"inarticulate manifestations of intelligence" beneath the surface of scientific practice, an
intelligence that "falls short of precise formalization" (1958: 53), wherein experimental
progress is made incrementally, by trial and error, and in such a way that researchers
92
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
"grope" their way toward insights (62-63). Diane's experience modeling maps onto this
description well: for her, the structure can remain obscure for a long time, until a shift in
perception opens it up to view. Once you have started building your model, she explained,
Then you'll look at it and go, "Okay, there's a big side chain
here." And three residues down there's something long. And
this looks like an arginine [an amino acid] and down there
[points] that looks like something big. And you'll go through
your sequence, and go, "Okay, where are the arginines?
What's four residues away? Oh, lysine [an amino acid].
That's no good." And you will work your way through. And
you'll sort of build some of it, and then go, "Okay now I'm
lost and I don't know where I'm going next"...
And there are certain folds that people know. Like TIM
barrels [see Figure 2.8]. One time I could see some helices
in an early map, and I was putting a couple in, and I put a
couple more in. And then, I think I got up for a minute and
came back and just sort of saw from a distance what I had
done. And I looked and there was a whole bunch of helices
around in a row. And I said, "That's a TIM barrel!" And
there's got to be strands in the middle. And then I pulled in a
TIM barrel and went, okay, it's a little off, it needs some
adjusting, but yeah, that's what it is.
And so, sometimes it takes a long time to recognize the fold,
because sometimes it's not a very standard fold. And other
times it can come out relatively quickly, you'll all of a
sudden see the connections by how things are, or you'll find
a region where you can see the density of beta-strands. And
you know that you can pull in the model and try to get it to
fit.
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Figure 2.8. A Ribbon diagram of a TIM barrel. Note the
circular arrangement of alpha-helices. Used with permission
from an anonymous ethnographic informant.
For Diane, building models is like a "detective story" where the crystallographer has to
search for clues about their structures. She says, "that's why you never know you are done
until you are done. Because at the end stage you go, "Okay if that's correct we should be
able to connect [amino acids] five and six, and it's all there!" Here Diane's account
suggests that there is a gestalt shift in seeing that occurs through the immersive work of
modeling, where the form of the folds jump out at her, emerging whole from a piece-meal
process of building. The interactive graphics systems that Diane uses can, as their early
developers advertised, engage her in the "intuitive, trial and error" style used with
mechanical models: these systems exploit an "interactive mode" which is "able to take
advantage of the powers and versatility of the "human computer" for pattern recognition
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and inductive thinking" (Barry, et al., 1974: 2368; emphasis added).
The Craft-work of Computer Modeling
We decided to develop programs that would make use of a
man-computer combination to do a kind of model-building
that neither a man nor a computer could accomplish
alone...It is still too early to evaluate the usefulness of the
man-computer combination in solving real problems of
molecular biology. It does seem likely, however, that only
with this combination can the investigator use his "chemical
insight" in an effective way.
Cyrus Levinthal, 1966: 49, 52.
Interactive computer graphics technologies are just one of the many ways that computers
figure in crystallographic work. Crystallographers were among the first life scientists to
make use of computers, initially for alleviating the massive labours they faced with
calculation, and later for reducing the physically labourious process of data collection and
for facilitating computer graphic representation and manipulation (de Chadarevian, 2002;
Francoeur and Segal, 2004; Siler and Lindberg, 1975; Tsernoglou, et al., 1977). In each
case, computers introduced important changes in the ways modelers did their work;
however, in none have computers completely replaced the modeler.
Until very recently, few steps of the crystallographic modeling process had been fully
automated. Though many computer scientists and mathematicians aim to automate protein
structure determination, the programs they have developed currently cannot, on their own,
fully determine protein conformation from its sequence, or perfectly fit a model to a map.
Thus the crystallographer is an essential component of this visualization technology. The
"human" part of the human-computer lens-that is, the crystallographer-must sculpt a
best fitting model into the map through a practice that requires intimate knowledge of
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molecular form, keen eyes, intuition, and an intimate bodily engagement with the model
as it is slowly built up over time.
As outlined in the diagrams comparing crystallographers and microscopists in Figure 2.6 (a
and b), while they may assume that microscopists rely on the "mechanical objectivity" s5 of
their technical apparatus to produce faithful microscope images of cells, crystallographers
explicitly theorize an entwined human-technological agency in their practice of drawing
proteins into view. In this sense, crystallographers are explicit about the contributions of
their knowledge and labour to model-building. It is the embodied nature of
crystallographic modeling that preserves for the crystallographer what might be called a
"critical epistemology of visualization". Key here is that crystallographers value the
intuitions and embodied knowledge they contribute to their work: they deem the craft
nature of their practice a virtue that raises the epistemological status of their data (see
Turkle, et al., 2005: Ch. 1, 2, 5). Recall the lesson learned from Chang's models which
were mangled by a glitch in a computer program: without the careful, embodied attention
to the model as it was being built, the machines left to their own devices produce garbage.
By making so explicit their direct participation in model-building, protein crystallographers
are very careful about qualifying the epistemological status of their various visual
productions: their renderings are only ever "models," imperfect but powerful
representations of otherwise invisible molecular worlds.
53 On "mechanical objectivity," see Daston and Galison (1992) and Galison (1998).
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Molecular Embodiments
To get used to [things] is to be transplanted into them, or
conversely to incorporate them into the bulk of our own
body. Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-
the-world, or changing our existence by approaching fresh
instruments.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty5 4
We may say that when we learn [a] probe, or a tool, and
thus make ourselves aware of these things as we are of our
body, we interiorize these things and make ourselves dwell
in them.
Michael Polanyi ss
How do interactive molecular graphics technologies enable this physical experience of
handling and manipulating structures? A phenomenological approach to the kinds of
learning enabled within the training ground of crystallographic model-building draws out
the fine details of this process. Exploring the prosthetic nature of tool use, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Michael Polanyi (1958) offer insights into the intimate
association of bodies and tools in learning. According to them, we learn to use new
instruments by means of enveloping them within the folds of our flesh, and also by
reaching our bodies outwards to meet the tool as an extension of ourselves. These insights
into learning suggest that our bodies are open to the world, porous to new possibilities and
adaptable to new kinds of tools. In this way, protein modelers can be understood to
"dilate" and extend their bodies into the prosthetic technologies offered by computer
graphics, and "interiorize" the products of their body-work as embodied models of
molecular structure. In a key moment during an interview with Diane, she offered this
insight into her experience incorporating molecular forms. She told me:
54 Merleau-Ponty (1962: 142).
ss Quoted in Rheinberger (1997: 74).
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
The person who builds a structure...they understand the
structure in a way that I don't think anyone else ever will.
And I try now as an advisor, I try to get inside the structure
and really try to understand it at that level. And I have for a
few of them, but it is really time consuming, I mean, to sort
of have the structure in your head in three dimensions,
which is how I felt about some of the other structures that I
actually did build myself. And I would be at a meeting and
people would be discussing a mechanism, and I would kind
of close my eyes and try to think about it and go, "No. Too
far away."
And you know, it's really this vision that you have of the
active site, and sort of this sense of how tightly packed it is
and how much flexibility there might be and where those
regions of flexibility are. To have this sort of sense that you
have. And you can think about it then moving in a way
because you sort of know something about what the density
was, so that you know that part is definitely mobile right in
there, but that this part would not be mobile. And this
information is kind of like stored in your brain in some way,
and it's not something that is easy to communicate, because,
you know you can't explain something in three dimensions
to someone...
A number of striking insights emerge from Diane's description. In order to really
"understand" the protein model, she has to "get inside of it." As she describes in other
conversations, by actively handling the model through interactive molecular graphics
programs she can project herself "inside" of it and figure out "where she is" within the
structure. She achieves this intimacy with the model by dilating her body-image to meet its
form. But clearly, her learning body does not just extend outwards to meet it: she also
envelops the model within her flesh. Although she indicates that she "stores it" in her
"brain" and can rotate the molecule around in her "head," while she describes the model,
her whole body is engaged in descriptions of its flexibility, intra-molecular forces, tensions
and movements. Once inside her as an embodied model, she has both a "vision" of the
active site and a "sense" or feeling for the forces within the molecule that exceed what
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could be described as a "mental image." It is through the dimensionality of her body that
she is able to appreciate the full three-dimensionality and movements of the protein model,
so that she feels the spatiality and temporality of the molecule by virtue of the spatiality
and temporality of her own body. While she mourns the limitations of language for the
communication of three-dimensional, structural knowledge, Diane's body provides an
articulate medium for vivid expression of the fine details of molecular structure: inflected
and informed by the molecular models that inhabit her body, she demonstrates with clarity
the twisting helices and the movements of the peptide backbone meandering through the
molecule. Throughout our conversations, during class lectures, and in informal discussions
with members of her lab, her gestures and affects animate the forms, textures, and tensions
within the protein.
Diane's molecular embodiments are in no way exceptional. In depth interviews with her
male and female students, and with other crystallographers, show that those who have
made it through the rite of passage of model-building, those have "solved" their own
structures, can carry specific knowledge of the configurations and chemical mechanisms of
their proteins in their bodies. For example, an interview with Diane's postdoc Brent, who
was a football player in college, revealed that molecular embodiments are not restricted to
a stereotype of the "expressive woman scientist."5 6 When I asked him to describe one of
the proteins he had modeled before, he proceeded with an elaborate demonstration of its
chemical mechanism. He leaned across the table between us, and drew his hands
56 I attended a reunion of structural biologists who had all trained under two well-known protein
crystallographers in the U.S. In one talk, a male crystallographer joked that you couldn't trust
anything that a particular female crystallographer said: she was too exuberant and prone to
exaggeration. The sexism of his sentiment was loud and clear: he aligned expressiveness and
femininity as excessive modality that threatened objective knowledge.
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together, carving a small pulsing sphere out of the space in front of him. In order to
describe the specific intra-molecular forces between a small cluster of amino acids in the
active site of his protein he tenderly drew the middle finger of one hand across an invisible
force field on the palm of the other, indicating the exact site where charged amino acids
interact with each other. Throughout his demonstration he held a buoyant tension in his
hands that extended through his arms, and into his whole body. He had cultivated a
profound feeling for his protein in the course of building the model, and he performed
what he hypothesized to be its chemical mechanism through gestures and affects that
reflected the intimacy of his molecular knowledge.
The habituses of other students I interviewed had not yet been inflected with such precise
molecular affects. These were the graduate students and postdocs who had not yet built
their own structures, including: those who were new to the lab and to crystallographic
practice; those who were still struggling to perfect what they often refer to as the "magic"
of getting their proteins to crystallize; and those stalled at the stage of trying to, as they say,
"massage" poor quality diffraction data into meaningful electron density maps. When I
asked them to describe proteins they were at least familiar with, those that they hadn't
modeled themselves, they rarely used gestures, and if they did, their gestures were vague
and imprecise, as if their hands loosely circumscribed the general form of an object at a
distance. They were familiar with the model from the outside, but it did not yet "belong" to
them.
Among protein crystallographers there is a profound sense of investment of one's "self" in
the model: seen as a craft product of labour and love, a crystallographic protein model is
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an artisanal object. For Diane, and others, the sudden emergence of the model after the
arduous "labor" of construction warrants a "birth announcement." In an interview, Diane
described it this way:
And so the process...I don't know, some other people say
that they want birth announcements when the structure [is
coming out]...because it is kind of like being in
labour...And often a building process will take nine months.
And it is, it's sort of as it's coming out...you're all of a
sudden, "Oh! Look at where that conserved patch is...Yes!
Oh! Oh! That makes so much sense! That other group was
wrong about what those residues do." And so it's sort of this
unveiling. And then you finally give birth to your molecule.
And what I've started doing is putting our structures on
refrigerator magnets and so then for Christmas you can share
with your family and friends. [Natasha: Like an ultrasound?]
Exactly. Right. Everyone sends out their pictures of their kids
and you send out pictures of your kids. It is kind of like that
in a way.
The product of a crystallographer's labour is always figured by the modeler as "my
protein," "my molecule." As Brent described, it's not until you can produce crystals that
diffract well, and start working on a model, that the protein becomes "yours." He
explained that he always keeps a number of projects running and maintains a kind of
emotional distance until a protein shows promise by forming "beautiful" and reproducible
crystals that diffract well. For him, it is only once a project is well on its way that the
protein becomes his own. He emphasizes his intense sense of ownership of the molecule
and the model by drawing his arms powerfully into his chest and emphatically repeating
the word "mine". This evocative gesture also served to remind me how the protein model
belongs to him: the model is not the product of disengaged rationalization, and it does not
hover in his head as a mental image. The model belongs to his body because in a sense,
that is where his knowledge of it lives.
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Thus the richest, most detailed model of the molecule resides in the modeler. Any
rendering the modeler produces is merely an abstraction of this knowledge. Diane makes
clear the frustration she feels about the limitations of the two-dimensional figures she must
construct to communicate to others what she identifies as the most salient features of the
structure. She insists that no one will ever understand the protein as intimately as those
who built the model. And this is why, when new structures are presented in the literature
or at meetings, she will never take the two-dimensional diagrams or descriptions of
mechanisms at face value: she must go to the Protein Data Bank and download the
coordinates of the model into an interactive molecular graphics program so that she can
examine the model herself and get a feeling for its folds. The listing of a model's atomic
coordinates in the PDB does not suffice: she must handle and manipulate the models as
tangible, three-dimensional objects in order to acquire at least some of the knowledge that
the crystallographer who built the model possesses.
Crystallographic modeling through interactive computer graphics is thus not only a
practice that produces digital renderings as visual forms of data; it is also a pedagogical site
for producing new protein crystallographers. The students who presented their misshapen
models to Diane, and elicited from her a cry of pain, were crystallographers-in-training:
they were in the process of acquiring a feel for the possible geometries, forces and
movements within proteins. Of the advanced students I interviewed, all recognized
Diane's skills but said they were still "nowhere near" her "level" yet. This was a skill they
understood as her ability to look at a model and intuit what was right and what was wrong.
However, Diane's skill, as she says, to "see what the structure is saying" does not merely
rely on memorized mental images of what proteins should look like. Keen molecular vision
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is, for her, an embodied practice of observation and manipulation, where seeing is also a
way of feeling what the structure is expressing in its form.
A number of specific protein models inhabit Diane's body-those models she worked on
herself. These molecular embodiments are the product of her intense involvement in the
modeling process over long periods of time. Becoming molecular, she is able to give what
is otherwise a virtual structure a physical body, a place for it to dwell. The practice of
building protein models has thus articulated Diane's body with specific molecular
knowledge (Latour, 2004; Prentice, 2005).57 In other words, through an interactive
practice of sculpting molecular models, the models themselves act recursively to sculpt
and reconfigure the modeler's body. Crystallographic modeling is thus a practice of
learning as incorporation, of building the model into one's body as it is sculpted piecemeal
onscreen. In this sense, molecular embodiments are generated by "infolding" the model
into the "flesh" of the modeler, where it comes to reside, as a part of the modeler her- or
himself (on "infolding" see Haraway, 2006; Merleau-Ponty, 1968). Inflected and informed
by the embodied models that get embedded in their tissues, researchers' bodies become
expressive media for the expression of molecular forms.
Conclusion
Protein crystallography presents a visualization practice that challenges traditional notions
57 Bruno Latour (2004) interprets laboratory training as a process that articulates the novice
researcher's sensory body. Drawing on Latour, Rachel Prentice (2005) develops the concept of
"mutual articulation" to describe how computer scientists in collaborations with surgeons design
effective computer simulations for teaching anatomy and surgery. In this case the designer must
articulate the model-patient through codes that in turn articulate the body of the surgeon who uses
this interface for training. There is also a form of "mutual articulation" going on between the
molecular modeler, their computer, and the models they construct.
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of knowledge. It is as if protein crystallographers celebrate lan Hacking's (1983) famous
reformulation of representation "as intervention": their visual facts are produced through
techniques of manipulation, and they are candid about the contributions of some forms of
tacit knowledge to their model-building practice. However, the human-computer lens of
contemporary crystallographic modeling requires that crystallographers have more than
"good hands" (e.g. Heath, 1997): they must also carry their knowledge of protein forms,
forces and movements throughout their bodies. In addition to their hands, their arms,
shoulders, torsos, necks, and even knees can be pulled into play. As they manipulate and
build crystallographic models, they incorporate these unique and complex molecular
forms into the folds of their flesh. In the process they rearticulate and so entrain their
embodied imaginations. Thus, in addition to revising conventional notions of scientific
vision as a practice of disembodied objectivity (see Haraway, 1991), crystallographers'
model-making reworks the relations between subjects and objects of scientific knowledge.
Modeler and model are intimately entangled and co-crafted in this practice. Indeed, as the
very objects around which their professional identities are formed, protein models belong
to their modelers in a way that goes beyond concerns over intellectual property and
scientific priority. To become a crystallographer, the modeler must become their model.
A thicker ethnography of protein modeling must extend beyond the model-building phase.
Once built, the structure of a protein model remains to be interpreted. "Thinking
intelligently about structure," requires hypothesizing how a protein carries out its functions
in the cell. This phase of research also depends on the trained intuitions and embodied
knowledge of experienced crystallographers. As Diane demonstrates, the crystallographer
carries the model within her body, but she also can "get inside of it" in order to "figure
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out" how it "works." Her goal is to have a three-dimensional atomic-resolution
understanding of "how nature has tailored" proteins to do chemical and biological "work"
within the cell. To do this she uses her embodied knowledge of the specific molecular
geometry and chemistry of the protein in order to reason through possible biological
mechanisms. In this sense, figuring out protein mechanisms requires another form of
"body-work," one that couples the body-work of incorporation to that of communication
(see Chapter 5). This wealth of embodied knowledge in turn shapes how proteins come to
be figured, both materially and semiotically within scientific papers and in pedagogical
and professional presentations (see Chapter 4).
Yet, protein models also have a life that extends well beyond the immediate grasp of the
modeler. Once a model is built, it is uploaded into the ever-growing Protein Data Bank,
where it becomes available to researchers in such fields as biological engineering and
rational drug design. Crystallographic models also feed into high-throughput proteomics
initiatives that seek to amass catalogues of all proteins produced in a given cell, tissue, or
species. Interactive graphics technology allows these researchers access to the folds and
intricate chemical forms over which the crystallographer had long labored. As mobile,
interactive objects, protein models can be manipulated and incorporated by a larger
audience, instructing others in the ways of its folds. However, as the models move out
from the crystallography laboratory, and enter wider circulation, crystallographers voice
some anxieties. PDB entries list the atomic coordinates of the protein model, include
relevant statistics and experimental data, and provide files that can be uploaded into
interactive graphics programs. Yet they do not carry the "thickness" of the modelers'
structural knowledge. For example, Edward, one of Diane's postdocs expressed concern
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that others would regard his model as a "static structure," rather than, as he described it, a
"breathing entity." His embodied knowledge is thicker and livelier than the data that can
be transmitted through the PDB: in a sense it is he who keeps his model alive, both in his
trained embodied imagination, and through his lively performances of its form. Thus, in the
process of distribution, much of the crystallographers' artisanal labour is obscured as their
craft-productions are, in a sense, picked off the shelf and swept up in capital-intensive
economies among drug developers and biomedical researchers.
In conclusion, this chapter has aimed to articulate how attention to the "body-fullness" of
protein modeling can transform historical and contemporary conceptions of life science
practice. In this study I have not only aimed to refigure the role of scientists' bodies in their
work, I have also sought new ways of making sense of the objects of biological research.
As protein molecules come to be figured in, through, and as bodies, the flattening tropes of
information and code are no longer adequate metaphors to describe the practices of life
scientists or the substances of life. Rather, molecular models, and the scientists who make
and are made by them, form exceptionally animate assemblages that demand interpretive
strategies with equally dynamic modes of attention.
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Performing The Protein Fold
The Pedagogical Lives of Molecular Models
Models, Bodies and Imaginations
One of my classroom-based field sites for this study included a semester-long lecture
course that examined the biology of protein structure and folding. "The Protein Folding
Problem" was cross-listed in the departments of biology, chemistry, and chemical
engineering and the students, both undergraduate and graduate, came to it from diverse
disciplinary backgrounds, including physics, biological engineering, and computer
science. The professors for the course were Jim Brady and Geoff Miller. Jim is a prominent
protein scientist, who is also known for his commitment to science education. Geoff is a
mechanical engineer who has recently taken an interest in protein structures.
Over the course of the semester I became acutely aware of the challenges these instructors
faced in teaching a new generation of life scientists how to visualize complex three-
dimensional models of proteins. In this course, students were asked both to imagine and
render multidimensional models of otherwise invisible and intangible objects. In the first
weeks of the course, students were encouraged to learn the intricate molecular structures
of proteins "by heart." Jim told the class: "We want you to have it in your head. You need
to know it cold." Throughout the semester, Jim worked hard to impart the skills students
would need to get protein structures in their "heads" and "hearts" through commanding
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performances of his knowledge of protein folding. Throughout his lectures, he leapt
energetically between streaking biochemical equations and experimental data across the
board, and demonstrating protein structures with colourful ball-and-stick models. Geoff, on
the other hand, brought his engineering expertise to the classroom and lit up his lectures
with slick interactive computer graphics displays to demonstrate the special features of
these elaborate molecules. Getting a feel for how these researchers approached the
challenge of training a new cohort of scientists requires some inquiry into the relations
between imagination and learning.
It is a truism that effective science teachers must awaken their students' imaginations. Yet
the landscape of the imagination, its formation, and its role in learning and scientific
research are little understood and seldom explored in the science studies literature. How
do structural biologists envision molecular events in the cell? When they close their eyes,
and imagine their proteins performing chemical reactions in the cell, what does that world
look like? What are the forms, textures, and temporalities of the molecular worlds they
imagine? This study examines biological visualization in the broadest sense: that is,
visualization as a practice of rendering models of life, and visualization as a mode of
conjuring imagined life-worlds. Where it is relatively straightforward to track the material
culture of protein models, including the media and machinery through which they are
constructed, it is more difficult for the historian or anthropologist to gain access to the fluid
permutations of scientists' imaginations.
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Historian of science Maria Trumpler (1997) has developed a wonderful approach to this
challenging field of inquiry. She documents the generation and reproduction of protein
scientists' rich imaginary worlds by inquiring into the changing representations of
membrane channel proteins over several decades. She writes about the "importance of the
scientists' own mental images," and how they "privately conceived" of "large, complex,
three-dimensional moleculels] moving in time and space" (1997: 55). No single model
captures the full picture held in mental images. According to Trumpler,
While any two-dimensional representation on paper shows
only one aspect of the channel, the convergence of the
different representations and the plasticity of imagination
yield a complex mental image that can incorporate all
perspectives simultaneously, reflect differing time scales at
will, and be a collage of various molecular models (1997:
56).
For Trumpler, "complex mental images" of otherwise invisible substances help researchers
pose experimental questions and communicate with each other."8 For her, the successful
mental image of proteins is dynamic: generated by means of the "convergence" of many
distinct modes of representation, mental images are the cumulative product of different
kinds of representations that shift as new visualization techniques and conventions are
incorporated into and worked over by researchers' "plastic" minds. To access the history of
this rich visual imagery, Trumpler examines the visual conventions of diagrams and models
58 Here Trumpler echoes the work of Cambrosio and his colleagues (1993) in their historical study of
the role of Erlich's models in his research into antibodies. In this case, Erlich created cartoon
diagrams that served as representations of what he imagined antibodies might look like and how
they worked, which, in effect, served to materialize otherwise elusive substances. In both these
studies, the role of imagination in scientific research is brought to the fore.
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arrayed in molecular biology textbooks. She notes that textbooks often combine and
juxtapose distinct visual representations in a single figure. She analyzes these figures as
attempts to convey, to students, templates of the converging models that practicing
scientists hold in their imaginations. She treats these as pedagogical devices that instruct
students in how to conjure protein structures in their own minds.
Trumpler makes significant contributions to our understanding of the nature of scientific
imagination: first by identifying the kinds of sources historians might use to find
expressions of otherwise imagined entities; and second, by recognizing that scientific
imaginations are produced through pedagogical processes, such that textbooks can be read
as instruction manuals for producing converging images in students' minds. I am curious,
however, how a methodological shift from accounting for the history of two-dimensional
representations of proteins in textbooks, to ethnographic accounts of the performance of
three-dimensional protein models in biology classrooms, can extend and refine the import
of her work.
With Trumpler, I propose that three-dimensional models have both a rich material history,
as well as lively inner life. As I showed in Chapter 2, X-ray crystallographers hold three-
dimensional protein models "in their hands" and "in their heads." Such embodied models
are both seen and felt in the tissues of the modeler. And yet, embodied imaginations do
find outward expression: model-making practices involve modes of body-work for both the
incorporation and performance of molecular knowledge. For glimpses into the inner life of
protein models, I tune my inquiry into sites where what is at stake is the communication of
embodied molecular knowledge. I examine how structural biologists perform embodied
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models in the classroom context of a lecture course in the biology of protein folding as a
means to demonstrate how models, bodies, and imaginations are entangled in processes of
teaching and learning.
Infolding the Fold
In an interview on teaching practices in introductory biology courses, one of Jim Brady's
former graduate students offered insight into her embodied experience of models of protein
folding. As an undergraduate, Joanna had studied chemistry. Very early on she realized
that she had a remarkable ability to visualize three-dimensional molecular structures and
chemical interactions. She credits her ability to do so well in chemistry to her skills as
"visual spatial learner." "I was never a memorizer," she told me. "But from the moment
that they put Van der Waal radii on molecules...I could see it in my head"59:
You know, when two molecules come together, or even
unlike molecules that don't want to be next to each other,
for whatever reason, I can see those electrons moving to the
other side of the molecule. It made total visual sense to me.
It didn't make sense on paper. It never made sense on paper.
I wasn't a memorization reaction learner at all. But electron-
pushing diagrams made so much sense. And I kept
wondering, "why is everyone else having such a hard time
with this?"
She laughed when I asked her to describe what these models looked like in her
imagination:
19 Van der Waal's radii describe the volume that a particular atom occupies. Van der Waal's forces
prevent atoms from occupying the same volumes.
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Natasha: Are they coloured?
Joanna: Yeah! [Laughter] I've never thought about it this
closely. Yeah, they're coloured! That's kind of bizarre.
Natasha: Are they textured?
Joanna: No, they are pretty smooth. Yeah, they're pretty
smooth! [Laughs] My proteins are either Ribbon diagrams in
my head or Van der Waals, depending on what I'm looking
at. If I'm looking at a binding pocket, it'll be a Van der
Waals image with just a surface that I see up there doing it.
If it's a folding, if anything has to do with folding it's a
Ribbon structure. It's always a Ribbon if it's a folding.
She recognized that the models "in her head" conformed to conventional representations
that she had learned. Diagrams that render Van der Waal radii are a particularly interesting
convention: they not only describe the volume that an atom will occupy, but they are
flexible spheres that can also be used to model regions of attractive and repulsive forces
between atoms. As in the example of Diane "feeling the pain" of the misshapen protein
model, researchers feel Van der Waals forces viscerally: when they look at structures
whose atoms defy allowable radii, they the sense the inter-molecular tension in their
bodies. I asked Joanna if these were forces she could feel as well as see. "It's hard to
describe. I just see it in 3D" she told me. But seeing for her appears to be a strongly
corporeal experience: as she described proteins that she had worked on in the lab, her
body came alive with articulate gestures that demonstrated molecular forms and forces.
She showed me how she communicates the complex forms and movements that are in her
imagination. With her arms held out in front of her, her wrists touching, palms open and
facing upwards, and her hands seeming to hold some invisible substance, she told me:
I always do this. [Emphasizing the gesture]. Whenever I talk
about the crystal structure...I always do this. 'Cause that's
how the molecule kind of looks. It's like this [Emphasizing
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the gesture, she rotates her hands and body.] You know.
And domain one unfolds and then it's flopping around. [She
mimes this floppy domain with one hand]. You know.
Always. Always. Even in my thesis defense talk. It was like
this. And it was flopping around like this.
In attempts to communicate protein folding to her colleagues, she performs her embodied
model of the protein, itself a convergence of many modeling efforts.
As a post-doc currently involved in developing new strategies for teaching undergraduate
biology, Joanna has faced some major hurdles trying to teach others how to see molecules
in three-dimensions. It has become clear to her that not everybody has the ability to
visualize complex molecules:
To me it is so intuitive. My hardest stumbling block is to
rationalize that it's not like that for everyone else. So to me
the hard part was actually stepping back, and realizing not
everyone gets this. How can I get other people to
understand what I see in my head automatically?
Like Joanna, I am also curious about how three-dimensional knowledge of protein
structures gets into students "heads". Jim and Geoff's protein folding class offers some clues
to explore this process in depth. What they demonstrate is that there is nothing "automatic"
about the process.
In one of his early lectures Jim drew his students' attention to some confusion around a
homework assignment. Some apparently had trouble with the wording of "Question 2".
Directing the students to a Ribbon diagram of a protein structure found in the textbook"
60 The textbook for the course was Brinden and Tooze (1999).
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the students were asked to:
Draw, copy, or trace a version of Figure 2 (e) with the alpha carbons and
nitrogen atoms clearly labeled or coloured.
Apparently some students had some trouble interpreting the meaning of "copy." Jim
clarified: "This means hand copy! If you Xerox it, you don't assimilate it!" "You have to
trace it!" he implored. He demanded that the students get involved in the structures: in
order to learn by heart the form of the fold, they had to trace the direction of the poly-
peptide chain by hand. He demonstrated for the class. Against the backdrop of larger-than-
life projection of a Ribbon diagram of a protein structure, Jim swept his entire body up in
the act of tracing the elaborate curvature of the fold (see Figure 3.1). He caught the curve
of the winding backbone, and traversing the full visual space of the amplified model, he
hitched a ride on its folds. As he folded his body to follow the direction of the poly-peptide
backbone, he told the class: "You have to signal actively" in order to "get" the structure of
the fold. He demonstrated how, in his words, "you can't not learn something" if you get
your body involved. Here Jim clued his students into their bodies as resources that they
could use to learn the fine structures of complex three-dimensional molecular forms.
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Figure 3.1: Ribbon diagram of a protein. Used with
permission from an anonymous informant.
Joanna and Jim offer an instructive cue that has helped me figure out where and how to
look for evidence of scientific imaginations in-the-making. In so doing, they also
demonstrate how Trumpler's notion of a "mental image" does not fully convey the
multidimensional textures of researchers' molecular imaginaries. Textbook images present
models as representations-the end products of scientific work. Yet, researchers' molecular
imaginaries are more than the convergence of representations in the form of "mental
images"; protein models are also renderings, and their conception, construction, and
elaboration have rich corporeal histories. Models don't just light up in their minds: they
multidimensional objects that entangle scientists' bodies.
Rather than producing "mental images" of converging representations of proteins, I argue
that structural biologists' imaginations are animated by the convergence of "embodied
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models." The difference between these accounts-between imagination as the
convergence of "mental images" or of "embodied models"-is that the latter pulls scientific
representations off the page and opens up a space for recognizing the multi-sensorial,
embodied nature of the formation of scientific imaginations. I see experienced researchers'
imaginations as animations of a multidimensional array of visualizations, analogies, and
data forms that they can both see and feel; over time, their embodied imaginations become
repositories of the most textured and nuanced imagery of protein folding. As experienced
researchers and teachers, Jim and Geoff face the serious challenge of communicating their
embodied models of protein folding to their students. Tracking just how they articulate
their embodied models requires that I attend to the body-work of teaching and learning;
that is, to the performance of models in the classroom.
As I examine throughout this study, researchers' embodied knowledge of proteins animates
classroom lectures, conference presentations, informal talks, and casual conversations. In
this chapter I show how these otherwise tacit forms of knowing are made explicit in the
classroom. In such sites, instructors teach students how to build their own embodied
models of protein folding, layer by layer. Teachers encourage their students to engage
three-dimensional models of protein structures kinesthetically (e.g. through physical
models and interactive computer graphics interfaces), and to get hooked into their own
bodies and experiences of other bodies as analogues for protein molecules through the use
of human-scale analogies. My thesis is that teaching protein folding biology is a physically
and conceptually demanding practice geared towards remodeling students' bodies and
imaginations, in order to give them a feeling for the fold. I thus offer this ethnography of
their teaching practices to provide a glimpse into the "infoldings" of bodies and models in
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the formation of scientific imaginations and practices of learning (Haraway, 2006;
Merleau-Ponty 1968).
The Protein Folding Problem
At the first meeting of Jim and Geoff's course, "The Protein Folding Problem," over fifty
students cram into the classroom. In his first lecture, Jim recalled that just fifteen years
earlier, when he first started teaching the course, only ten students signed up. "What has
changed?" he asks the class. "Why so much interest in proteins?" The growing wave of
interest in proteins among students appears to echo the interests of the pharmaceutical
industry and researchers in biomedicine and public health. Protein folding research has
attracted massive funding and a multi-disciplinary group of researchers (e.g. Smaglick,
2000; Wadman, 1999). In these arenas, there are currently major efforts underway to
develop new understandings and new treatments based on knowledge of protein structure
and protein folding pathways. For example, Alzheimer's, Huntington's, and CJD, the
human form of mad cow disease, are all protein-folding diseases, in which proteins in the
specific kinds of cells do not fold correctly. Misfolded proteins damage tissues by
producing lethal aggregations inside cells. The problem as Jim defines it is that no one fully
understands how "healthy" proteins "know how" to fold into the proper conformations, or
what triggers them to misfold.
When protein folding fails, Jim is concerned that "we can't efficiently correct the problem."
In a vivid example of the protein folding problem on an industrial scale, Jim describes Eli
Lilly's Indianapolis fermentation plant that produces insulin for "10 million diabetics."
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There they enlist E. coli bacteria into insulin production through genetic engineering. The
proteins produced inside these bacterial cells are, however, not yet in the "active" form.
The peptides that are produced must first be extracted from the bacteria, and then purified,
unfolded, denatured, refolded and processed in vitro to get them to fold into their active
conformations. Jim illustrates his point: "If insulin is not folded correctly, it forms
scrambled eggs." Though researchers at Eli Lilly have, through trial and error, developed a
series of steps to go from "scrambled eggs" to "native" (meaning active) insulin, the
biochemical processes involved in getting insulin "folded" into the correct conformation, is
itself is not fully understood. There is currently no coherent theory on which they can draw
for the precise engineering of this process.
Jim believes that progress in this area requires the training a new cohort of scientists to
tackle the problem. He advertises the course as a means to spur a generation of students to
take on the task of "deciphering the second half of the genetic code." He presents a
challenge to his students: "Hopefully one of you will solve this class of problems." Indeed,
this course is not so much designed for the generational reproduction of a set of known
facts, but as a way to equip students with the tools they will need to push the field forward.
Jim organizes the course so that his students can acquire what he calls a "deep" knowledge
of protein structure and folding.61
61 It should be noted that this chapter limits its focus to the activities of teaching and the techniques
for learning that are introduced in the classroom setting. I have not included interviews with
students or attempts to capture their "uptake" or incorporation of the structural knowledge of
molecules. Further studies need to be conducted to examine students' individual and collective
"memory practices" (Bowker, 2005). How do students "sign" molecular models to each other? How
do they teach themselves and each other? How do they learn "how to learn" about molecular form
within and beyond the classroom?
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In class, Jim described the emergence of the protein folding problem for life scientists. The
defining moment for him was when the first model of myoglobin was produced by John
Kendrew's laboratory at the LMB in Cambridge, UK. In 1958, Nature published
photographs of a more refined version of Kendrew's first "sausage" model (Kendrew, et al.,
1958). Looking a little less like viscera than the sausage model, this model resembled
sculptures of contorted bodies caught in an awkward embrace.62 According to Jim, this
model was "shocking" to the scientific community: "The moment that image hit the press,
people wondered: 'How does this chain know where to go'?" Kendrew himself was
surprised by the irregularity of the protein structure that emerged from his X-ray data. He
had expected that proteins, able to organize themselves into highly ordered crystalline
states, would have some form of internal symmetry (Kendrew, 1964). What gave this
strange molecule its conformation? How did this polypeptide chain know how to fold?
Jim describes the challenge of the protein folding problem: "You can have a deep
understanding of the end state, but have no clue how it got there." Proteins fold deep
within the cell; this process occurs on the "subvisible" scale of atoms and at the speed of
nanoseconds, and is thus, in practice, invisible. Visualizing protein folding thus presents a
significant challenge to researchers, and they have responded with an array of imaging,
modeling and simulation techniques drawn from chemistry, physics, biochemistry,
crystallography, molecular genetics, computer science, and mathematics. Even still,
protein folding has resisted definitive visualization and analysis. No single representation
of protein folding satisfactorily captures the elusive behaviours of the polypeptide chain as
62 For a history of Kendrew's myoglobin models see de Chadarevian (2002).
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it wriggles its way through a range of conformations in search of its "active" or "native"
state. Computer scientists and mathematicians have attempted to build simulations to
animate these dynamic processes (see Figure 3.2), but as I show in Chapter 5, the
animations are approached cautiously and with much skepticism. Protein folding thus
presents visualization and communication challenges for scientists and their students: what
can they do to convey the full multidimensionality of this process?
The process of protein folding is not only difficult to communicate through pictures and
words; it also presents a challenge to the ubiquitous application of cybernetic models of
communication to cellular processes. If one follows the mechanism outlined by the
increasingly shaky "central dogma" of molecular biology, polypeptide chains are the end
product of a complex process that involves the reading and writing-the "transcription"
and "translation"-of "information" stored within the genome.6 3 In this rhetoric, DNA is
transcribed into an RNA molecule, which, in turn, serves as a "messenger" that transports
an RNA "transcript" of the nuclear DNA into the cytoplasm. It is in the cytoplasm that
ribosomes, tiny macromolecular organelles, "read" the ribonucleic transcript, and
"translate" it into a polypeptide chain of amino acids linked end to end.6
63 For critical readings of the history of the central dogma see Keller (1995), Kay (2000), Haraway
(1991), Doyle (1997). For an example of how biologists are reworking the central dogma see Coen
(1999).
64 For a fabulous "animation" of the translation of RNA into protein, see "Protein Synthesis: An Epic
on the Cellular Level." This re-enactment of protein synthesis was performed on a football field at
Stanford University in 1971. Introducing the resulting film, Nobel Prize Laureate Paul Berg notes,
"Only rarely is there an opportunity to participate in a molecular happening. You are going to have
that opportunity. For this film attempts to portray symbolically, yet in a dynamic and joyful way, one
of nature's fundamental processes: the linking together of amino acids to form a protein." The
reenactment is set to a revision of Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky," and is produced in what
Berg calls the "dance idiom": dancers in flamboyant costumes portray key molecules in the protein
synthesis pathway, leaping about and calling out their molecular identities to animate the
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It is at the point where the polypeptide chain is released into the cytoplasmic matrix that
the protein folding problem emerges as a practical issue for the cell. This is also the point
where the metaphor of cybernetic communication breaks down, and ceases to do
productive work for illuminating what I call the molecular practices of cells. For a protein
to acquire cellular activity, the long, floppy polypeptide chain must fold itself into specific
conformations. In the process of forming active structures, the polypeptide chain folds,
unfolds, and refolds dynamically. A single chain can form intricate secondary structures
such as coils, helices, or sheets, each which depend on delicate hydrogen bonding
between the side chains of the amino acids for their formation and structural integrity.
There is no template or code that determines a protein's active form: many different amino
acid sequences can produce similar tertiary structures, and similar sequences can even
produce different folds. Somehow, the proteins, in their complex cellular environments,
must figure out how to fold themselves into their active three-dimensional forms. It is in
this interruption of the cybernetic model of information flow that protein folding has
stumped researchers for the last fifty years.
"programming" and "assembly" of a polypeptide chain. If this is indeed a reenactment of the
cybernetic metaphors of code and information flow, it is at least cybernetics on LSD. This movie has
become a major hit on YouTube, with over 110,000 viewings as of June 2007. It is widely viewed in
undergraduate biology classrooms, and has been repeatedly recommended to me by practicing
scientists. See
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9dhOOiCLww
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Figure 3.2: Screen shots from a hypothetical computer
simulation of a protein folding. This simulation describes a
theoretically feasible pathway for protein folding see the
protein folding prediction simulations by David T. Jones at:
http://ww.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/D.lones/
Since the early 1960s, researchers in biochemistry, biophysics, molecular biology,
engineering and computer science have searched in vain for an algorithm to predict the
protein folding pathway and the active structure of the protein from the amino acid
sequence of a polypeptide chain. Cyrus Levinthal, working in collaboration with computer
scientists and engineers at MIT's Project MAC, was the first to devise an ambitious project
to use computer algorithms to predict complex protein structures (Levinthal, 1966;
Francoeur, 2002; Francoeur and Segal, 2004). Working with the assumption that the
biologically active conformation of the protein would be at its "lowest energy state,"
Levinthal developed computer algorithms that experimented with hypothetical forms of
protein molecules. However, no matter how much he tweaked his computer programs, he
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failed to predict the correct conformations for protein structures that had already been
determined with X-ray crystallography. 6
Today, Increasingly powerful computers are being applied to protein prediction. Computer
modelers participate in competitions to test their algorithms for protein structure
prediction. CASP, or "Critical Assessment of Techniques for Protein Structure Prediction,"
is a competition funded by NIH and the National Library of Medicine. This competition
has now hosted a series of experiments, in which protein modelers apply their predictive
algorithms to see which methods best predict the structures of proteins.66 The biggest
challenge these researchers face turns out to be modeling where and how water molecules
interact with the polypeptide chain as it folds up in its wet, cellular environment. One of
the problems is that this work requires extensive computer power to run protein folding
simulations. This problem has been addressed by distributed computing. Folding@Home,
for example, is protein prediction project that has been modeled on SETI (which searches
for signs of extra-terrestrial life in the universe) by making use of volunteers' home
computers to run predictive algorithms.67 These projects continue, with marginal success,
to devise algorithms in attempts to predict structure from protein sequence (e.g. Jones,
1997).
65 The failures of this assumption have led to what is known as the "Levinthal Paradox", whereby a
single polypeptide chain can have multiple low energy states. Jim suggests that the assumption that
the native conformation is at the lowest energy is "religious dogma," which is not based on
empirical evidence.
66 See httpl//predictioncenter.org
67 For Folding@home see http://folding.stanford.edu
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In 2004, Diane Griffin introduced the speaker at a university-wide lecture on protein
folding hosted by the department of chemistry. The speaker was Barry Honig, a Howard
Hughes Medical Institute researcher at Columbia University. Half joking, Diane introduced
him as "the man who, if he's right," will put her and other crystallographers "out of work."
A burst of nervous laughter rose from the audience as they sat with anticipation to hear the
latest on computational advances in Honig's talk, titled "Protein Structure Prediction."
Although he admitted current failures, Honig expressed his confidence that they will soon
be able to predict folding pathways and structures, and in effect, replace the empirical
work of crystallographers and other structural biologists (Honig, 1999). However confidant
Honig's claims were, it was a tough sell for this crowd.
Jim Brady and members of his laboratory were in the audience at Honig's talk. I sat a
couple of rows away from Jim and watched his reaction to the talk. He didn't ask questions
at the end of the lecture, and when it was over promptly got up and left the room. As he
had emphasized in his lectures, he is skeptical of those who believe they would find the
answer to the protein folding problem with bigger and better computers. In his second
lecture of his course he explained to the class that DNA "codes" cannot be treated as a
proper language, and so, the rhetoric of informatics does not hold for proteins. If there is
no algorithm to predict the fold, what then could be going on in the transformation of the
linear peptide into the complex three-dimensional structure of the mature protein? For Jim,
"protein folding is a deep problem." Refusing to flatten protein folding into a two-
dimensional problem of reading or writing DNA sequences, he drew his students' attention
to the depths and dynamics of the fold. If they are to become "true protein folders," as
Joanna his former student identifies, they must learn how to embrace the "depths" of the
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protein folding problem, and with this, the indeterminacy of the fold. I read this as an
admission that protein folding doesn't readily lend itself to computation or automation, and
as such, I see it as an invocation that researchers must go "deeper," and apply their bodies
and imaginations to cultivating embodied models of proteins.
Over the duration of this lecture course, I was able to observe the layer-by-layer, real-time
construction of what, after Trumpler, could be called "converging models" of protein
folding. In his lessons, Jim scribbled a seemingly endless series of graphs and equations
across the blackboard to illustrate the biochemistry of protein folding in relation to
experimental data on molecular kinetics. He augmented these shorthand scrawls, diagrams
and charts with several other visualization media. These included analogies and physical
models. In addition, in his lectures, Geoff contributed to this rich visual culture by building
physical models of protein structures, and conducting demonstrations with interactive
computer graphics and virtual animations. Taken together, these various modeling media
combined to give body to the folds and structures of protein molecules.
Modeling Molecular Bodies by Analogy
Models that function by means of analogy are useful for illustrating the intertwining of
mind and body in scientific reasoning. Analogies can illustrate complex processes or
otherwise inaccessible phenomena by enlisting imagination, experience and intuition
(Morgan and Morrison, 1999). Peter Taylor and Ann Blum suggest that modeling by
analogy and metaphor enable "associations from one field to animate a scientist's thinking
about another field," and so make "research 'do-able'" (1991: 276). Analogies can be
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thought of as producing their own form of "realism" (Lynch, 1990: 208). In this sense,
analogies achieve a materiality that can often be more tangible than the thing being
modeled (see Cambrosio, et al., 1993). In particular, conceptual analogies can connect
familiar, embodied experience of the world to distant or invisible phenomena. Jim used
analogies in his class to materialize the phenomena of protein folding in forms and at
scales that made them tangible to his students. The use of analogies in the class
demonstrates the material-semiotic practices involved in modeling students' bodies and
imaginations with knowledge of protein folding.
Each time Jim introduced a new class of proteins, he offered the students what he called a
"motivator" to capture their interest in the protein of the day. These motivators were
analogies that got the students thinking about the everyday materiality of proteins. He used
examples of cooking egg whites and making Jell-O to illustrate effects of heat and cooling
on proteins like albumin and collagen: heat denatures proteins and promotes their
aggregation, changing the state of a substance from fluid to solid. According to Jim, Jell-O
is merely "unfolded collagen." To call up people's familiar experiences with collagen in its
denatured form, Jim offers other examples such as glue, the congealing of chicken soup
and the healing of wounds. He also used fever as an analogy to illustrate the temperature
sensitivity of protein folding ("above 106 degrees, you're dead"). Beginning at the
macroscopic scale he took the class on a journey from the familiar worlds of corporeal
experience, down to the molecular realm. In this way he tapped into students' experience
to help them get a richer feel for these substances.
These analogies gave texture to the molecular worlds that the students in the class couldn't
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otherwise grasp. In some senses, these analogical models were metonymic in their nature.
Metonymy, by connecting part and whole through association, acts by revealing contiguity
through processes of scale-manipulation (Lanham, 1991: 101-2). However, rather than
using a "part" of a thing to stand in for the "whole," Jim inverted this rhetorical form: he
used the "whole," that is, large-scale phenomena to draw students into the molecular
"parts". In other words, Jim employed human-scale phenomena like egg whites, hair, and
gastric juices, processes like the curdling of milk, and the cooking of eggs to model the
structures and states of proteins at the molecular scale.
These metonymic figurations were meant to hook students' imaginations. Yet, he also
recognized that these motivators wouldn't always hook everyone. When he didn't get a
rise out of the class from his description of leather as unfolded collagen, he muttered under
his breath, "Nobody wears leather shoes anymore. We're moving into the modern age. I
need to change the motivator!" And again, when no one could answer his question about
what happens to blood when you heat it up, he felt compelled to provide washing
instructions to the students so they would know what to do if they got bloodstains on their
clothes:
Let's say we want to look at denaturation versus
temperature. Let's take a mixture of ovalbumin and
lysozyme in egg whites. What happens when you heat that
up? Does it denature? Yes. Can you establish an equilibrium
between the denatured state and the native state? No? What
about haemoglobin? Some of you are very familiar with
haemoglobin. What happens when you heat up
haemoglobin? Some of you must have had bloodstains? [No
response.] You never had bloodstains? Wow. [A male
student tentatively answers: "It loses colour?"]. It changes its
colour. Right? And then is it easy to get out? You know? No!
Once you heat up haemoglobin, right...if you make a
mistake and you've got a bloodstain, and you put it in a
washing machine with hot water, you are done, you'll never
127
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
get it out. You are much better off washing it in cold water.
[Laughter]. Let me tell you, you ever get a bloodstain you
have to wash it with cold water [Jim gets louder]! If you
wash it in hot water you will get thermal denaturation and
aggregation!
This is, of course, a lesson the women, who make up about half the class, likely
understood quite well, though were in no position to admit publicly."6 Faced with an
awkward silence from his students, Jim was forced to scrounge for hooks that could elicit
recognition and produce an embodied understanding of the effects of heat on protein
folding. When the hooks did work, however, their effect was visceral. I, for one, really got
how collagen folds at the site of fresh wounds by contemplating the formation of my own
scars.
For philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers (1999; n.d.), abstractions, such as analogies
and models, are propositions "asking for, and prompting, a 'leap of imagination'; they act
as a lure for feeling, for feeling 'something that matters.'" Effective models, like analogies,
can produce what Stengers (n.d.) calls an "empirically felt elucidation of our experience":
To define abstractions as lures and not as generalizations is
something any mathematician would endorse. For a
mathematician abstractions are not opposed to concrete
experience. They vectorize concrete experience. Just think
to [sic] the difference between the mute perplexity and
disarray of anybody who faces a mathematical proposition
or equation as a meaningless sequence of signs, and the one
who, looking at this same sequence, experiments [sic]69
sheer disclosure, who immediately knows how to deal with
it, or is passionately aware that a new possibility of doing
mathematics may be there. In order to think abstractions in
68 During his lecture, Jim showed no sign that he recognized the gendered aspects of his inquiry into
students' experiences with blood-as-hemoglobin.
69 In translation from the French, there is a wonderful folding over between "experience" and
"experiments" in Stengers' text.
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the constructivist sense I am presenting, we need to forget
about nouns like "a table" or "a human being" and think
rather about a mathematical circle. Such a circle is not
abstracted from concrete circular forms, its mode of
abstraction is related to its functioning as a lure for
mathematical thought, luring mathematicians into
adventures which produce into [sic] a mathematical mode
of existence new aspects of what it means to be a circle
(n.d., emphasis added).
Here, the metonymic motivators that Jim uses to traverse dramatic shifts in scale can be
understood as "lures" that operate to "vectorize concrete experience": they move the
students to feel the transformations the protein undergoes in its folding and unfolding, as
movements they can sense with their own bodies. This is the "sheer disclosure" of insight,
which suggests that understanding is a kind of bodily "concrescence" (see Stengers on
Whitehead, 1999). I read concrescence as a material-semiotic convergence where
"knowing" is a feeling that resonates in one's flesh. And yet, as I explore more thoroughly
in Chapter 4, a lure is only effective in the hands of someone trained to use it; that is,
trained in the nuances of the world a particular abstraction inspires. Stengers' example of
the abstraction of a mathematical circle shows how a circle operates as a lure most
especially for the trained mathematician, who is immediately pulled into a whole world of
circles as mathematical objects. Seen in this light, it is Jim's job in the classroom to both
generate lures that can hook his students in, and train them in how follow these lures so
that they can "vectorize" their experience and make the Alice-in-Wonderland leap into
molecular worlds.
The Body-work of Modeling
Three-dimensional models can be thought of as enactments of the intimate knowledge
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their modelers engendered in their production. Yet models have a life that extends beyond
the immediate grasp of their modelers. When molecular models leave the hands of their
makers, the models themselves become teachers in their own right. They do this by
attracting the active and "curious hands" of other users.70 Models and modeling practices
are mobile, they move from research into teaching contexts and back again as they are
built, used, revised, remodeled, and reconfigured (see Hopwood, 1999; Francoeur, 1997).
In this sense, models have a pedagogical life cycle as they move between the hands of
their makers and users: in different contexts, these objects afford different kinds of
interactions and different kinds of learning. Teaching, learning, and research thus become
intertwined through practices of modeling.
During a lecture on the major folds or secondary structures that form in proteins, Jim
demonstrated the structure of the alpha-helix with a well worn ball-and-stick model. He
claimed that this relic was brought to this campus some fifty years ago from the LMB in
Cambridge, England. The model Jim held up in front of his class re-membered the
molecular structure that Linus Pauling "discovered" in 1948.71 Indeed, the model that Jim
held up was one of many replicas of the alpha-helix that had been produced to help other
researchers grasp the fine details of this special fold. Elaborating this point, Jim recounted a
story about his experience as a post-doctoral fellow at Cambridge University. There he
worked with Cyrus Chothia and Arthur Lesk at the MRC when they were investigating
Pauling's proposed structure in order to learn how alpha-helices might pack together to
70 On how models attract "curious hands" see Langridge, et al. (1981: 661).
71 See Glusker (1981), Pauling, et al. (1951).
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form larger tertiary structures within proteins. According to Jim, they spent "years and years
and years just looking at this structure." This required re-building physical models of the
alpha-helix and trying to figure out how multiple helices might pack together.
In this case, Pauling's original model of the alpha-helix was transformed. No longer an
object whose intrinsic properties remained to be determined--what Hans J6rg Rheinberger
(1997) might call an "epistemic thing"-the model became a "technical object" in an
experimental system that posed a different kind of question: rather than inquiring into what
this thing was, Chothia and Lesk was an inquiry into how this structure related to other
similarly shaped things. Made over into an experimental tool, it became a means to
produce new kinds of questions. In a sense these models became what Rheinberger might
call "vehicles for materializing questions" (1997: 28).
Models of the alpha-helix also became instructive objects that taught their users how to
look at molecular structures, and see in new ways. Jim reminisced:
One thing was very clear in that group: some people were
just able to sit and look at the structures. But most people
could not do that. They had to get up and get a cup of coffee
and do an experiment. Some people could just look at the
structures. And finally they saw things that nobody else saw.
Because that discipline of sitting and looking is something
that is very hard. And it is something that has been lost. I
worked with Aaron Klug who won the Nobel Prize for a
three-dimensional structure. He used to sit there and say to
us, he'd say, "You Americans you can't sit still long enough!
You go off and do an experiment... You don't look."
Jim used the ball-and-stick model to teach his students how to see. In so doing, he offered
insight into practices of looking and the corporeal discipline involved in working with and
learning from molecular models. When Jim presented the alpha-helix to the class he made
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it clear that "sitting and looking" is anything but a leisurely activity. You can't just gaze
lazily at the model: "If you just look at it you don't see anything." Playing on the double
meaning of the verb "to grasp", he told the class: "Now...This is not easy to grasp, and
that's why it's so important to grasp these structures. 72 He picked up the model, which was
two feet tall and a foot and a half in diameter, and rotated it around in his hands, assuring
the class, "soon you will start to see." He demonstrated that "seeing" requires active
handling. With his hands and eyes he showed the class how to "walk through" the model
amino acid by amino acid. Examining it atom by atom, he used his hands to feel around
the grooves and ridges formed by the side chains as they spiraled up the helix. For Jim,
"sitting and looking" involved his whole body, and so he showed the students what they
would have to do with their bodies in order to really get a handle on the intricate folds of
protein models.
The protein folding problem demands that students develop keen spatial reasoning skills as
well as the ability to "recall" instantly the form of a given protein structure. Jim made this
requirement clear: "You must be able to see leucine [an amino acid] in three dimensions.
You need to be able to see it immediately." When he demonstrated the structure of the
leucine zipper, an important fold for protein-DNA interactions, Jim joked that students
need to know it well enough so that "if your grandmother asks you for it, you could draw
it." These instructors did not expect students to absorb this knowledge passively by just
looking with their eyes. In his performance of the model of the alpha-helix, Jim's bodily
involvement was essential. As demonstrated in his insistence on "hand copying" rather
72 For a description of embodied metaphors like "grasping" see Lakoff and Johnson (1999).
132
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
than photocopying the diagram in the textbook, he did not expect the students to absorb
this knowledge passively: he insisted the students fold the structures into their bodies.
Building Molecular Models
In contrast to the gooey, proteinacious forms that Jim evoked through his body-based
analogies, Geoff brought "engineering thinking" to the classroom. Able to think about the
physicality, forces, and forms of protein structures, he also drew on a different logic than
the linguistic and cybernetic metaphors that have dominated theories and practices in
molecular biology over the last five decades. According to Jim, people who can think like
Geoff are sought after by biologists to help them reason through the intricacies of structure.
When Jim was first working on the lattice structure of a virus, he turned to Geoff: "No wet
biochemist could deal with a lattice. Who knows about lattices? Engineers know." Indeed,
while many of Geoff's lectures were illustrated with digital media, on several occasions he
felt compelled to "bring home" the complex structures he was describing by using
improvised physical models that he would pass around the class. In one case he passed
around a soccer ball as a physical model of the icosahedral structure of a viral protein
shell, and in another, he demonstrated the ways two helices come together in the
formation of a special fold found in collagen microfibrils-the coiled coil-by using rolled
transparencies marked with the locations of amino acid side chains as they would be
positioned on the helix (see Figure 9). True to engineering form, during one lecture he
rigged-up a model of collagen microfibrils with pencils, "magic tape" and a volunteer:
Alright, so this is a diagram [of collagen, projected on the
LCD screen, see Figure 3.31 to try and get in your head. And
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if you're like me...I couldn't quite visualize it. So if you
don't mind, we're going to play a little game....Sparing no
expense, what I have here...And this one takes some
volunteers, so if you don't mind, I'll sign you up. [Points to a
male student in front of him]. This is not a skill thing, it's just
proximity. [Laughter]...Alrighty? And this is what we are
going to do. I have very expensive materials. I have pencils,
which are going to approximate little collagen triple helices.
And this is absolutely the best. I don't know how you feel
about the state of marketing ... I want you to know, this is
"Magic Tape." It says right there "Magic Tape." ... Anyhow,
here's what we are going to do...Everybody see the elements
here? I'm going to do all the hard work. I'm going to put
them down and then you get to hold it while I tape it
together.
Each pencil represented a helical structure formed by three collagen peptides, and Geoff
laid the pencils down, side by side, with their ends staggered with respect to each other.
He used a transparency marked with a grid to define the stagger distances between each
triple helix. In close negotiation with the student, he managed to roll the five pencils up to
create a tube-like structure.
Okay I'm going to pick this thing up, and I'm hoping you are
going to tape this sucker everywhere you can. Nature does
this in a flash. It doesn't need magic tape either. We are
going to pass this thing around, lest they think we are
fooling them ... Perfect. Alright. Give Chris a hand here
[clapping] ... Starting with you, we'll pass this around. A
collagen microfibril right before your very eyes!
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Figure 3.3: Three views of the coiled-coil structure of
collagen microfibrils. I used Swiss PDB to produce this
image by downloading the coordinates for a collagen
microfibril from the PDB and experimenting with different
views and visualization conventions. The original structure
was deposited by J Bella, et al. (PDB ID lcgd), and was
published in Structure (1995) Volume 3(9): 893-906.
As the model was passed around, students examined it closely, rotating it in their hands,
and looking down through the narrow channel formed at the center. They chimed in with
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questions about what pencils represented, and how microfibrils packed together to form
higher order structures of collagen fibrils. The demonstration was a success in that it got
the students working with their hands and gave them a concrete structure to think with so
they could begin to ask questions. As this example demonstrates, physical models were put
into play where two-dimensional representations failed to get students bodies involved in
the structural problem at hand.
Projection and Play with Virtual Models
Where models like the ball-and-stick alpha-helix seem to be relics of days gone by, this
new cohort of students can download molecular graphics software onto their home
computers in order to play in the molecular realm. There is indeed a playful element to the
software, but a kind of play that's inherently pedagogical. In his lectures, Geoff took the
students on "Hollywood tours" projecting protein structures using slick interactive
molecular graphics and animation programs. "Just in case you haven't played with your
Playstation today," he announced to the class, "This is a little fun ride." He invited the
students into the game of interactive molecular graphics, playing up the magic show effect
of these "nifty" tools.
Geoff walked the students through the main features of interactive graphics programs like
SwissPDB, Chime, and Protein Explorer (see Figure 3.4). These tools enable the display and
manipulation of the protein structure data that can be downloaded from the Protein Data
Bank (PDB). In addition to leading students through the ins and outs of the programs, Geoff
also instructed the students how to look and what to see in molecular molecules on-
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screen. With his mouse and a few control keys, he demonstrated how one can zoom in on
particular regions of the protein fold, highlight specific amino acid groups, rotate the
molecule in digital space, and develop an eye for finding the right point of view to display
particular structural features. The challenge, as he presented it to the class, was that
molecular models are complex. There are a "whole lot of atoms," he explained, "what you
want to look at is distributed through the molecule. There's not one single thing that you
look at." "Looking" for Geoff, appears to involve as much "handling" as Jim's walk
through of the physical model of the alpha-helix.
In one lecture, while Geoff was in the midst of projecting a virtual model for the class, Jim
jumped in to help to narrate the biology of a particular fold. With Geoff at the controls of
the interface, Jim called out requests for Geoff to display certain views, or highlight specific
residues to emphasize certain features of the molecule. New, more dramatic views of the
proteins were met with hushed "Oohs!" and "Ahhs!" from the students behind me.
Collectively the instructors demonstrated how interactive molecular graphics software
could be used to reveal otherwise hidden features, conceal some at the expense of others,
and to move back and forth between viewpoints. According to Geoff, "You're going to find
you spend 90% time spent fiddling to get the point of view correct." He told the class that
they'll have to keep asking "Where did that disulphide bond go?" He advised the students
to "pick a view that looks good to you and remember it."
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Figure 3.4: A screen shot of a protein model viewed through
the SwissPDB graphics interface. To make this image, I
downloaded the coordinates of a protein (beta-purothionin,
a plant toxin) from the PDB (PD8 ID 1bhp) and played with
various visual conventions until I found a way to highlight
the alpha-helices and beta sheets in the molecule. The
original structure was deposited by M.M. Teeter, et al., and
published in Acta Cystallography, Section D (1995), Vol.
51: 914.
Yet he was not totally swayed by what he called the "pretty pictures" that can be generated
through these technologies, and warned the students against the "deception of animation."
In a fly through tour of coiled coils, he paused to offer this:
And let me just point out to you, if you were paying
attention there, you'll notice the deception of animation. I
can only pull on this [alpha-helix] as a rigid body. I only
have at my disposal the means to translate this, to pull it
sideways as a rigid body. If you look at it your intuition
should tell you that you should not be able to do that.
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Because these things are wrapped around each other. The
physics of the matter would require you to unravel [the coil].
And that's exactly the situation...And of course here [in this
virtual medium] we can just ignore that. We can just let
these things blithely interpenetrate! [Laughter] To hell with
physics!
Both Geoff and Jim adopted what could be called a "critical epistemology of
visualization."" Geoff pointed out a common misconception about models derived from
crystallographic modeling: "Beware of the fallacy of false precision. You get the impression
that these molecules are known rock solid....But there is a certain amount of judgment
involved." He warned the students that crystallographers do a lot of what he calls
"tweaking and jiggering" to get the best fit between the model and the data. "What you are
seeing is someone's best guess." In line with numerous other research scientists across an
array of disciplines (Turkle, et al., 2005), these instructors were faced with the challenge of
assessing the possibilities and limitations of emerging virtual media. As such, they were
adamant about teaching their students how to engage these tools critically. What is
interesting here is that the measures against which virtual media are tested are based on
73 On critical epistemologies of visualization see Turkle et al (2005). In results emerging out of a
collaborative NSF study on computation, visualization and emerging professional identities, myself,
Sherry Turkle, Joseph Dumit, Susan Silbey, Hugh Gusterson, and David Mindell introduced the term
critical epistemology of visualization to account for the ways that interactivity in virtual media
allows practitioners to exercise their tacit skills, judgment, and skepticism with regard to computer
mediation of their objects and experiments. This term refers to the many ways that researchers and
designers assess the truth claims and scientific value of visual images, the kinds of criteria they
invoke for evaluating images, and more generally, the ways they critique visualization and
simulation practices. In my research for this project I found that today's life scientists approach
visualization with a healthy skepticism. For crystallographers who determine the structures of
complex molecules through a complicated, mentally and physically challenging set of imaging,
mapping and modeling techniques, the model they produce is only ever "just a model." These
researchers understand the representational and technical limitations of their visualizations and
never confuse the model for the molecule itself. Even microscopists who work more directly with
the material they visualize, tend to recognize the extent to which their images are mediated, abstract
representations of the cells they study. In addition, all the cell and molecular scientists we worked
with insisted on a critical pedagogy for visualization.
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the physicality of corporeal experience.
Molecular Gestures
Joanna and her colleagues in the biology department have recently developed a series of
workshops and lesson plans using specially designed three-dimensional models and
interactive computer graphics to help students learn to visualize the structures and
movements of biological molecules. Through this work, Joanna has come to recognize that
teaching these concepts places extra demands on her body to perform the multi-
dimensionality of biological phenomena. While she is wary of what she calls
"anthropomorphizing the molecule" (see Chapter 5)-she worries that students might take
her too literally-she tells me that in class she actively animates molecules with her body:
I probably like the dancing and movement so much [in the
classroom] because I do see these things rolling around in
3D in my head. And yeah, its like, if I could get my body to
do this [As she curves her body around an imaginary fold,
voicing the movement with a "Schwooo!"], and have this
little arm flapping in the breeze. I don't know. It just makes
more sense.
As she talks, her body comes to life, and I can see her delight in communicating the details
of the fold. But what kind of anthropomorphism do her proteinacious choreographies
perform? Need she be so wary of ascribing agency to the molecule? As I investigate below,
it may well be this very mode of becoming molecule that Joanna is able to communicate to
her students in ways that facilitate their learning.
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Drawing on an array of representations, including biochemical assays, crystallographic
structures, computer generated models and simulations, as well as metonymic models that
hook students into molecular phenomena, Jim and Geoff moved through a wide array of
media in order to generate a collage of converging models of protein folding in the
imaginations of their students. And yet, like Joanna, perhaps the most vivid medium that
Jim had available for communicating the forms and movements of proteins was his own
body. Inflected and informed through his own practice of modeling molecular forms, Jim's
body had itself become a pedagogical model.
Bumping up against the limits of language for articulating the qualities of three-
dimensional things, Jim struggled to find the right words to paint a clear picture of protein
structure:
It is clear from the X-ray diffraction patterns that proteins are
objects with space in them. This is very different from
packed polymers. So, we can ask: What is the character of
the interior? Is it oily? Is it patchy with regions of solvent?
But patchy is a two-dimensional word. I can't think of a
three-dimensional word that gets at this.
Where language falls short, and where two-dimensional images fall flat, Jim used his body
to get at the otherwise elusive texture, tensions, forms, and movements of proteins.
Expressive throughout his lectures, he used his body to convey special features of a given
fold. When describing the folding of a globular protein, he often drew his arms into the
core of his body. Curving over and tucking inward to create a concave form, he used the
shape of his arms to mimic the internal organization of helices and sheets. When
describing the packing of two helices in a protein, he repeatedly drew his arms in towards
each other, crossing them at the forearms to specify the precise angle at which they are
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associated. The flexibility or inflexibility of this association was made clear through the
tension he held in his muscles.
Several studies have recently taken up the question of the role of gesture in scientific
reasoning (Alac and Hutchins, 2004; Ochs et al., 1994; Goodwin, 2000) In "Interpretive
Journeys: How Physicists Talk and Travel Through Graphic Space," Elinor Ochs (1994) and
her colleagues have approached the study of gesture in the performance of scientific
concepts. They describe the gestures that mediate communication among physicists who
attempt to convey their research to each other in weekly lab meetings. In this paper, they
apply ethnomethodological conversation analyses to video recordings in order to track
how bodily gestures help physicists narrate and dramatize their scientific stories. They
observe what they call "understanding-in-progress" and show how "scientists can take
seemingly immutable transcriptions such as published graphic displays, and, over narrative
time, transform them into highly mutable, highly intertextual and symbolic narrative spaces
through which they verbally, gesturally, and graphically journey" (1994: 158).
In their example, physicists' gestures are seen as explicitly discursive; gesture for the
physicists offers a "dynamic grammar," a means of supporting their language, and helping
them to make statements about mathematical relations and two-dimensional graphic
displays (1994: 161). By contrast, in the protein folding class, Jim's gestures are
performances of forms that take up space and move through time.
Rather than using movement to animate language, Jim used his body to perform
substances, forms, and textures that are hard to relate through words. Jim's gestural
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choreography was thus less a "grammar" than a form of mimetic modeling. Three-
dimensional molecular models of proteins find expression through mimetic gestures; that
is, gestures that render the form and movements of the molecule through the form and
movements of the modeler's body. Brian Rotman (n.d.) approaches mimetic gestures as the
most "primitive" gestural form. I would like to argue, however, that such mimetic gestures
offer sophisticated modes of model-making and reasoning for these researchers. Mimetic
gestures of molecular embodiments can themselves be considered species of mimetic
models: they are renderings that articulate forms of knowing and performatively sculpt
imagined worlds.74
In this sense, Jim's body became molecular (Deleuze and Guatari, 1980) in order to
perform the protein fold. In the process his body became a model and pedagogical tool.
Key here is that in this performative idiom, the boundary between the scientist and their
object breaks down. This appears to be a productive form of anthropomorphism-where
human bodies become resources for communicating the otherwise inexpressible molecular
forms, textures, and tensions.
Though Jim looks nothing like a protein molecule (!), his molecular gestures are precise.
During an in-depth demonstration of the packing of helices during protein folding, Jim held
his arms out in front of him, crossed at the forearms to mimic how it is that the "side chains
are talking to each other." His stance strong, and holding his arms in position, he began to
74 Through mimetic gestures, I also hope to challenge the assumed binary between the visual and
the discursive. These gestures are not quite rhetorical devices, nor are they purely visual cues. They
are material-semiotic modes of communication. In this sense mimetic gestures operate somewhere
between discursive and non-discursive modes of expression. See Deleuze's (1988) Foucault.
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describe his body as the model: "Now when two helices are packing against each other
they form a junction..." All of a sudden he paused and looked up. He called on Geoff. "I
want you to stand up." "Alright," Geoff agreed, and stood up. Jim gave him instructions:
"Now, point to the junction." Geoff pointed vaguely at Jim's crossed arms. "No, not there!"
With his "helices" still packed together, Jim used his voice and eyes to redirect where
Geoff was pointing: "Right between ... Yeah, okay."
Jim carried on with his description while Geoff stood by his side, pointing at the junction.
In this moment, Jim made explicit that he was the model. By asking Geoff to point to the
junction where his arms meet, he demanded and received Geoff's confirmation that his
arms really were helices. In this way, the class could also come to see Jim as the model of
interdigitating helices. Moreover, Jim required Geoff to point, not to any place where his
arms meet, but to a specific site on his body-as-molecular model. There was a specificity in
this mimetic gesture that demanded Geoff locate the exact site of the junction. Becoming
molecule, Jim made the model tangible and thinkable for himself, Geoff, and his students.
Conclusion
In this course, teaching protein folding became a practice of modeling students' bodies and
imaginations. This pedagogical work is an example of what Bruno Latour (2004) has
described as the "articulation" of the scientists' sensorial body as they get trained in
laboratory instruments and techniques. After Latour, Rachel Prentice (2005) has developed
a concept of "mutual articulation," which acknowledges the recursive nature of model
building: in the process of building models, the models can then act recursively to
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rearticulate the modeler's body. In the case of improvising new models for teaching protein
folding, modeling becomes a pedagogical practice that produces new "molecular
embodiments," by reconfiguring the bodies and imaginations of students.
Collectively Jim and Geoff worked hard to create a learning environment where each
student could experience the convergence of models, images, diagrams, and analogies,
and so develop a feeling for the elusive nature of protein folding. The aim of their teaching
was to hook their students' bodies and imaginations into the fold. The course gave students
a mission ("Hopefully one of you will solve this class of problems.") and a method ("First
you must master the structure, then you can move on to experiments."). By invoking
mastery, Jim was not asking for definitive knowledge, but a willingness among the students
to let models instruct their bodies: in other words, he had to train his students how to use
models as lures that can pull them into the subvisible worlds of protein folding. The skills
they would need included the ability to become molecular, to inhabit the model, and
perform the fold. In a sense, the course elaborated just how models are material-semiotic
actors "built to be engaged, inhabited, lived" (Haraway 1997: 135). It was in this process
of learning how to model their bodies and imaginations, that Jim's students, in turn, were
ushered into the fold of an emerging professional identity skilled in the lively arts of
molecular visualization.
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Chapter 4
Modeling Molecular Machines:
Structural Biology, Biological Engineers & the
Materialized Refiguration of Proteins
Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly
ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial,
mind and body, self-developing and externally designed,
and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms
and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we
ourselves frighteningly inert.
Donna Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto," 1991: 152
I am convinced that technoscience engages promiscuously
in materialized refiguration; that is, technoscience traffics
heavily in the passages that link stories, desires, reasons, and
material worlds. Materialized refiguration is an eminently
solid process, even to the point of the practice of objectivity,
not some merely textual dalliance.
Donna Haraway, 1997: 64
Introduction
"Who here has taken a biology course before?" Dan Hijiko, a professor of biological
engineering looked up at the eighty or so students who had crowded into a too-small
lecture hall on the first day of spring semester classes at this private, east coast university.
They had arrived for a freshman seminar aimed at recruiting a new cohort of students into
the school's brand new biological engineering major. Save one or two, all the students put
up their hands. "Good," he responded. "But this will be a little different from what you
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learned in your other courses." Dan was the coordinator for this half-semester course that
featured lectures by biological engineers drawn from departments across the institution. He
turned to introduce the director of the program, Stan Graham, who offered the students a
taste of what this new major would offer. "Biology has changed," Stan told the class.
"When I was your age biology was just starting to be on the verge of being quantitative and
designable." According to him, the molecular and genomics revolutions transformed
biology by making biological "parts" and "components" available to manipulation at the
molecular scale. "Biology today is at the point where getting the parts and manipulating
them is relatively easy. Now, the hard part is: How do they work? Now that you know
what the components are, how do they work? Well," he announced to the class, "they
work as machines."
Stan turned to the projection screen that displayed a black-and-white, time-lapse movie of
a cell migrating across a slide. He and the students watched its magnified, animal-like
body undulate as it pulled itself across the screen.
If you look at a picture of a cell here migrating across a surface, you want to
know how to make that cell migrate faster, to colonize a biological
material, or slower to prevent a tumor from metastasizing. You have to look
inside the machine for how the molecular components work together as a
machine to transmit forces to the environment; to pull on the environment,
pull the rest of the cell along. There's the actin cytoskeleton, and all sorts of
proteins that link the actin cytoskeleton to receptors across the cell
membrane. These all work as an exquisite, many, many, many, many
molecule machine.
This moving image was juxtaposed against other projected images, including colourful
cartoons of the "molecular machinery" of the cell, and engineering-styled electrical circuit
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diagrams that traced the intra-cellular "regulatory circuits" that "govern" the cell's large
machine "assemblages." "Now that we have the components," he explained, "biology
needs to be studied the way engineers look at things." These freshmen, interpellated as
would-be biological engineers ("you have to look inside the machine"), were instructed to
see this cell as engineers engage their objects. The classroom became a training ground for
new students to learn see through the obscuring density of the seething cellular masses that
constitute living bodies. At the same time the instructors aimed to instill in them the desire
to get at the underlying parts, components, and devices that "do work" in the cell to
"drive" cellular life.
"These are very appealing metaphors and this is engineering language," Stan explained.
Indeed, molecular machine metaphors are alluring to many, and this is a language that has
become pervasive in contemporary scientific texts, where proteins are ubiquitously figured
as "molecular machines," "the machinery of life," (Goodsell, 1993), and even as "nature's
robots" (Tanford and Reynolds, 2001). Proteins are rendered as the mechanical levers,
hinges, switches, motors, gears, pumps, locks, clamps, and springs that "transduce" forces,
energy, and information (e.g. Hill and Rich, 1983; Bourne, 1986; Hoffman, 1991;
Krieisberg, et al., 2002; Harrison, 2004; Chiu, et al., 2005). These components are seen to
assemble and reassemble into complex interlocking devices that act to build and maintain
the cell as a higher order machine. It appears that the metaphor of molecular machines is
on the rise, both in the scientific literature, and in the rhetoric that prevails in teaching and
research contexts. In this sense, life science is rapidly becoming a discipline in structural
engineering.
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Yet, sitting in this introductory biological engineering class I was struck by the distinction
that Dan had pointed out between what students in this class would learn that was
different from what they got from their biology courses. This distinction quickly became
clear to me. In Jim Brady and Geoff Miller's course, "The Protein Folding Problem," protein
molecules were narrated in a range of registers. While Geoff did bring an engineer's
aesthetic to protein molecules, rendering them similarly to Stan's "molecular machines,"
Jim's animated body-work and analogical scale-manipulations modeled proteins as gooey,
lively bodies. One key difference here is that "The Protein Folding Problem" was first and
foremost a biology course, and Jim, the primary instructor, a classically trained biologist. In
that course, figurations of protein molecules were allowed to oscillate between molecule
as lively body and molecule as machine; and yet, the prevailing tropes for protein folding
in that course were dynamic, dancing forms that could render the subtle movements and
textures of the folding process. In this chapter I am interested in those researchers who put
the metaphor of molecular machines to work. I want to understand what is at stake when
researchers attempt to keep protein metaphors from oscillating between the figures of lively
bodies and machines, and how researchers clamp down on machines as principal
figurations for these molecules. To do this I first examine how the metaphor of molecular
machines has operated in the history of cell biology and biophysics, and in the
contemporary contexts of biological engineering and structural biology communities. In
this inquiry, I am not admonishing the use of machines as an analogy for molecules. On
the contrary, following Isabelle Stengers (n.d., 1999), I see the production of "molecular
machines" as an exquisite achievement. This chapter examines the many layers of this
achievement. In what follows I track how these machines are constructed; what kinds of
machines are constructed inside cellular bodies; and the forms of expertise that must be
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engineered in order to put these machines to work in living organisms.
Machine Vision
Protein modelers and structural biologists increasingly apply molecular visualization
technologies such as X-ray crystallography, cryo-electron microscopy and computer
algorithms to the task of building three-dimensional atomic-scale models of protein
molecules and interpreting their cellular activities. The interesting thing is, the closer they
look with these visualization technologies, the more machines they seem to discover in the
cell. But, let us pause for a moment here. Are structural biologists and biological engineers
merely applying their visualization tools to reveal protein machines at work in what is fast
becoming the factory floor of the cell?
As I hope to show in this chapter, visualization technologies are not such neutral devices:
machinic discourses and aesthetics play a major role in how these invisible substances are
brought into view. By figuring the very objects of biology through machine tropes and
stories, biological engineers are not just artfully describing cells and molecules through
appealing language. Their metaphors transform how they make proteins visible, tangible,
and workable as objects. A key element of this process, which I examine below, is that this
also transforms what kinds of investigators are recruited to do this work. So, while for the
uninitiated, machinery may not be an obvious or self-evident descriptor for the writhing
form that crawls across the microscope slide, or the gooey substances that churn within it,
in practice, the seething cellular body is not merely like a machine for the biological
engineer, in their hands, it becomes one. Figuring molecules and cells as machines
through technoscientific narratives is for Donna Haraway (1997) an "eminently solid
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process" (64) through which things and words "implode" (97), crystallizing new kinds
meanings and forms of life for both scientists and their objects. My aim in this chapter is to
show how structural biologists and biological engineers learn how to build and use the
metaphors of molecular machines.
From Informatics to the Mechanics of "Life Itself"
In the context of the sequencing craze of the genetics and genomics revolutions and the
rise of corporate biology and genetic engineering, Donna Haraway has suggested that "the
living world" became a "command, control, communication, intelligence system," or "C31
in military terms" (1991: 150; 1997: 97). For her:
These issues are about metaphor and representation, but they are about
much more than that. Not only does metaphor become a research program,
but also, more fundamentally, the organism for us is an information system
and an economic system of a particular kind. For us, that is, those
interpellated into this materialized story, the biological world is an
accumulation strategy in the fruitful collapse of metaphor and materiality
that animates technoscience (1997: 97).
Key to Haraway's concerns here is that rendering through metaphor is a practice of
worlding. She writes that, "We act in and are inside this world, not some other. We are
subject to, subjects in, and accountable for this world" (ibid.). From the vantage point of a
feminist science studies model of accountability, we must take responsibility for how our
renderings cut into and so rend the world.
In 1985, when Haraway wrote the "Manifesto for Cyborgs," she remarked: "The new
machines are so clean and light"; "cyborgs are ether, quintessence" (1991: 153). In the era
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of C31, materiality was disavowed, and the "depths" of the organism were elided by the
glinting "surfaces" of silicon chips and body-less codes. In the 1980s and 1990s "life itself"
had become a problem of coding to be solved in the language of informatics (see also Kay,
2000). However, in these early days of the twenty-first century, our machines and
economies are morphing (Franklin and Lock, 2003; Sunder Rajan, 2006; Waldby and
Mitchel, 2006), and so too is the machinery that has come to constitute "life itself" (see
Fujimura, 2005). In this post-genomic era of computer-intensive, atomic-scale, 3D
molecular visualization and simulation, "life itself," can no longer be flattened into the thin
threads of information scripted into genetic sequences: structural biologists are involved in
the work of re-membering the materiality of cells and molecules.
Stephen Harrison, a prominent protein crystallographer whose Harvard-based laboratory
builds atomic-resolution models of protein molecules, has suggested in recent years that
there are
hints that specific kinds of control logic are embodied in specific kinds of
molecular architecture ... Thus, structural biology must seek to understand
information transfer in terms of its underlying molecular agents by
analyzing the molecular hardware that executes the information-transfer
software ... The architectural principles of the cell's control systems and the
dynamics of their operation are no less proper studies of structural biology
than are the organizational and dynamical properties of the molecular
machines that execute the regulated commands (Harrison, 2004: 15).
Harrison remains invested in the model of the cell as a computing command, control,
communication system, and yet, he is convinced that there is another level of analysis. As
the techniques of structural biology that he and other crystallographers employ become
more widespread, the code-cracking analysis of the "informatics" of life is being buttressed
by the structural analysis of the "architecture" and "hardware" of life. In Harrison's
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articulation, the key actors in the cell are no longer the genetic code-scripts read as
software. He looks to the structures of the "molecular agents" that underlie the transfer of
information, and the "transduction" of forces and energy in the cell. It is the proteins that
have been figured as the cell's hardware, and it is their properties that are to be measured,
modeled, and manipulated as machines in order to flesh out the story of "life itself."
"Captured in" the hands of twenty-first-century structural biologists, it has become evident
that "life itself" is denser than code: it has a three-dimensional material body whose
textures, structures, internal forces and intricate movements carry out the regulated, well
disciplined work of the cell. Researchers are no longer satisfied reducing the organism to
the software of a coding system; the organism now has a mechanical architecture, and its
molecular mechanisms have come to resemble the many kinds of machines with which we
currently live and work (see also Fujimura, 2005). These include: the cogs and wheels of
industrial capitalism, like those pictured on a recent cover of Cell (Figure 4.1); computer
hardware; electrical circuits; and the springs, locks, and clamps of modern day mechanical
devices. If, as Haraway entreats, we are to be accountable for the worlds we craft, we must
try to understand the models of life into which we-including our kin, those fresh-faced
would-be biological engineers-are being interpellated.
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Figure 4.1: The cover of Cel September, 8, 2006: 126 (5).
"A Cogwheel for Signal Transduction across Membranes." "
75 Inside the journal, the caption for the cover reads: "The mechanism by which receptors transduce
signals across membranes remains an important open question in molecular biology. Various
models have been proposed, involving association/dissociation and piston and pivot motions. In this
issue, Hulko et al. (pp. 929-940) describe the NMR structure of HAMP, a widespread domain of
prokaryotic transmembrane receptors, which forms a parallel, four-helical coiled coil. Based on the
interdigitation of the side chains in this structure, the authors propose a cogwheel model for signal
transduction, which involves the concerted rotation of the helices in a plane perpendicular to the
membrane. The model is illustrated conceptually on the cover by a gear box with four cogwheels.
The image is by Martin Voetsch (Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology)" (Anonymous,Cell, 2006).
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Materalized Refiguration
Nature is...about figures, stories, and images. This nature, as
tr6pos, is jerry-built with tropes; it makes me swerve. A
tangle of materialized figurations, nature draws my attention.
Haraway, 1994: 60
Donna Haraway invites her readers to take a closer look at rich tropes and stories that
shape knowledge and practice in technoscience. She asks: "How do we learn inside the
laboratory and all of its extended networks that there is no category independent of
narrative, trope, and technique" (1997: 161, emphasis in the original)? Haraway explains
that in Greek, "tr6pos is a turn or a swerve; tropes mark the nonliteral quality of being and
language" (1997: 135). For her, metaphors are tropes, but they are not merely immaterial
utterances, they are "material-semiotic actors" (1991: 200). To use a biophilic analogy,
metaphors can be thought of as proteinacious catalysts: they are dense, fleshy substances
that can activate, congeal, crystallize, and precipitate new kinds of bodies and new kinds
of meanings. For her, scientific models are also kinds of tropes, but tropes that are
"instruments" that can be "built, inhabited, lived" (1997: 135). I extend this definition of
scientific models as tropes to three-dimensional models of protein molecules and ask: How
are molecules turned into machines in the hands of life scientists? How are models of
molecular machines built, inhabited, and lived by biological engineers and structural
biologists?
Haraway also attends to the many figures that participate in the production of
technoscientific stories. The term "figure," of course, has many meanings. The Oxford
English Dictionary suggests it can signify a person or character, a body or object, or a
trope, model or other form of representation. As a verb, "to figure" also implies the act of
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reasoning, as in "to figure something out." I animate three multi-valent figures in this story:
machine-inspired protein modelers; the otherwise subvisible proteins to which they give
body through practices of molecular modeling; and the machinic tropes they enlist to
make sense of these molecular structures. As persons, objects, metaphors, and modes of
reasoning, these figures each have long histories in the life sciences. And yet today, they
have become increasingly potent catalysts, producing and propagating new scientific
objects and forms of life in both laboratories and science classrooms.
The molecular machines so important to biological engineers and structural biologists are
the products of what Haraway would call materialized refiguration. This is a practice
through which scientists can turn "tropes into worlds" (1994: 60), conjuring new scientific
practices, material possibilities, and forms of signification. For her, this "collapse of
metaphor and materiality" is a question of "modes of practice among humans and
nonhumans that configure the world-materially and semiotically-in terms of some
objects and boundaries and not others" (1997: 97). In the hands of differently trained
researchers, distinct tropes can be used to catalyze some models of life and not others.
The materialized refiguration of cells and proteins as machines hinges on the productive
meeting of biologists and engineers. Joanna, who conducted her PhD research in Jim
Brady's laboratory, told me a story about one particularly productive meeting. Geoff Miller
had been invited into Jim's lab to begin collaborating on protein structure projects76 . On
his first day at the group's lab meeting, Geoff completely refigured how Joanna thought
76 In Chapter 2, I describe how Jim Brady sought out Geoff to get his help working on the lattice
structure of viral coat proteins. According to Jim: "No wet biochemist could deal with a lattice. Who
knows about lattices? Engineers know."
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about a protein with which she was already very familiar. In the meeting, he performed a
form of model building that echoed how he had approached modeling collagen with
pencils and "Magic Tape" for the protein folding class:
Just as we were all sitting around the table describing [the protein], and
talking about [it], all Geoff did was take a paper clip that was sitting at the
table...and he took the paper clip and he's like "Okay. I need to understand
what you guys are talking about." And he just folded the paperclip into a
three-dimensional representation of what we were talking about. And we
were all sitting there going, "Wow." It was just kind of so bizarre that after
twenty some odd years of working on [this protein], [we] had never thought
about it in this way. And Geoff, as soon as we started talking about the
structure, he wanted to see a model of it. It was like, immediately, "Let's
make a model." He came back the next day with more elaborate wire that
he had taken and molded at his house...And he came in and said, "Oh!
There's a clamp! This is a lock. I mean this is lockin' that molecule right in
place." And now there're all these papers they've published on the
molecular clamp. It's a lock! It's a clamp! And it's so exciting. And its
funny, his whole approach was entirely different...I'd looked at that
structure a million times. You know. And I was like, "Oh yeah. It's a lock! I
mean that's a clamp!"... I wasn't working on that project, but it opened a
whole door of experiments that would have not happened otherwise. An
entire postdoc was hired to work on this. And it hadn't been called a clamp
until Geoff came to the meeting.
A modeler by nature, this engineer needed to hold the structure in his hands. Simple
modeling tools would suffice: a paper clip or wire that he could turn and twist. But he also
had other tools at his fingertips that were integral elements of his visualization apparatus:
he had a facility and a familiarity with clamps as mechanisms, and the analogy of the
molecular clamp came easily to him. As Haraway (1997) suggests, a metaphor can even
drive an entire research program (97). In this sense, the livelihood of a postdoc, the
scientific significance of a protein, and the productivity of a research laboratory all turned
around the figures of the clamp, the engineer, and his jerry-built model.
When viewed as a practice of materialized refiguration, it becomes possible to see that the
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visualization technologies researchers engage do not merely "unveil" fully functional
molecular machines within the body of the cell. Machine analogies are also not merely
aesthetic flourishes of language, or just "attractive" figures of speech. The application of
machine metaphors is itself both a penetrating visualization technology, and a lure that
draws its users into other possible worlds, with world-changing effects for both the scientist
and their objects.
The figures of the biological engineer, the protein, and the machine are all entwined in
processes of materialized refiguration. Fulfilling their desire to see into and manipulate
molecular worlds, protein modelers produce practical cultures that can refigure protein
molecules through machine analogies. In turn, these machine analogies reconfigure the
practice of life science. In effect, this process remodels the scientists themselves: as the
molecule becomes a machine, the biologist must become an engineer. Moreover, as
biologists' molecular imaginations become increasingly machinic, engineers' machines are
becoming increasingly biological, and surprisingly lively. As Haraway has shown in the
context of genetics and genomics, it took work to refigure "life itself" as informatic code.
As I show here, it takes work to build machines into the body of organisms. Haraway's call
to attend to the materiality of language is thus also a call to make visible how
technoscientific tropes are put to work, for whom, and at what cost. I examine the
rendering of molecules as kinds of machines, and thus the worlding of new kinds of
bodies, models of life, and livelihoods, all of which protein modelers have found ways to
propagate and sustain.
158
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
A Brief History of Molecular Machines
In the late-nineteenth-century, Thomas Henry Huxley argued that life must be analyzed
according to its chemical and physical properties. In the 1870s he developed a mechanical
theory of the cell that he peddled as the "protoplasmic theory of life" (see Geison, 1969;
Huxley, 1878). In 1880, the Encyclopedia Britannica published Huxley's definitive entry
on "Biology." It was here that Huxley took the opportunity to display his new way of
thinking about the stuff of life. He explained:
A mass of living protoplasm is simply a molecular machine of great
complexity, the total results of the working of which, or its vital
phenomena, depend, on the one hand upon its construction, and, on the
other, upon the energy supplied to it; and to speak of vitality as anything
but the name of a series of operations, is as if one should talk of the
'horologity' of a clock (Huxley, 1878: 15; and cited in Beale, 1881: 297)
In light of contemporary biological engineering, Huxley's parsing of the protoplasm, and
indeed, the phenomenon of life, as a working machine whose parts must be supplied with
energy, would probably not make today's audiences swerve. Huxley's contemporaries,
however, took great exception to the analogy and its implications for vital phenomena.
Lionel Beale, a vitalist who argued against the mechanization of life, was the president of
the Royal Microscopial Society, and one of Huxley's most prominent opponents (see
Gieson, 1969). In his annual address to the society in 1881 he voiced this strong objection
to Huxley:
This is the sort of teaching that has long retarded the progress of thought,
and affords an example of the puerile objections palmed off on the public
as scientific criticism, and supposed to be sufficient to controvert evidence
founded upon observation, and arguments based on facts which any one
may demonstrate. It is not most wonderful that Professor Huxley can
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persuade himself that a single reader of intelligence will fail to see the
absurdity of the comparison he institutes between the invisible,
undemonstrable, undiscovered "machinery" of his suppositious "molecular
machine" and the actual visible works of the actual clock, which any one
can see and handle, and stop and cause to go on again (Beale, 1881: 297.
Emphasis added).
Similarly for JW Dawson, then the outgoing president of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, it would "scarcely be possible" in the space of Huxley's
Encyclopedia entry, "to put into the same number of words a greater amount of
unscientific assumption and unproved statement" (Dawson, 1883: 195). Their primary
complaint was that, given the limits of microscopic vision at the time, "molecular
machines" could be no more than an elaborate fantasy. To identify invisible and intangible
substances as machines represented at best a kind of catachresis: in this sense, a metaphor
that lacks a concrete referent (see Kay, 2000 on catachresis). For Huxley's opponents,
machines were real, but molecule-sized machines a fiction. For molecular machines to
exist they had to have, like a clock, "actual visible" workings into which one could
intervene. According to Beale:
Magnify living matter as we may, nothing can be demonstrated but an
extremely delicate, transparent, apparently semi-fluid substance...
[O]bservations.. .favor the conclusion that living matter should be regarded
as consisting of infinite numbers of infinitely minute particles, varying much
in size, and possibly capable of coalescing, free to move amongst one
another, as they exist surrounded by a fluid medium which contains the
materials in solution for their nutrition and other substances (Beale 1881:
279).
Beale refused to entertain the existence of machines within the transparent, fluid bodies of
living cells. In his commitment to objective empirical observation, Beale rejected the use
of what he saw as figurative language. His qualitative description of the cell was however,
not free of tropes: indeed, his description conjures a kind of molecular society of freely
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moving bodies. Haraway warns her readers to be aware of the denials of the rich
metaphoricity and figural craft of scientific vision. To deny the material-semiosis of vision
is a ruse: all scientific vision depends on troping. The irony is that Beale did not recognize
the genius of what might be called Huxley's "working conceptual hallucination."77 In
contrast to Beale's intractable, free moving bodies, Huxley's machinery was able to
produce an alluring object of analysis for the exact scientist. By conjuring machines within
the body of the cell, Huxley conceived of a biological object whose properties could,
theoretically at least, be quantified. The metaphor of machinery offered Huxley a bridge he
could traverse in his imagination between the visible, tangible and manipulable world in
which he lived, and the invisible, intangible world of biological molecules. In light of the
recent dominance of machine figurations in biology, this would become the enduring and
alluring metaphor that could do the work of luring would-be-engineers into the sciences of
life.
While Huxley's theory of molecular machines was not vindicated in the late nineteenth
century, these debates between vitalists and mechanists show that a struggle over effective
metaphors to visualize biological molecules-as kinds of free roaming bodies or inanimate
machines-was already in place before molecules could ever be seen. In 1885, for
example, Emil Fischer proposed a mechanical theory to explain the intimate specificities
and forms of interaction between molecules, such that "enzyme and substrate" would "fit
together like a lock and key" (Fisher cited in Clardy, 1999). In 1900 Paul Erlich elaborated
on this model of protein specificity to develop his own theory of molecular association
between antibodies and antigens. However, rather than rendering these molecular
77 Gilbert and Mulkay quoted in Lynch (1991).
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associations as the mechanical interlocking of keys and locks, he animated antibody
proteins in a comic strip narrative that rendered them in the form of animal bodies, which
some suggested resembled "hungry pollywogs" (Cambrosio, et al., 1993: 676). As Alberto
Cambrosio and his collaborators show, in spite of the fact that no one knew how these
molecules looked, Erlich's "tangible diagrams" became effective research tools that
enabled him to conceptualize and materialize a successful experimental program (676).
Though controversial in their time, these "imaginative diagrams" provided a richly
figurative medium through which Erlich was able to imagine, and experimentally intervene
in, molecular associations, and so, in the process, "give body" (Hopwood, 1999) to
otherwise invisible antibodies.
Whether proteins are figured as machines or animals, it is clear that those who practice
molecular visualization have never relied exclusively on visual evidence in order to
construct models of these subvisible worlds. That is, visualizing molecules has always
involved imagination: the conjuring of figural vocabularies-such as metaphors and
models-that could provide at least tenuous, tentative links between that which could be
seen, that which could be imagined, and that which-in the context of the particular
culture of life science at the time-could be said (see Foucault, 1973). Materialized
refiguration is thus, a creative material-semiotic practice of conjuring some forms of life
and not others.
Resolving Molecular Machines with X-Ray Crystallography
As I showed above, in the history of protein science, there had been a continuous
oscillation between the figure of the protein as an animate body, and the figure of the
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protein as machine. However, with mounting evidence of the chemical and physical basis
of vital phenomenon, at the turn of the twentieth century the mechanistic model of life
began to gain ground and trump vitalist accounts (see for example Jacob, 1973; Lenoir,
1982; Kay, 1993; Keller, 1995). This was facilitated in part by efforts already well under
way among chemists to figure molecules as the mechanical building blocks of life.
In the history of chemistry the machine aesthetic has long had quite a hold over scientists'
imaginations. Christof Meinel (2004) has produced an insightful history of the earliest
construction of physical models in chemistry. He links the aesthetics of the earliest
molecular models to those of architecture and engineering. To do this, he traces three-
dimensional modeling practices in chemistry back to a period in the nineteenth century
before chemists had even fully theorized the spatiality of atomic structures.'" One of the
earliest forms of these models, called "glyptic formulae," was first presented to a
distinguished audience the Royal College of Chemistry in London by the then head of the
College, August Wilhelm Hofmann, in 1865. According to Hofmann, the "combining
powers" of atoms were demonstrated by joining painted croquet balls to each other by
78 Henricus van't Hoff published the first theory of three-dimensional molecular structure in his
Arrangement of Atoms in Space, in 1874. However, because molecular structures could not be
visualized directly, this concept took much time to be absorbed. In 1892, John W. Caldwell (1892)
published an article in Science titled "Some Analogies Between Molecules and Crystals," that
confessed his earlier skepticism with regard to this structural theory. He writes:
A fifth analogy [between molecules and crystals]...bases upon the hypothecation of actual
molecular structural form--configuration according to Wunderlich's proposed term to
express stereo-chemical relations. The subject of molecular configuration is comparatively
new; still we are becoming familiarized with diagrams and models intended to represent
such relations. Many of us may have been at first indisposed to accept these views as
anything more than visionary and fantastic; but the more we have pondered them, the more
we have been impressed with their significance and beauty. Shape, form and volume must
be attributed to molecule as well as to mass; the only trouble has been in regard to the
former, the apparent audacity and hopelessness of any attempt to penetrate matter to such
depths (89).
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means of metallic tubes and pins. The models, assembled as vertical and planar branching
structures, were mounted on stands to "rear in this manner a kind of mechanical structure
in imitation of the atomic edifices to be illustrated" (Hofmann cited in Meinel, 2004: 250).
Though they were not intended to depict the actual structure of atoms, they closely
resembled the ball and stick models still in use today. Meinel astutely asserts that it was not
chemical theory these models were meant to convey:
What Hofmann delivered in front of the powerful and the
leisured was not meant as an introduction to organic
chemistry. Instead it was a most carefully composed
performance primarily meant to convey the idea of the
chemist as someone who knows how to manipulate matter
according to his will, and who will eventually be able to
build a new world out of chemical building materials that
could be assembled and disassembled ad libitum (252).
Meinel links the aesthetics of early molecular models with other kinds of modeling kits
already in wide circulation in the nineteenth century. Construction kits that enabled
"children to create a variety of polygonal forms by connecting peas or coloured balls of
wax by means of toothpicks" (267) were instruction devices to inculcate children into the
"conquest of space" made possible through the engineering and architectural "culture of
construction" that dominated aesthetics in the nineteenth century (266). Once made over
into mechanical objects that could be assembled, disassembled, and rebuilt, chemists
could re-imagine themselves as engineers synthesizing mechanical molecular structures.
Thus, long before Huxley had proposed the notion of molecular machines, chemists had
developed a "symbolic and gestic space" (Meinel, 2004: 270) in which molecules could
be imagined and manipulated as mechanical devices.
I jump ahead now, in this brief history, to 1957, when John Kendrew's laboratory in
164
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
Cambridge, UK completed the first ever X-ray crystallographic model of a protein
molecule. At that point, protein crystallography had been in development for over twenty
years, as biophysicists struggled to visualize and build atomic-resolution models of these
complex molecules by diffracting X-rays through crystallized protein (see Law 1973, de
Chadarevian, 2002)." Since proteins could be coaxed to form "beautiful" crystals,
biophysicists expected proteins to be highly symmetrical chemical entities. The scientific
community was thus not prepared for what Jim Brady referred to as the "shock" of
Kendrew's model when photographs of it hit the press (see Figure 2.2) Those who viewed
this early model-its convoluted structure molded out of thick tubes of black Plasticine and
supported on wooden pegs-remarked that it looked like "abdominal viscera" (de
Chadarevian, 2002: 142) and had a "rather repulsive" appearance (Perutz, 1968: 45). The
"sausage model" defied all expectations: it looked nothing like the symmetrical forms
proteins were hypothesized to have. As Max Perutz recounted in a collection of essays on
molecular biology put together by Scientific American:
It was a triumph, and yet it brought a tinge of disappointment. Could the
search for ultimate truth really have revealed so hideous and visceral-
looking an object? Was the nugget of gold a lump of lead? Fortunately, like
many other things in nature, myoglobin gains in beauty the closer you look
at it. As Kendrew and his colleagues increased the resolution of the X-ray
analysis in the years that followed, some of the intrinsic reasons for the
molecule's strange shape began to reveal themselves. The shape was found
to be not a freak but a fundamental pattern of nature (Perutz, 1968: 45).
9 It wasn't until methods for X-ray diffraction were under development by Bragg in 1913, that
molecular form could begin to be determined from a crystal. Indeed, when Caldwell wrote on
analogies between crystals and molecules, X-rays had not even been discovered yet. W.C. Roentgen
discovered this potent form of radioactivity in 1895, and it wasn't until 1912 that crystals were first
contemplated as good material for diffracting X-rays. In a remarkable inversion of technology, in
1913 W.L. Bragg discovered that he could turn this X-ray diffracting property of crystals into a
technology for investigating the molecular structures within the crystal itself. For Bragg, the
discovery of X-rays "increased the keenness of our vision over then thousand times and we can now
'see' the individual atoms and molecules" (Bragg quoted in Crowfoot Hodgkin, 1964: 71). It took
until the 1930s and 1940s until protein crystallography was developed.
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It seems as if the crude low-resolution Plasticine model offended these biophysicsts'
molecular aesthetic. Curiously enough, however, the closer they looked the more beautiful
the protein model became. As they intensified their X-ray beams, applied augmented
computer power to calculate the atomic map of the structure, and swapped their Plasticine
modeling materials for standardized molecular modeling kits with machined parts, the
protein molecule became a mechanical object, with clean lines, precise angles, and
movable elements that could be clicked in and out of functional conformations (see de
Chadarevian, 2002; Francoeur, 1997). In the process, it became possible to analyze
complex molecular structures as mechanical objects.
Figure 4.2: Max Perutz and John Kendrew in 1962. A close
up view of Perutz model is pictured in Figure 2.3 of Chapter
2.
A photograph
captures well
taken in 1962 of John Kendrew and Max Perutz eyeing each other's models
how different modeling materials and scales of crystallographic resolution
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produce very different molecular aesthetics (Figure 4.2). Kendrew, with his later, more
delicate, wire-frame atomic-resolution model of myoglobin, stands at the right, while
Perutz with his dense, lumpy, low-resolution model of hemoglobin made of thermo-setting
plastic is on the left. It was not until 1968, twenty-two years after he initiated the project,
that Perutz attained an atomic-resolution model of hemoglobin. In a video interview
conducted by Vega Science Trust towards the end of his life, Perutz can be seen animating
one part of an atomic-resolution model of hemoglobin, clicking the oxygen-carrying heme
group in and out of its active conformation (see Figure 2.4.).
As they increased the resolving power of their tools and applied standardized, machined
parts to the task of building their models, the figure of the molecule-as-grotesque-body was
eventually superceded by the figure of molecule-as-mechanical structure. Unsatisfied with
the irregularity of the visceral sausage model as the symbol of "life itself", they disciplined
their tools and their craft--including the resolving power of their visualization technologies
and their mechanistic aesthetic-to make their molecules visible, tangible, and
manipulable as machines. The figure of the mechanical molecule seems to have provided
a tacit framework through which they evaluated the representational status and aesthetic
value of their models. Indeed, their narrative quest to make the stuff of life visible could
only be resolved, that is, come to full resolution, once molecules could be modeled on the
aesthetics of machined parts.
Cultivating A Feeling for Machines in Structural Biology
It took great effort for Kendrew and Perutz to model proteins as mechanical structures with
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movable, machinic parts. Today, structural biologists use a vast range of interactive
computer graphics media and multiple conventions for depicting molecular structures (as
wire frame models, Ribbon structures, space filling models, etc.). These distinct media
produce numerous opportunities for modelers to express their own molecular aesthetic.
Modelers can render proteins in a range of aesthetic forms: in ways that make them appear
to have glinting, metallic architectures; or as globular, gooey bodies that wriggle when
they are animated onscreen. Thus, while the rhetoric of the molecular machine is
pervasive, it is by no means the only way proteins are figured. Edward, a postdoc in Diane
Griffith's laboratory surprised me during one of our conversations. As we sat in front of his
computer, he explained why it is so difficult to use off-the-shelf software to predict how
proteins might bind, or "dock" with one another. It is hard to predict the shape of a protein
because, as he told me:
Edward: You know, proteins are breathing entities...
Natasha: Did you say proteins are...breathing?
Edward: Breathing entities... I don't know sounds a bit romantic, doesn't it.
He is what he calls a "well-trained" crystallographer. As such, Edward does not see
proteins as the static molecular structures that are published in scientific papers. These
models are effective lures for him, pulling him into a lively world of molecular forms. He
has a feeling for the intra-molecular forces within a protein, for the ways that they move
and "breathe" as they interact with other proteins, folding and unfolding in their watery,
intracellular worlds. Edward is moved to enact the breathing qualities of his molecule,
which he mimes by wrapping his hands around an invisible, pulsing sphere. I remark on
how different this lively language sounds from the ways he had just been describing what
he called his "mechanistic approach" to molecular analysis. "I can see there is a bit of a
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paradox in there, isn't there," he admits. In a single breath he shifts from figuring the
protein as a breathing body, to modeling it as a molecular machine. In this, he seems to
straddle with ease the chasm that once separated Beale's and Huxley's models of the
substance of life. In what follows, I examine how, and for whom, proteins cease to
oscillate between lively body and machine. When do life scientists' discourses and
practices clamp down on the molecule as a machine? When, and for whom do proteins, at
least, temporarily cease to be "breathe"?
Edward's colleague, Fernando, is a fifth year PhD student also working in Diane's lab. In
one of our several interviews I asked Fernando if he ever used metaphors other than
machines to talk about his proteins. I remarked to him that often I heard structural
biologists talk about proteins as kinds of bodies. This suggestion put him on edge a little,
and his response was firm: "A protein by itself is not a living thing," he tells me. "It is...it is
a machine. And it will break down, just like machines do. Okay? And if something is not
there to repair it, another machine, another piece of machinery," the whole system will
"break down." At the suggestion that proteins had lively qualities, Fernando clamped down
firm on the metaphor of molecular machines. 80
Fernando is fluent in the rhetoric of molecular machines. Yet machine metaphors are not
just pedagogical devices for him. He likes to use the metaphor in part because he has a
80 For some insight into what might be at stake for structural biologists in affirming the machine
metaphor over body metaphors, in Chapter 5 I describe this interview in more depth, and show how
figuring molecules as "breathing entities" creates a serious problem for teaching concepts in
evolutionary theory. Molecular machine metaphors, in this respect, act like a kind of public
relations campaign to keep lay people from thinking that molecules themselves could be driving
evolution through their affinities and "desires."
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particularly nuanced feel for machines and their parts. He is a latecomer to science, and at
forty, he is significantly older than most of the graduate students in his cohort. He grew up
in a working class Hispanic family and spent his twenties working as a plumber, manual
labourer, and pizza delivery boy, and took much pleasure in building cars. He later went
back to school, and started teaching CAD drawing to architecture and engineering students
at a community college. Machines are familiar to Fernando: they are, like Beale's clock,
"actual visible works" into which he can see and intervene. He understands how they
work, how their parts fit together, and what keeps them ticking. In the middle of our
interview he got up to show me how door hinges work, how you can look at them, handle
them and know which way the door should swing. I smiled and nodded when he resorted
to the example of the hinges on "ladies' makeup compacts," which he thought would
really drive his point home to me, in particular. Our conversation produced dizzying
Alice-in-Wonderland effects of scale as we zoomed along what seemed to be a continuum
of visibility, from human-scale machines, down to the scale molecular machines and back
again.
As a protein crystallographer he builds models of proteins to figure out what the
"machinery" of the cell looks like, and how it works. For him, X-ray crystallography is a
visualization tool that he uses to get a "snapshot of the machine." He describes his job as a
protein modeler through an allegorical tale that took us to the factory floor of a robotics-
mediated automotive assembly line:
So you know, you are talking about the machine that screws in the fender
at the Ford car plant. We're studying that machine because we are trying to
find out what it does. And without [the X-ray crystal] structure we are just
feeling it, just tentatively, sometimes with big thermal gloves. So we can't
really get to feel the intricacies or the nuances of the drill bits. And all of a
sudden crystallography is a snapshot of the machine. Okay. It [the
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machinel can even be in multiple states. Standing still turned off. In a state
when there is a screw being drilled into the fender. You know, it can be
somewhere in between. Alright? But because we've seen a similar machine
in another company, we kind of have an idea of what the machine does.
We've seen the individual parts and stuff like that. I'm not going to mistake
the machine for drilling for the machine for welding. Okay. What
crystallography allows you to do is to say, "Hey that is a drilling machine,
not a welding machine." Okay. And by looking at certain parts of the
machine you can tell whether the drill bit is six inches long or two inches
long or whether it has a the neck that moves up and down, or whether the
neck is static. That's the sort of stuff you get in a crystal structure that you
don't have before.
Intense in his delivery, Fernando successfully sustained the analogy of the cell as the
factory floor of the Ford car plant throughout his story. He had such a strong grip on the
analogy that there was eventually a slippage from the machine as a metaphor for the
molecule, to the molecule that had actually become a machine; in this case a (robotics-
mediated) machine that could do highly specialized kinds of work in (a capital-intensive)
cell.
Fernando's image of a human worker whose tactile and visual acuity is dampened by
wearing big thermal gloves is an effective analogy to demonstrate how hard it is for the
structural biologist to make sense of molecules without the resolving power of both X-ray
crystallographic vision and an elaborate figural vocabulary to make sense of the substances
they draw into view. Crystallographic modeling gives Fernando both a three-dimensional
visualization of the molecule and a "nuanced" "feeling" for its "intricate" structure. As he
made clear during another interview, crystallographic modeling with interactive computer
graphic interfaces is, for him, a craft practice through which he has been able to develop
what he calls a kind of "touchy-touchy-feel" for the molecular model as he builds it
onscreen: "I don't want to say touchy-touchy-feely like that, but that sort of holding on to
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something and getting a feel of it.""' Taking off his thermal gloves, so to speak, he uses the
interactive computer graphics interface to bring molecules into haptic sensation, as well as
into view. And yet, he goes a step further: he draws on his feeling for machines to
complete his mechanistic model of the molecular structure.
In an interview about how mechanical engineering contributes to biological
understanding, Geoff Miller suggested that protein researchers are working "in the dark".
He explained: "Imagine yourself in a pitch black room. Your job is to figure out what's in
the room. You have three or four flashlights. Each has a different frequency of light, and is
a different shape and size. One light will show you a spot this big around [Makes a gesture
with his hands]. Another will only show flat objects of certain size. Another shines a little
bitty spot." Molecular visualization could, in this sense, be understood as a practice of
groping around and fumbling in the dark with objects at the limits of the visible, tangible,
and imaginable world. As such it is a process of shining select beams of light, grabbing
hold of small parts of a larger phenomenon, and collecting up this data to form more
coherent picture of the whole. As protein modelers struggle to give form to molecules and
figure out how they work, they also model the cell and its substances through tangible
analogies, tropes that are ready-to-hand, and familiar to the touch. These are analogies that
enable modelers to grasp-to make sense of, to imagine, and to intervene in-otherwise
invisible realms. For Fernando, this entails modeling molecules figuratively and materially
as those objects most familiar to him; that is, as machines.
81 As I examine more closely in Chapter 5, when I asked him whether he found that he relied on his
body to help him understand molecular form, he very nearly blushed, and got quite uncomfortable,
as if asking him about his body had overtly sexual or at least overly sensual implications. This to say
that invoking bodily knowledge makes my informants uneasy.
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Though he is quite taken by the tools X-ray crystallography affords his curiosity, Fernando
is ambivalent about his future in the field. "You can get so fascinated by the intricate gear
work of a particular piece," he told me, "that you never learn how to operate the whole
machinery." He finds he's very attracted by developments in biological engineering today,
which do promise the possibility of "operating" the "whole machinery" of the cell. These
are same kinds of promises that have enticed a new generation of students to sign up for
the new biological engineering major at his university, the one directed by Stan Graham.
The "molecular machine" is thus a powerful lure, an alluring recruiting device for rallying
would-be engineers into life science practice. The materialized refiguration of the
molecule as a machine gives the engineer something they can get their hands on,
something they can literally grasp. And it is through this metaphor that biology has become
quantifiable, manipulable and re-designable, in ways that, for the first time, have enabled
engineers to re-work biology; literally and figuratively they have put life to work at the
molecular scale.
Engineering Biological Engineers
Like proteins, metaphors left to their own devices don't automatically crystallize into forms
that can produce new meanings and material effects. Like crystallographers' efforts to coax
proteins to form "living, breathing" crystals, metaphors must be nourished and sustained
within the context of a practice and a culture that can keep them alive. This raises a
problem for the emerging discipline of biological engineering. While machines are
prominent companions in daily life, as expert technical objects they tend to fall outside of
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the domain of the classically trained biologist, and more to the point, outside the
experience and expertise of many freshmen, and sophomores taking a seat in introductory
biological engineering courses. Few would likely have had as much experience with
machinery as Fernando. In order to work the machine into the cell, life scientists' ways of
thinking and imagining biological worlds must be reconfigured. Biological engineers must
enlist and train a new generation of scientists to think and work like engineers. They do
this by luring new recruits with the technological promise of "direct access" to biological
worlds at the molecular scale. In order to make the machine analogy do work, however
they must engineer biologists who not only have a "feeling for the organism," but who also
have a feeling for the machine. Biological engineers must be trained to cultivate and
deploy machinic analogies, and entrain their visualization techniques and technologies,
their language, tacit knowledges, and practices to lively substances in such a way as to
make machines visible and tangible within the cell.
During my observations of a semester-long undergraduate biological engineering teaching
laboratory, I learned that cultivating a feeling for machines is not an easy task. This was a
required laboratory course for sophomores who, through a lottery, had won a coveted seat
at the laboratory bench and an opportunity to major in biological engineering. The third of
this four-module course focused on what the instructors called "systems engineering."
Over the course of six labs, students helped fine-tune a "bacterial photography" system;
that is, they optimized the conditions under which bacteria, engineered to induce colour
changes when exposed to light, could be deployed to take photographs using the simple
principles of pinhole camera technology. In order to analyze how it was that their bacteria
were being put to work, they needed to understand the principles of the regulating
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machinery controlling the engineered bacteria's cellular "circuitry." Their laboratory
manual offered this insight:
Biology is particularly well suited to model building since
many natural responses appear digital...The digital
responses of cells to perturbations, combined with lab
techniques for moving DNA parts around, allow logic
functions and circuits to be constructed in living cells.
But what is a circuit? Electrical engineers are of course quite familiar with circuits; the
concept of a cellular circuit is drawn directly from electrical engineering, and uses the
same iconography and nomenclature as electronic circuit diagrams (see for example
Gilman and Arkin, 2002). In the lab, the students were introduced to an analogue-what
could be considered a materialized figuration-of their photo-sensitive bacteria. This
analogue was a circuit board. The students were expected to apply electrical engineering
concepts, and to complete an electronic circuit in order to demonstrate their understanding
of the engineered circuitry in their bacterial cells. Each pair of students had at their desk a
partly assembled electronic "solderless breadboard" that included a photodiode and an
LED, which, if the circuit was completed correctly, would turn on and off in response to
changes in light intensity sensed by a light-sensitive photodiode (Figure 4.3). Students were
asked to complete the circuit by connecting resistors of varying strength to appropriate sites
on the breadboard.
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Figure 4.3: A "breadboard" wired up as an analogue of the
bacterial photography system. Used with permission from an
anonymous ethnographic informant.
Some of these sophomore biological engineering students, however, struggled with basic
electrical engineering concepts. Meera, who was trained in computer science before
coming into biological engineering, was the TA for this module of the lab. She had to run a
remedial tutorial in electrical engineering several times over for small groups of students.
Looking rather confused, they gathered around her at the white board. The laboratory
director, herself not trained as an engineer, but as a molecular biologist, also joined the
lesson. Current flow, resistors, converters, photodiodes, signal matching and ground all
had to be explained. Meera, who had assembled all the circuit boards herself, seemed a
little surprised by how hard it was for the students to get the concepts: "Inverters ... you all
know what that is? ... Okay? ... Does it make sense when I say current flows through a
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wire? ... Does that make sense?
The students' blank stares, and repeated questions gave the lie to the excited statement in
their lab manual: "Notice how much easier it is to assemble electrical circuits as compared
to biological circuits. It takes seconds to swap in a new resistor into your circuit but a few
days to assemble," a couple biological parts together. Apparently, it was not that easy:
what they were being asked to do was make sense of what was a rather dense material-
semiotic tangle. Modeled on a circuit diagram, the bacteria had been engineered from
"standardized biological parts"; that is, proteins and genetic sequences that had been
modeled as input, output, and signal matching devices, resistors, inverters, terminators,
and protein generators. Thus the bacteria themselves were an analogue, or materialized
refiguration, of an electronic circuit. The circuit they fumbled with at their lab benches was
therefore a materialized refiguration of a materialized refiguration: it was an analogue of
the cell, which itself had already been designed and built on the model of the circuit
board. Their attempts to wrap their heads and hands around this did indeed give them
cause to swerve.
One might expect that analogies are most useful when they draw on knowledge of a
familiar realm to illuminate another, less well-known realm. The use of the language of
circuitry for inscribing cellular signaling and regulation had already become standard
language in the lab and in classroom lectures, yet the students did not have an
appreciation for its full import. The bacterial system they had been using throughout the
module depended an in-depth understanding of electrical circuits. However, the students
were not yet fluent in the terminology and techniques for electronic circuit construction or
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analysis. The circuit building exercises were, in this regard, quite productive: they were
diagnostic of where students' understanding of the analogy of the cellular circuit had
broken down, and offered to remedy the situation by enabling them to cultivate a feeling
for the circuit as a tangible machine. The lesson learned by the students, their instructors,
and their ethnographer was, then, that the circuit is not a self-evident figure for the cell,
and that its effective use must be cultivated. It takes work to build the machine into the
organism, and this work must be supported by a practical, conceptual, and material
culture. This involves engineering a new generation of biological engineers who can be
lured by the metaphor of molecular machines.
Machinic Fetishism or Lively Machines?
"Life itself" depends on the erasure of the apparatus of
production and articulatory relationships that make up all
objects of attention, including genes, as well as on denial of
fears and desires in technoscience.
Haraway, 1997:147
In an article that appeared in Nature in 1986, "One Molecular Machine Can Transduce
Diverse Signals," Henry Bourne remarked astutely that in the life sciences, "argument by
analogy, like gambling, was once practiced behind closed doors" (814). Bourne was
claiming that by the mid-1980s, analogical reasoning in biology had finally been "elevated
into respectability" with rich "payoffs" (814). In this article Bourne could be said to have
"outed" analogy as an integral practice in the work of science. What is curious, however,
is that just as he put the rich productivity of some kinds of analogy on display, he
simultaneously obscured others. Most notably he made no reference to the analogy that
most promiscuously populated his essay: the figure of molecular machines. No longer an
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animating figuration, the molecular machine had, for him, already become a dead
metaphor, an unremarkable thing-in-itself. Yet, as Emily Martin suggests, "far from a dead
metaphor," it had become "a sleeping metaphor" that must be "woken up so we can
examine the work it is doing" (Martin, 1998: 39).
One hundred years after Huxley first introduced the machine metaphor, it seems to have
lost its punch. Some might weave this tale into a Whiggish historical narrative that reads
molecular visualization technologies as having finally vindicated what could only now be
seen as Huxley's daring and provocative premonition of the underlying nature of molecular
life. Once molecules' "works" were made as "actual" and tangible as Beale's clock, this
history could be trumpeted in a triumphalist tone: "Lo and behold! The invisible protein
molecule has been made manifest-and look for yourself, it really is a machine!" In this
move, machines are no longer animating figures that enable the scientist to take a leap
across the divide between the visible and the invisible; with atomic-resolution molecular
vision, molecular machines have been forged into technoscientific fact.
In this light, the work that has gone into producing molecular machines is at risk of being
made invisible, and drawn back behind closed doors. Following Haraway, I am wary of
such moments in which the richly "tropic" and figurative nature of technoscientific vision
is erased or denied (See 1997: 133-137). Drawing on Marxist, psychoanalytic, and feminist
analyses Haraway offers crucial insight into how tropes are sedimented, or "corporealized"
(141) into technoscientific objects. She examines how, in the name of objectivity and
neutrality, technoscience denies the tropic nature of its visual and material productions,
and in effect produces a literalization that gives fixed form to the trope as a "fetish" object
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(1997: 141-148). In her reading of the "genetic fetishism" of late-twentieth century life
sciences, she shows that "life itself" was corporealized into the flattened forms of
information and code, tropes whose powerful figurations have shaped biology since the
1960s (Haraway, 1997: 141; see also Kay, 2000). But biology today, as Stan Graham told
his students, is changing, and I would hazard to say that this "genetic fetishism" is giving
way to a kind of "machinic fetishism" in structural biology.
For Haraway, fetishes are "substitutes," that "obscure the constitutive tropic nature of
themselves and of worlds. Fetishes literalize and so induce an elementary material and
cognitive error. Fetishes make things seem clear and under control" (1997: 136). She
reminds us that "fetishism is about interesting 'mistakes'-really denials-where a fixed
thing substitutes for the doings of power-differentiated lively beings on which and on
whom...everything actually depends" (135). In the case of commodity fetishism, "things
are mistakenly perceived as the generators of value, while people appear as and even
become ungenerative things, mere appendages of machines, simply vehicles for
replicators" (ibid.). By naturalizing and literalizing machines in the bodies of organisms,
asserting the neutrality of visualization technologies, life scientists risk giving the
impression that they are merely unveiling the underlying machinery of life. In so doing
they disavow the power of their own inventive analogies and the work they put into
crafting their models. In the case of protein modeling, I want to draw attention to structural
biologists' labour, their conceptual and practical dexterity, as well as their creativity and
desires; these are investigators who, in their productive application of the machine as a
metaphor, have been able to turn their molecules into visible, tangible, and workable
objects. I remain curious, however, about those moments when molecular machines get
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naturalized as nature's tools, rather than recognized as the elaborately constructed figural
machinery of the investigator.
In the all-too high stakes game of contemporary US creationism-evolutionary debates, in
which proponents of both Intelligent Design82 and neo-Darwinian evolution deploy the
metaphor of molecular machines with serious deadpan literalism, the question of who
made these molecular machines anything but a trivial matter. The joke, at which neither
the creationists nor the evolutionists are in a position to laugh (their silence revealing the
depth of their investments), is that these are neither God's clever little devices, nor
evolution's sometimes-clumsy concoctions. From the vantage point of materialized
refiguration, molecular machines can be seen as neither Nature's nor God's handiwork:
they are none other than the marvelous conjurings of creative scientists and engineers,
who have figured and materialized them through the techniques, aesthetics, and desires of
their technoscientific arts. What is ironic is that both sides continually defer the
responsibility for engineering these machines to higher powers, evolutionary or
otherwise-to the extent that they don't take any credit for this crafty work. In the end, it is
the biological engineers, more than other life scientists, who fess up to the absurdity of this
denial. For, though they might muffle their laughter, they do get the joke: as they struggle
to reassert the respectability of "design" and "designers" in the realm of life science, they
82 See the website http://www.arn.org/mm/mm.htm for insight into how molecular machines are
used by proponents of Intelligent Design. Access Research Network hosts a "Molecular Machines
Museum," which provides "an introduction to molecular machines and irreducible complexity,"
complete with animations of all kinds of molecular machines in the cell, in particular the bacterial
flagellum, whose mechanism, ID proponents suggest is just far to complex to have evolved through
Darwian processes. The site quotes ID proponent Michael Behe: "A man from a primitive culture
who sees an automobile might guess that it was powered by the wind or by an antelope hidden
under the car, but when he opens up the hood and sees the engine he immediately realizes that it
was designed. In the same way biochemistry has opened up the cell to examine what makes it run
and we see that it, too, was designed."
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do, after all, want recognition for their labours-those massive, micro-scale engineering
projects that they have rigged up within living cells. They are keenly aware of how the
analogy of molecular machines has been productive of new objects, meanings, lines of
research and forms of life. In particular, they understand well how it has sustained their
very livelihoods.
If, as Haraway suggests, materialized refiguration is a practice of "worlding" that gives
substance and significance, body and meaning, to emerging technoscientific objects, then
how technoscience refigures the stuff of life matters: this is a practice that materializes
some kinds of bodies and meanings rather than others. Refusing to take responsibility for
crafting these figures and models is what Haraway calls an "avoidance of the tropic...tissue
of all knowledge" (1997: 137). Such a denial emerges from a misplacement of "error,"
where scientists are trained to assume that error is located in the "zone of culture," (137)
that is, in what are assumed to be unscientific practices of storytelling and figuration.
However, as she shows, the actual error "inheres" in the assertion of the "literalness" of
models of "life itself," in this case, the deadpan literalism of the molecular machine (137).
As I hope I have made clear in this chapter, scientific visualization is ripe with materialized
refiguration, and this process is anything but straightforward. As Jim Brady's evocative
body-work demonstrates, machines are not the only figures that populate molecular
imaginaries. With ethnographic attention to materialized refiguration in practice, to the
"enactment" of the metaphor of molecular machines, it is possible to see that the machine
analogy does not resolve fully mechanical objects in the bodies of organisms. In spite of
attempts to clamp down on figural vocabularies of proteins, to render them as deterministic
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machines, life scientists' animating performances of the analogy produces biological
machines that are undeniably lively.
The biological engineers that designed the laboratory course really did get this when they
found themselves at the limits of their metaphor of the electrical circuit. After describing
the "easy" features of the circuits they had engineered in bacterial cells, their laboratory
manual provided this caveat:
In practice, spatial and temporal factors hamper even simple
designs. The cell is a messy circuit board without the static
physical separation you could find between electronic
circuit elements. Proteins are made and roam the cell,
invariably interacting with nucleic acids and with other
proteins in unpredictable and unspecified ways (emphasis
added).
Proteins in this "messy circuit board" "roam the cell," and in their meanderings, (which
seem to evoke Beale's "freely moving bodies") escape full characterization and predictive
analysis. In practice, biological engineers' machines are indeterminate and unpredictable.
Like the cyborgs that propagate through Haraway's texts, these molecular machines are
"queer" figures that do not produce a straight story or picture of life that comes to any
determinate resolution (on "queer" science see Franklin, 2006, and 2007). As I show in the
next chapter, the machinic fetishism maintained in scientific texts breaks down the
moment that proteins are performed by structural biologists as simultaneously machinic
and lively. It is in the moment when the modeler enacts these machines as if they were
also breathing, desiring, writhing bodies with chemical affinities and anthropomorphized
affects, that the craftwork and creativity of their figurations are made palpable. Thus
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biological engineers and structural biologists perform a far more "wily biology" (Dumit,
2003) than their machinic fetishism avows.
The practice of modeling the stuff of life is, then, akin what Haraway (1997) might call the
"unapologetic swerving of liveliness" of "worldly bodies-in-the-making" (137). To literalize
or fetishize the machine in the body of the cell is thus to refuse to recognize machine
analogies as animating and enlivening tropes. It is also to deny their roles as penetrating
visualization technologies; as the integral components of the "apparatuses of observation"
(Barad, 1996) and "bodily production" (Haraway, 1991) that draw molecular structures
into view. It is also to ignore their role as powerful "lures" that enable both a "leap" of
imagination (Stengers, 1999), and an attractive and tractable means for engineers to finally
get a grip on "life itself" as a quantifiable, manipulable, and designable substance. Taken
as a profound achievement, in Stengers sense, it is possible to track the "intense pleasure in
skill," of modeling molecules as machines, such that "machine skill," and the skill to use
machine analogies, is not a threat to feminist knowledge practice (Haraway, 1991: 180). In
Haraway's (1991) cyborg figuration: "The machine is not an it to be animated, worshiped,
and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our embodiment" (180).
There is, afterall, "no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of
machine and organism, of technical and organic" (Haraway, 1991: 178). Molecular
machines can in this way be made visible as the potent, material-semiotic substances they
are: that is, as the catalysts that have, in the hands of researchers, worked efficiently and
effectively to crystallize matter and meaning, practices and cultures, and ways of life for
both molecular substances and their scientists.
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Animating Mechanism:
Animations and the Propagation of Affect in the Lively
Arts of Protein Modeling
Introduction
In the summer of 2005, anthropologist Michael Fischer and I were both pursuing research
the field of structural biology. We were invited by a mutual friend to jointly conduct a
series interviews with structural biologists based in a group of laboratories at a privately
funded cancer research institute on the east coast of the U.S. There we met with Andres, a
protein crystallographer doing his postdoctoral research in an immunology lab. During our
interview, Andres demonstrated a molecular mechanism he had worked out for
intercellular adhesion. This is a mechanism that operates between cells, and makes use of
inter-locking proteins to maintain the structural integrity of developing tissues. His
structural study of a group of cell surface proteins determined that these molecules are long
and straight. One part of the protein is embedded in the cellular membrane, while the
other extends out into the extra-cellular environment where it is available to bind to similar
molecules on adjacent cells. The binding end of the protein has three short protrusions that
give it a ratcheted structure. He hypothesized that this ratcheted structure provides a
mechanism to strengthen binding between adjacent cells.
Andres, Mike, and I were seated facing each other on tall stools next to a workbench in
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the lab. Andres was telling us how his protein works, and I was busy scribbling notes in my
notebook while he was talking, with barely enough time to watch how he was
demonstrating the structure. "Here, take my hand", he said. With this, I looked up. "As if
we were shaking hands." I had to drop my notebook and pen in my lap, so that I could
reach out my hand, apologetic for having been so distracted by my note taking. He wanted
to convey the strength of the associations made between molecules whose binding holds
two adjacent cells together. We clasped hands in a firm handshake, but he leaned back. I
was unprepared for this, and our hands slipped apart. "How would we make our grip
stronger?" he queried. "Suppose we are climbing a mountain, what kind of grip would we
need?" Still holding hands, he eased me into an answer by gripping me at the wrist. I
followed along, and clasped his wrist in turn. We both leaned away. Our grasp was
decidedly stronger. "Right", I confirmed. Molecules binding at their first and second hooks
would form a stronger bond. "And how would we make it even stronger?" He extended his
grip further up my arm, clasping me at my elbow. I followed suit and we tested the
strength. Together, Michael Fischer, Andres and I, acknowledged the augmented stability
of this third hold.
Ratcheting up the grip, from binding at the hands, to the wrists, to the elbows, Andres
sculpted a model for strong molecular association by using the physical intuition of his
body. By enlisting my participation in this performance of his model he interrupted my
note taking and redirected my ethnographic attention towards the body-work of reasoning
in structural biology. His own body had become a key resource for him to be able to make
arguments about molecular mechanisms: his body was invested in his interpretation of
protein structures, and the forms and potential functions of these proteins animated his
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imagination. He in turn animated his hypothesis by entangling us both in this
demonstration of his model. More than a pedagogical trick, I argue that that his bodily
intuition has contributed to his scientific questions and committed him to several years
worth of research into these intermolecular interactions. Despite little evidence to support
his theory-that these proteins bind to each other using all three hooks-he still holds out
hope that he might one day find the crystal structures that can validate this feeling he has
for the strength of these molecular associations.
His animation of the mechanism of inter-cellular adhesion seems at first to contradict the
tropes and registers in which proteins are typically figured in the scientific literature. As I
showed in Chapter 4, the metaphor of molecular machines is pervasive in structural
biology and biological engineering communities.83 In some ways, protein modelers'
mechanistic rhetoric could be read as an attempt to eradicate vestiges of vitalism from
biological explanations. Indeed, as I demonstrate in this chapter, many I have interviewed
and observed teaching express concern about the ascription of agency to proteins. They
invest much effort into policing what they see as rampant anthropomorphisms that ascribe
forms of human desire to proteins. In some ways, it's plausible to interpret researchers
prevalent use of machine metaphors as an attempt to quell this tendency to slip into
animistic language. It appears as if they are operating with the assumption that machines
83 Mechanism has held a prominent place in the history of biological modeling and theory-making
more generally. This mode of reasoning builds on a long history of theories and metaphors that
inscribe living bodies as machines (see for example Gieson, 1969; Hopwood, 1999; Keller, 1995;
2002; Lenoir, 1982; Pauly, 1996). Researchers working in the broad field of the life sciences have
deployed mechanical theories of biological function at many scales of the organism, and in ways
that have shaped knowledge in such fields as embryology and development (see Hopwood, 1999,
2002), as well as cell biology (see Landecker, 2003, 2007).
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are predictable and tractable entities, and that their machine metaphors will reduce
otherwise messy systems to the deterministic logic of physical and chemical laws.
Andres's performance of this molecular mechanism, however, forces me to take a closer
look at the nature of mechanistic reasoning and machine metaphors in biology. As he
performed them, his mechanistic model does not fully de-animate living processes. Indeed,
there is something curiously lively about his molecular mechanism. I aim to show how,
rather than spelling the "death of nature" (see Merchant, 1983), mechanism in the life
sciences might be an interesting site for feminist analyses of scientific practice. In this
chapter, I examine modes of learning and communication among protein modelers in
research and teaching contexts, paying special attention to how they use a variety of
media, including their own bodies, to animate chemical and physical processes at the
molecular scale. Paying attention to the expressive body-work of molecular modeling, I
show how researchers' affects and embodied performances inflect mechanistic knowledge
in structural biology. Rather than deadening living processes in order to make them more
tractable, and so available to analysis, my informants' expressive performances show up
what Donna Haraway has called the "unapologetic swerve of liveliness" that animates
both bodies and knowledge in-the-making (1997: 137).
In this chapter, I draw on a diverse array of tools from ethnographic, historical, and
philosophical literatures that have a bearing on visualization, embodiment, and modeling
in the sciences. I draw on feminist science studies scholar Karen Barad's (1996, 2003,
2007) theory of "intra-action"; Chris Kelty and Hannah Landecker's (2004) "theory of
animation"; Michael Taussig's (1993) exploration of "mimesis" as a form of modeling; and
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Deleuze's (1986) Bergsonian mediations on movement. I develop the notion of
"liveliness," not as an immaterial vital force that imbues matter with the properties of life,
but as a narrative form that shapes life scientists' stories about living bodies. "Liveliness," in
this sense is a performance that taps into the excitability of all kinds of bodies (human,
nonhuman, and machine) that are swept up in the act of crafting compelling narratives of
life. Throughout this chapter, and in the conclusion to this study, I examine how narratives
of liveliness present a narrative form that is distinct from that which scripts scientific
visualization as the "capture of 'life itself'." I argue that stories of molecular liveliness
inflect structural biologists figurations of molecular machines, and enable them to enact a
kind of biophilic resonance that helps them make sense of the substances they lovingly
model. This chapter thus aims for an account of mechanistic reasoning that does not elide
the passions that are so alive in practices of making of scientific knowledge.
Intra-action, Response-ability, and Excitation
I am interested in how protein modeling practices can extend feminist theories of
performativity in science, in particular how these practices make visible relations among
modes of embodiment, learning and communication, and the role of affect in the
propagation of scientific knowledge. My hope is to expand the category of what counts
among the central practices to be tracked in ethnographic analyses of the visual cultures of
science. Feminist scholars have made major contributions to the literature on performance
and performativity in science.8 4 These include Judith Butler's (1993) analysis of the
' On the role of performance in scientific experiments, and in the production of scientific
knowledge, see Pickering (1993) and Sibum (1995).
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relationship between biological sex and gender performance in her extension of Austinian
theories of performativity, and Donna Haraway's (1991; 1997) theory of "situated
knowledges", which takes seriously the "material-semiotic" production and performance of
scientific knowledge. Karen Barad (1996, 2003, 2007) makes significant contributions to
the long-standing debates in the science studies literature on human and nonhuman
agencies. She draws on both Butler and Haraway to propose a feminist theory of "agential
realism" that can account for the "enactment" of scientific knowledge through the multiple
material and conceptual agencies involved in its production. Barad's theory calls for an
account of knowledge production at the scale of the "phenomena" that are produced in
experimental configurations, and so she pays particular attention to the specific
configurations scientists set up between themselves, their apparatuses for observation, and
the things they observe.
In order to think through the dynamic relations between all kinds of agents in a laboratory
configuration, Barad distinguishes interaction from intra-action. For her, interaction
"presumes the prior existence of independent entities", and builds on a "Cartesian cut" that
assumes an inherent distinction and division between subject and object in a given
situation. Intra-action, on the other hand, "enacts an agential cut", that is, "a local
resolution within the phenomenon" (Barad, 2003: 815). To elaborate her theory, Barad
extends Neils Bohr's philosophy-physics and his treatment of the wave-particle duality of
light to account for the impossibility of separating an experimental object from the
"agencies of observation" that are enlisted to draw it into view. Bohr was concerned with
how different laboratory configurations could be used to enact distinct properties of light.
Light could be detected in the form of either waves or particles, but never both forms at the
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same time. In Barad's framework of intra-action, light becomes one of two possible
experimental objects - either a wave or a particle - through precise intra- actions between
the scientist, their agencies for observation, and the substance subjected to
experimentation. Thus, for her, laboratory observations refer not so much to the object as
such, but to the phenomena performed at the scale of whole experimental configurations
(Barad, 1996).
For Barad, this means that "phenomena do not merely mark the epistemological
inseparability of 'observer' and 'observed'; rather, phenomena are the ontological
inseparability of agentially intra-acting 'components" (Barad, 2003: 815, emphasis as in
the original). Barad shows how subjects and objects precipitate out, as such, from their
experimental configurations. In other words, the "agencies" which participate in
experiments are themselves formed by each other in their intra-action. She is thus able to
expand the frame for analysis of scientific experimentation to include the experimental
configurations of objects and apparatuses, as well as the material and discursive agencies
enacted by the scientist.
This inseparability of objects and other agencies directs attention to issues raised in the
feminist science studies literature, in particular the question of accountability in the
production scientific knowledge. In Human-Machine Reconfigurations, Lucy Suchman
(2007) reviews theories of agency in the STS literature. In this context, she grapples with
the legacy of actor network theory (ANT) and "its aftermath", drawing Barad's theory of
intra-action into a long-standing conversation among scholars concerned with the "mutual
constitution" of human and nonhuman agencies in scientific practice. Suchman quotes
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Michel Callon to show that ANT's "network" is not one "connecting entities which are
already there, but a network which configures ontologies. The agents, their dimensions,
and what they are and do, all depend on the morphology of the relations in which they are
involved" (Callon cited in Suchman, 2007: 261). Yet, as Suchman's genealogy of theories
of agency in STS makes clear, Barad's formulation takes a further step to articulate a
feminist account of power, knowledge and responsibility in science. Extending ANT to the
embodiment and performativity of the scientists, Barad's agential realism poses the
question: Where do scientists' bodies end and experimental instruments and objects begin?
For me, this means that they do not simply interact, or mutually produce each other, but
are profoundly entangled. It is the form of such entanglements-including the modes of
embodiment and forms of knowledge performed-that remain within the purview of the
scientist. While taking seriously material constraints-how matter matters-Barad's theory
of intra-action also aims to account for the responsibilities invested in those who configure
experimental arrangements. Her theory insists that scientists (and analysts) account for the
roles they play in circumscribing phenomena, making the cuts that locate subjects and
objects, and producing and performing knowledge.
I extend Barad's work to understand how, in the entangled configurations of life science
laboratories and classrooms, knowledge is enacted through affect and feeling as well as
through instruments and objects. So, while intra-actions can be seen to morph the object in
order to produce experimental data, I do not assume that the human observer is left
untouched. I aim to understand how, in their intra-actions with experimental objects and
visualization media, scientists affect, and are affected by, scientific knowledge as they
produce and perform it. I read intra-action as a call for attention to the intimate, partly
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choreographed, partly improvised contact-dance85 between human and nonhuman bodies
and machines in scientific practice. I argue that scientists must learn how to move with
and be moved by the objects they investigate, and that this elastic, intra-active push and
pull between bodies is key to how they engender knowledge. I suggest that scientists get
entangled in a contact dance with the objects they study, as well as with the malleable
media and metaphors they get use to model these bodies; and I aim to show how the
knowledge they gain depends on their own bodies' response-ability to the bodies they
model. In what follows I explore how scientists themselves could be conceived of as
excitable tissues86 who can respond intra-actively to their molecular objects and the media
they use to model them. Through their intra-actions with each other and with their models,
protein modelers transduce and so propagate the molecular affects and gestures they have
cultivated in order communicate their feeling for protein forms and mechanisms. The aim
of this exploration is to develop an inquiry into how scientists and their analysts might
become more accountable for the passionate forms of knowledge produced and
propagated within and beyond laboratories.
85 Contact improvisation is an improvisational dance medium in which two or more dancers engage
in a tacit conversation between bodies. Dancers keep close physical contact while exploring the
conversational interplay between their bodies and experimenting with balance, gravity, weight
tension, gesture and tacit modes of communication. It is a viable metaphor to capture the
improvised and choreographed entanglements enacted between bodies (human, nonhuman and
machine) at work within biological laboratories. I am looking for a way of theorizing the relations
between bodies that holds on to their affects, unpredictability, and multiplicity, and which allows
room for seeing how bodies can move with and be moved by each other. The metaphor of contact
improvisation, which invokes bodies in motion and in conversation, does this work for me.
86 The history of life science abounds with the language of "excitation", "irritability", and
"sensitivity." These are terms deployed in cell biology and neuroscience in the nineteenth century.
In Matter and Memory, Bergson (1991) writes: "living matter, even as a simple mass of protoplasm,
is already irritable and contractile...it is open to the influence of external stimulation, and answers
to it by mechanical, physical and chemical reactions" (28). See Gieson (1969) for a taste of the
language of irritability and excitation in history of the protoplasmic theory of the cell and studies of
muscle tissue. I develop this notion of excitable tissues towards the end of the chapter.
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Sites of Intra-action in Protein Modeling
Barad's notion of intra-action is particularly useful in thinking through the production of
visual facts in science. Visualizations, like protein models, can be regarded as the products
of intra-actions between scientists, their objects of analysis, and their visualization
machinery - which includes the material and semiotic technologies they deploy both to
parse and propagate their data. I investigate the intra-actions that produce structural
knowledge of protein molecules. The primary objects, the "epistemic things" in Hans-J6rg
Rheinberger's (1997) terminology, are the proteinacious substances being modeled. Yet, as
invisible entities, molecules as such are inextricably bound up with the agencies of
observation that draw them into view. In this case, these agencies include X-ray
crystallographers' extensive assemblage of machines-including metaphors and interactive
digital visualization media--collectively gearedto produce and interpret atomic resolution
models of proteins as molecules. Living substances are thus made molecular through these
techniques and practices. The primary phenomena produced out of these intra-acting
assemblages of human and nonhuman bodies and machines are, then, interactive
computer graphic renderings of the atomic structures of proteins.
As I showed in Chapter 2 and summarize below, these digital models are interactive: they
can be handled, manipulated and modified. As such, they enable multiple sites of intra-
action, not only for those who build them, but also for their extended users, including
those who attempt to pull these models off the screen and communicate the fine details of
protein structures to wider audiences. As this chapter aims to show, such intra-actions
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produce another range of phenomena, in particular the animations that bring mechanistic
models to life. I examine ways that protein modelers animate their models and mechanistic
theories through a range of excitable media"8 including their own bodies. I explore how
such "active" media enable researchers to communicate more than just the configuration
of a molecular mechanism. They also relay a range of affects and sensibilities that inflect
the model they perform. In order to examine how molecular expertise is propagated, I
show how these gestures and affects comprise a form of mimetic communication through
which knowledge of protein structures and mechanisms is relayed in both professional and
pedagogical settings.
Crystallographic modeling is a fine example of intra-action in the production of visual facts
in science. The human-computer interface that crystallographers use to build protein
models offers an exceptional site to examine the intra-actions that shape knowledge of
protein structures and mechanisms. This visualization practice involves active and
87 This is a term that is already in use in the scientific literature. Current uses resonate nicely with the
ways I want to use the term here. Gil Bub, a researcher in physiology working on pacemakers at
McGill University defines excitable media as follows: "Excitable media are spatially distributed
systems which have the ability to propagate signals without damping. For example, a forest fire
travels as a wave from its initiation point, and regenerates with every tree it ignites. This is in
contrast to passive wave propagation, which is characterized by a gradual damping of signal
amplitude due to friction. An example of passive wave propagation is sound waves passing through
air. An impulse over a certain threshold initiates a wave of activity moving across the excitable
media. As each element undergoes an excursion from steady state, it causes its neighbors to move
over threshold at a rate determined by the diffusion coefficient (a 'passive' property of the media),
and the rate of rise of the diffused species of the excited element (a 'active' property of the media).
The propagation of electrical activity in cardiac muscle involves the interaction of different ion
species across a combination of active and passive ion channels and diffusion of charge through a
heterogeneous substrate with dynamically changing conductances. Despite complexity inherent in
conduction at microscopic scales, the heart can be approximated as a continuous excitable media.
A variety of cardiac tachycardias have been attributed to formation of large scale patterns of
excitation such as the formation and break up of spiral waves." See
http://www.cnd.mcgill.ca/bios/bub/lexcitablemain.html
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prolonged handling and manipulation of experimental data throughout what is an often-
arduous process of constructing the model by hand (de Chadarevian, 2002) or onscreen
(see Chapter 2). As I outlined in Chapter 2, Eric Francoeur and Jerome Segal (2004) have
shown how a series of computer hardware and software innovations in the 1960s and
1970s enabled protein modelers to transition from building molecular models with
physical materials to using interactive computer graphics systems for the display and
analysis of structural data. Although modeling materials have changed dramatically
between the early days of physical modeling with mechanical ball and stick parts
(Francoeur, 1997), early computer graphics developers were able to preserve the
materiality of physical models by engineering workstations interactive enough to give users
the sensation that they were directly manipulating virtual molecules "with their hands"
(Langridge, 1974, 1981; Francoeur and Segal, 2004).
Yet, once built, crystallographic protein models can also travel: as digital objects, they
become available to many other users. For example, once a crystallographer builds a
protein model, she uploads the structural data into the Protein Data Bank (PDB). In so
doing, she makes it available to a wider range of researchers, including biological
engineers, predictive modelers, and drug designers who are always on the lookout for new
protein structures. A curious researcher will download the coordinates of a protein
structure and manipulate it onscreen. As I described in Chapter 2, these tools prosthetically
couple the researcher to the model so that as they navigate through the intricate folds of
the protein, zooming in on atomic details, and rotating it through virtual space, it becomes
a tangible object (see also Francoeur and Segal, 2004). For me, this practice constitutes a
kind of intra-active body-work that enables the researcher to learn the structure by
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incorporating the form of the protein into their body as an "embodied model."
The intra-actions that produce molecular knowledge also exceed the computer interface:
the details of a molecular structure, and hypotheses about how it functions, must be
communicated among researchers and their students. Key here are sites of social intra-
action. As I showed in Chapter 3, my observations of the pedagogical lives of models show
that once a researcher has cultivated converging embodied models of proteins, he or she
may then be able to perform these models for others off-screen, so to speak. In addition to
teachers' and students' performances of protein forms and movements in classrooms and
teaching laboratories, researchers also readily enact their embodied knowledge of
molecular structure in professional contexts. They do this in formal and informal research
settings, including in weekly lab meetings, in presentations at meetings and conferences,
and even as they chat with each other at the laboratory bench. Additionally, ethnographic
interviews offer another site for researchers to express molecular knowledge through their
bodies. In each of these sites, structural biologists may perform their knowledge of a
protein alongside graphic renderings in order to elaborate a structure or its movements; or,
in the absence of other visual media, researchers' may rely on their bodies to render the
protein.
I argue that performative modes of body-work are intra-active in the sense that they require
others who can move with and be moved by these molecular gestures-in both the
physical and affective senses of the verb "to move"-so that the details of the structure and
hypotheses about molecular mechanisms to be relayed. That is, for these embodied models
to become effective lures, they must be able to draw others into new forms of
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understanding. This demands that structural biologists and biological engineers be attuned
to the figural vocabularies and molecular affects that are alive and in play in their
communities. I return to this point in later sections of this chapter.
Modeling Biological Mechanisms
Brian Found is a biological engineer based at a computer science and artificial intelligence
research center at the same institution where Jim Brady and Diane Griffin teach. In the fall
of 2005, Brian Found co-taught a course on biomolecular kinetics and cellular dynamics
with Stan Graham, the director of the school's new biological engineering major. The
course was geared towards biological engineers-in-training. In one of his lectures Brian
defined "mechanism" as the parsing of a living entity, such as a cell, into discrete,
interconnected units. For him, a mechanism is an abstraction that severs a larger entity into
parts and orders them by their functionality, affording an effective means for manipulation.
As a biological engineer, he is invested in garnering as much mechanistic knowledge
about his system as possible. He told the class:
You have to get a mechanistic understanding of everything. Because that's
where the true power comes from. If you have a mechanistic understanding
you really know how it works and- you can change how it works. If you
have kind of a philosophical understanding you can describe it after the
fact. You can wrap some pretty words around it, but that understanding
isn't sufficient to empower you to make the system do something different;
that is, what you want it to do. So that's our mantra. The question is how
deep into the mechanism do you need to know?
The "true power" that Brian invokes is the ability to engineer new kinds of molecular
mechanisms that perform predictable functions in living systems. He desires a level of
understanding that makes living processes tangible at the scale of intra- and inter-
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molecular forces and energies. The biological engineering "mantra" that he and Stan
frequently recited in their lectures was "measure, model, manipulate, and make". They aim
towards building quantitative models of cellular and molecular processes that enable
intervention and re-engineering. In one sense, their designs on life serve as a not so subtle
reminder of the ways that mechanistic thinking has historically alarmed feminist theorists
concerned with the exploitation of nature (e.g. Merchant, 1983; Griffin, 1984; Plumwood,
193). I would, however, like to read their desire for mechanistic knowledge more
generously.
I want to draw attention to the kind of understanding that Brian gestures towards, even
while he dismisses its merit. Though he is not convinced it will get you very far as an
engineer, he does see that it is possible to "wrap some pretty words" around a model to aid
in "describing" the mechanism, if only "after the fact". My fieldwork in Brian's lectures,
and in group meetings among members of his laboratory show that often a protein is
modeled as a body at the same time as it is made over into a mechanical object. Indeed, it
is not only words, but bodies too, that get "wrapped around" the model as the mechanism
is conceptualized and performed. My observations suggest that modeling molecules as
complex molecular machines that take up space and move through time has enlisted these
researchers' own moving bodies as resources to "give body" (Hopwood, 1999) to the
mechanisms they investigate, and to animate their theories.
Mechanisms, or things that operate mechanically, have three-dimensional, temporal
structures, in ways similar to living bodies. A biological mechanism, by definition, involves
some kind of movement or change: biological substances are transformed chemically and
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physically in the process of conducting "work" in the body. The development and
application of a mechanical theory to a biological process is a practice that requires
postulating an internal teleology of things; that is, relationships between the part and the
whole, between structure and function, and between form and purpose. Mechanistic
reasoning involves ascribing a narrative teleology to how the parts and forms of an object
change and move over time. In this sense, determining how molecules work, how they
perform their functions and interact with each other in the cell (with the assumption that
they in fact perform a kind of work), is an act of interpretation: the researcher must form a
hypothesis by piecing together partial snapshots of an otherwise dynamic process.
The framework that structural biologists draw on to make such interpretations is clearly
shaped by chemical and physical laws and theories. But, as I have shown in previous
chapters, it is also shaped by their experience working with models, and by analogies that
produce metonymic shifts between the scale of human experience and that of molecular
life. As I showed in Chapter 4, in order to interpret the functions of molecules, protein
modelers draw on (among other things) their embodied experiences with human-scale
mechanisms and machines (both within and beyond the laboratory) as sources of practical
logic and reasoning. Machines work well as analogies in part because they are also three-
dimensional and move through time. Practical knowledge of machines shapes how
structural biologists produce and disseminate knowledge of protein structures and
functions. Viewed from this perspective, mechanistic modeling appears to rely on
researchers' application of experiential knowledge as well as with their dexterity with
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language." In this sense, I see mechanistic reasoning is an intra-active, material-semiotic
practice. I propose that gestural and verbal descriptions of molecular mechanisms are more
than the aesthetic flourishes of expressive scientists: they are integral to the very
conception and development of mechanical models. And while structural biologists insist
on mechanical analogies, their renderings do not actually deaden living processes. Indeed
the renderings that they produce through the animating media of their bodies are
exceptionally lively.
Animating Mechanisms
Mechanisms, by definition, move. Animating media that can pull phenomena into time,
are especially useful for playing through the temporal forms of mechanical objects and
theories. Such media are particularly useful as visualization tools in the life sciences, as
they have the capacity to render the temporal forms of living organisms. What I hope to
show in this section is how, when scientists craft animations that pull a parsed process into
time, the mechanisms they engender can acquire rather lively properties.
Here I examine animations rather than simulations in life science. I do this for several
reasons. First, the term simulation is in wide use in the life sciences, and it has several
connotations many of which are beyond the scope of this study. Not all simulations are
animations: some simulations remain "in code" and do not have visualization features that
animate processes visually in time. For my purposes here, term animation keeps in play the
88 For an account of the cultivation of metaphors and "muscular" knowledge situated in the context
of imagery prominent in Victorian science, see Jordi Cat's (2001) account of Maxwell's methods of
"illustration".
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connection between visualization practices that pull static entities into time, and animation
as the act of breathing life into, or re-animating static objects. I also want to move away
from the primary association that simulations have with representation, where simulations
call attention to the resemblance or similarity they produce between the world and the
model. In similar ways to the term rendering, animation maintains focus on the scientist as
the creator, the conjurer, or animator, of otherwise invisible worlds. Where I see animation
as an intra-active practice, it is in the end the scientist who is accountable for crafting such
visions of the world.
All kinds of animations have been developed in the history the life sciences. For example,
embryologist Wilhelm Roux (1859-1924) employed everyday materials to create an
experiment that could defend mechanical theories of organismal development against
Hans Driesch's vitalist theories. By incubating balls of dough containing varying quantities
of yeast, joining them together in cellular formations, and observing the patterns they
formed as they rose, Roux effectively produced an "animation" of the differential growth of
cells in embryogenesis (see Hopwood, 1999). Keller (2002) documents another early form
of animation, which she describes as a kind of "simulation." 89 Stephane Leduc (1853-
1922), a biophysicist working at the Nantes Medical School drew on the persuasive
powers of mimicry to simulate the mechanical processes governing life forms. In the
laboratory Leduc produced "artificial" cells and organisms from osmotic gradients
generated by salt crystals and dyes. These chemical creatures seemed strangely alive, their
growth patterns and forms mimicking those of dividing cells, sporulating mushrooms,
89 In this context, simulation captures well how Leduc's technique produced a "similarity relation"
between the model and the world it represented (Morgan and Morrison, 1991).
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blooming plants, and free swimming algae. As mimetic animations, they worked
marvelously. According to one observer: "these mineral growths are not mere
crystallizations as many suppose...They imitate the forms, the colour, the texture, and even
the microscopic structure of organic growth so closely as to deceive the very elect."90
Through his strange "methods of imitation," Leduc conjured the semblance of living
entities in "materials chemically unlike but physically resembling the cells and tissues
themselves" (Keller, 2002: 15). Leduc's animation was a temporally dynamic model: by
moving through time it could evoke a living process."1
Leduc produced these animations in an attempt to demonstrate a link between living and
non-living matter, to generate evidence for his belief that living entities were governed by
nothing more than the same physical laws that acted on chemical substances. As a means
to stamp out vitalist tendencies which still haunted biology at that time, Leduc's "artificial
organisms" were meant to prove that no external vital forces were required to enliven
matter; that physical materials could, left to their own devices, acquire the characteristics
most closely associated with living substances. Leduc, then, was able to make use of the
temporality of this animating media in order to demonstrate the physical basis of living
processes, and as a means to evoke support for his mechanistic theory.
Chris Kelty and Hannah Landecker (2004) have proposed a "theory of animation" that
examines the relations between moving image technologies and the production of
knowledge in the life sciences. Alongside contemporary modes of digital animation, they
90 W. Deane Butcher quoted in Keller (2002: 15).
91 Rheinberger (1997) describes a simulation as a model in "precession" (113).
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treat early-twentieth-century microcinematography (Landecker, 2005) as a form of
animation. In its joining of biological and filmic techniques, micro-cinematography was a
form of animation that brought cells to life on film screens. For them, "media that represent
the living organism over time, such as time-lapse microcinematography, not only
demonstrate the life of the organism in question, they also animate it in relation to other,
often dominant, modes of static representation" (Kelty and Landecker, 2004: 45). Kelty and
Landecker are less interested in the ways that animations simulate life than their "status as
images in relation to knowledge" (32, emphasis as in the original). They read animations as
the playing of theories or models forward in time, that is, as the animation of otherwise
static abstractions or ways of seeing that have already been systematized in scientific
research. Thus, it is the theories themselves that are animated through time-based imaging
technologies.
Kelty and Landecker provide a crucial contribution to situating time-lapse imaging and
animation within the history of theories and models in life science. To extend their work
further, I foreground the ways that animations not only embed ways of seeing, but also,
how, in pulling static models into time, animations refigure these ways of seeing and the
very theories they enact. Seen in the framework of intra-action, it is in their very
performance that animations also transform knowledge. As I show in the following
section, Kelty and Landecker's approach works well for graphic animations, including the
computer animations that structural biologists are currently producing. However, as I
examine later in the chapter, there is an important difference between Kelty and
Landecker's "theory of animation"-as the animation of scientific theories-and what I
propose, which is a model of animation concerned with the animation of models. This
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difference can be seen most clearly by exploring how structural biologists use their bodies
as animating media.
Computer Graphic Animations
Today, protein crystallographers and protein folding researchers make use of the spatial
and temporal possibilities of digital media to build and manipulate their protein models as
time-based renderings onscreen. In the process they animate the molecular mechanisms
they hypothesize and intuit. Such animations are proudly displayed and available to be
downloaded from laboratory websites, frequently projected to awed audiences in
conference presentations and in undergraduate classrooms, and they circulate widely
through informal networks on the Internet. Some make use of high-end graphics, while
others use mnuch simpler imagery.
One of the more elaborate molecular animations currently circulating among life science
researchers and students was developed for teaching core biological concepts to Harvard
undergraduates. The "Biovisions" project employed character animators and state of the art
computer graphic animation systems in its aim to offer a glimpse into the "Inner Life of the
Cell." 92 Building directly on protein structure data, the creators saw this as a "completely
92 The animation is available to view online at http://www.studiodaily.com/main/
technique/tprojects/6850.html. It was produced out of a collaboration between Harvard University
and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute Biological Sciences Multimedia Project. Alain Viel and
Robert A. Lue directed the conception and scientific content, and the animation was produced by
John Liebler at XVIVO Studios. See the "Multimedia Production Site" for descriptions of other
projects, guided tours through contemporary innovations in the life sciences, interviews with
scientists, and clips of other animations, at http://multimedia.mcb.harvard.edu/ . Currently clips of
this video are widely circulated on YouTube. As of June 2007, just one of the many clips of this
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accurate rendering" (Marchant, 2006). However, set to ambient, orchestral music this 3D
flythrough animation does more than just pull mechanical objects into time: these
animations also provide glimpses into the scientists' and animators' molecular
imaginations. Animations like this could be described fairly as "working conceptual
hallucinations"; that is, "hybrid combinations of schematic, iconic and even fantastic
features" (Gilbert and Mulkay quoted in Lynch, 1991: 209). I propose that such animations
are renderings that combine researchers' practical knowledge with imagined forms: they
are temporally dynamic tracings of researchers' physical intuitions-their feeling for-
protein forms and movements. Animating media thus afford protein modelers a medium
through which they can express their molecular imaginations and intuitions in time.
Moreover, if these are expressions of researchers' embodied imaginations, what is
remarkable is that rather than following through on the aesthetic of their machine
analogies, these animations are surprisingly lively. As one reviewer comments, the
molecules and organelles "move with bug-like authority, slithering, gliding and twisting
through 3D space" (Marchant, 2006). It is possible to parse a phenomenon into discrete
elements and configure it as a mechanism. However, by pulling these static elements into
human time, protein modelers narrate biological mechanisms through lively figurations,
endowing molecular mechanisms with animistic, even wily behaviours. In this sense,
modelers use malleable media, and apply temporal structures such as musical scores and
story lines, in ways that inflect their molecular knowledge with a range of animistic affects.
Biological machines, and their modelers' fantasies, are expressed through what I am
calling a narrative of liveliness (see Chapter 6). These animations thus make clear the
animation people have posted on YouTube has been viewed over 500,000 times; is accompanied
by 2663 posted comments; and has been listed as a "favorite" 4202 times.
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etymological relations among the terms animation, animal, and animism.
However effective they are as pedagogical lures, many researchers are quite skeptical
about using these animations as anything more than entertainment. Lynn and Joanna are
postdocs who had been hired to work with professor of biology George Fraser on an HHMI
funded program to transform the introductory biology curriculum for undergraduate
students. I interviewed them about how they use visualizations when teaching an
introductory biology course. In the midst of our conversation, I asked Joanna, who had
been a graduate student in Jim Brady's laboratory, how she felt about computer animations
that attempt to visualize protein folding. Her response, and the conversation that ensued
between her and Lynn are quite telling. I offer an extended excerpt below:
Joanna: I've always hesitated [to make animations of protein
folding]...maybe it's because I'm from Jim Brady's lab. I have always really
hesitated trying to put what I see on my head onto paper. I was always the
one in the lab up there who was able to make beautiful models for people.
Not 3D models. But I was the one who was easily able to take the data, and
make the 2D cartoon to see that "Okay this step goes first, then its got to be
this step, then this step." I could do that very easily. But I always hesitated
to actually put anything amorphous, [like] the simulations together.
Because from day one joining the lab, Jim was like "You can't make a
simulation of protein folding. You can't do it! It's not going to be accurate!"
I can give you the steps that I know happen. I have no problem describing
or creating representations that make people understand that very easily.
But making an animation that goes from one to the other...It's that
ingrained Jim Brady thing that says: "No you can't do that it'll be wrong!"
For instance the molecule I was studying when I was there: It's got two
sections. And we-myself and another grad student-we determined that
yes, in fact, without a question, what happens is that one section folds
before the other. We could see it and we know it happens. And we have
lots of data that shows that's how it happens. But I would never try to
model a...
207
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
Lynn: A continuous process?
Joanna: Yes, a continuous process out of that. I could say yes, I can give
you a model that shows that this guy is solid, this guy is loose. But I would
never [animate it]. It's the Jim Brady in me ... It's very difficult because so
little is known. That's what makes protein folding is so hard to describe to
people. Cause, everyone seems to want to put a time sequence on things, to
make a simplified animation. There's so few cases where we can say a
simplified animation, oh, that's right. We just don't know.
Lynn: That's interesting. I just realize that's what irks me about the tRNA
folding movie that [we] show in class. It's precisely that. You don't know
that's what happens.
Joanna: You don't know the directionality, you just don't know ...
Lynn: ... that that's the order of the steps.
Joanna: From a protein folding background, to me its infinitely frustrating
when people do that. I've seen more graduate students spend their careers
trying to make animations and simulate folding when there's no
experimental basis for what they are doing...And it's very difficult as a true
protein folder-I can't buy it. I don't believe it. I can see the desire to
represent that, or to get at those steps. But there is just not enough data to
support [it].
One thing that is very interesting here is that Joanna kept repeating that her resistance to
animation is the Jim Brady "in her". It appears that as much as molecular forms have been
folded into her embodied imagination, so has her teacher. In this sense, her embodied
knowledge of protein folding is not just about scaling between the dimensions of the
human and the molecular, but a kind of transduction of knowledge from one human to
another (for more on transduction, see later sections of this chapter). More to the point of
here, however, is that Joanna and Lynn are concerned that animations overdetermine the
temporal sequence of what is for them a dynamic and complex process. Joanna "knows"
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how a protein folds, and she can "see" it; she even understands the "desire to represent"
the forms and movements of the folding process. However, she is very concerned that
animations overdetermine the temporal form of the dynamic processes she studies. She is
anxious about how animations rend time.
Looking at the BioVisions project as a rendering, it is possible to see how computer graphic
animations shed insight into the embodied imagination of their makers. However, when
these animations are treated as end-stage representations of a process they produce a kind
of closure: by putting a time stamp on a process, by directing how others see and
experience the temporality of a process, animations are risky because they can seduce lay
audiences by overdetermining the viewer's experience of temporality.
My reading of this is that computer animations, seen as representations, cut off the
possibility intra-action between the viewer and the model. This was evidenced quite
strongly when Jim Brady (apparently against his better judgment) presented a computer
graphic animation of a "molecular machine" in his protein folding course. During one of
his lectures he projected an animation of GroES, a chaperonin molecule, doing its work in
the cell. "It really is a molecular machine; the structure was solved," he told the class as he
stood in front of the projection screen that animated the molecule through its movements.
"We are seeing a cycle. You see what happens to the machine. Charges up with ATP,
recharges, cap binds. There's rotational motion." Jim started to try and describe what was
happening, but he suddenly stopped, stood in front of the screen, with his back to the
students, and just stared up at the movement, as if he'd gone into a trance. He eventually
pulled himself away, and told the class: "You can look at this quietly in your own home.
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We'll let that go." He paused again, and then said, "You've got the sense of a real machine
there." At this he shut down the LCD projector, and went back to his lecture.
The animation produced a kind of stunned silence. Projected as a representation, this
animation left no room for intra-action. In this sense, animations are distinct from the static
models that Jim animates and brings to life for his class. Static models seem to leave much
more room for intra-active play, opening up to a kind of exploration that enables the
viewer to participate in figuring out the temporal form of a process. Computer animations,
while they do provide a window into how molecular worlds are imagined, do not entangle
their viewers in the same ways, and so tend to cut off the kinds of embodied participation
that students need in order to really get a feel for molecular forms and movements.
As I examine in the following sections, it is through modelers' intra-actions with models,
that they are able to animate and propagate their tacit knowledge of molecular structures
and mechanisms. Moreover, entangled with this tacit knowledge is a range of affects that
turn out to be central to how researchers learn and communicate molecular knowledge.
Embodied Animations and Molecular Affects
There are many viable media for animating life science data and hypotheses, including
physical (e.g. rising dough), celluloid (e.g. film), and virtual (e.g. computer graphic)
media. 93 These are all malleable materials that can be used to pull abstract concepts-like
93 See Eugene Thacker's, Biomedia (2004) for an exploration of the various ways "media" comes
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mechanical theories-into space and time. Researchers bodies, it turns out, are also
exceptional media for producing animations. The body-work involved in protein modeling
and mechanistic reasoning demonstrates vividly what protein researchers must do with
their bodies in order to bring molecular models and mechanisms to life. In many ways,
they rely on gestures and affects to communicate structural knowledge of proteins amongst
themselves and their colleagues, and to students and their wider publics. With an interest
in examining the role of affect in the performance and propagation of knowledge in
science, I extend the study of animations to include modes of animation that excite the
bodies and imaginations of scientists.
In order to understand how embodied animations are enacted, I follow Kelty and
Landecker (2004) to examine techniques in which living substances are first fixed or
frozen, and then re-animated. In this way I can track how static renderings are pulled into
time through the animating media of researchers' bodies and imaginations. And yet, the
embodied animations I am interested in are distinct in important ways from the cinematic
forms and the mathematical formalism of L-systems described by Kelty and Landecker
(2004). In Cinema 1, Deleuze (1986) examines Bergson's 1907 theses on movement from
his text Creative Evolution. Deleuze defines a kind of modern cinematic movement that is
produced through a mechanical recomposition of "real" movement. This modern form of
cinematic movement is the "mechanical succession" of "snapshots" (what Deleuze calls
"immobile sections") that cut movement into equidistant moments of time ("any-instant-
whatever"). He associates this concept of movement with the achievements of the
into play in contemporary computer mediated sciences.
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Scientific Revolution, which were able to abstract time as an independent variable.
According to Deleuze:
The determining conditions of the cinema are the following: not merely the
photo, but the snapshot (the long-exposure photo belongs to another
lineage); the equidistance of snapshots; the transfer of this equidistance on
to a framework which constitutes the 'film'...; a mechanism for moving on
images. It is in this sense that the cinema is the system which reproduces
movement as a function of any-instant-whatever, that is, as a function of
equidistant instants, selected so as to create and impression of continuity.
Any other system which reproduces movement through an order of
exposures (poses), projected in such a way that they pass into one another,
or are 'transformed', is foreign to the cinema (1986: 5).
Snapshots are produced through an apparatus of capture that sections and immobilizes
"real" movement into "closed sets" of cinematic movement. Deleuze includes the "cartoon
film" (5)94 in this cinematic lineage, which may also include the computer graphic
animations I described above. However, this is not the same kind of animation that I am
observing in structural biologists' body-work: what I am seeing in their performances are
forms of animation in which gesture itself the animating media (see Agamben, 2000).
Where time in a time-lapse moving image can be sped up or slowed down, pulling fast or
slow movements into human time, and so into perception (see Landecker, 2005; Myers,
2005), time is not mechanized in the embodied animations I see performed. Their
animations are lively narrations whose temporality is elastic: they pull at and bend
molecular time by acting out the attractive and repulsive forces and tensions between
94 Deluze on "cartoon films": "This is clear when one attempts to define the carton film; if it belongs
fully to the cinema, this is because the drawing no longer constitutes a pose or a completed figure,
but the description of a figure which is always in the process of being formed or dissolving through
the movement of lines and points taken at any-instant-whatevers of their course. The cartoon film is
related not to a Euclidean, but to a Cartesian geometry. It does not give us a figure described in a
unique moment, but the continuity of the movement which describes the figure" (Deleuze, 1986: 5).
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atoms in molecules; their body-work engenders an exploratory rendering, a kind of
reaching towards, without producing a representation. Deleuze's definition, then,
embodied animations are "foreign to the cinema," and appear to suggest a form of
movement much more along the lines of Bergson's "open whole" of "duration" (Deleuze,
1986: 3-11), a kind of movement "cannot be divided without changing qualitatively at
each stage of the division" (10). The models that structural biologists perform are
explorations of the character of the protein, its habit, and its desires in a way that inflects it
with their own character, habitus, and desire. Thus, I treat gestural movements differently
than the animations produced through computer graphics."
Protein crystallography offers an illuminating example of how embodied animations are
generated. Fit squarely within a tradition of biological imaging and modeling that fixes or
freezes substances in order to bring them into view, crystallography produces static models
of protein :structures. This practice offers a fitting comparison to Kelty and Landecker's
example of microcinematography as a mode of animation, because it also begins with a
technique that produces snapshots. The difference is that embodied animations
reconstitute movement in a much more open way.
To gather data on a protein structure, a crystallographer first must concoct an appropriate
biochemical medium that will encourage their particular proteins to crystallize into large,
organized forms that can diffract X-rays. Before they even begin visualization,
crystallographers have already cultivated an imagination of their proteins as lively. They
9' This is one reason that video ethnography poses a challenge to my research. To make movies, or
isolate snapshots of modeler's mid-gesture, is to cut into what I see as a larger social and semiotic
context for expression and meaning making.
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treat crystals as living, breathing entities: once successfully "seeded" in the proper media,
their crystals "grow." They conceive the proteins themselves in lively ways: even though
the molecules are packed within the ordered array of the crystal lattice, they imagine that
individual protein molecules vibrate energetically.
Diane Griffin produced a vivid demonstration of the nature of molecular excitations during
a guest lecture for students in an advanced biology course. Taking on the job of instilling
critical visual skills among the next generation of scientist, she instructed them in how to
read protein crystallography papers, helping them to navigate the data and statistics they
would need to understand in order to evaluate crystal structures published in papers and
housed in the PDB. Pictures of ducks are commonly used to teach the concept of
resolution in crystallography textbooks. Diane would like to use dogs to teach the concept
of B-factors, which are a statistical measure of how much movement a molecule has inside
of the crystal lattice. The more movement there is in a molecule, the more "disordered" the
structure and data are, and thus the more that the crystallographer must make what Dehlia,
Diane's student called "executive decisions" about where the atoms and the polypeptide
backbone go in the structure. Molecules that have "floppy" side chains are disordered;
and this raises the B-factors in particular regions of the structure, which the critical reader
must use as guides to determine how good a fit there is between the model, the data, and
the molecule:
This is my favorite example. Those of you who know me, know that I'm not
a fan of the duck. I'm a fan of the dog. And so I've decided that
crystallographers should use dogs as examples rather than ducks. So
anyway, this is my former dog, who passed away recently, Remy. He was a
great dog.
Diane points to a picture of her dog on the beach, projected on the screen behind her. The
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waves crashing up against the beach are vivid in the picture. Remy, however, appears as
an indistinct blob in the center of the image. Diane continues:
I don't really know if you can make out that this is a dog, cause there's a
shadow. But this is a leg, there's another leg. This is the tail. Ah, that's an
ear. Here's the nose. And so, this is what always would happen when I'd go
out and try and take a picture of my dog. And the minute the camera would
come out...the dog is like sitting nice, and you know smiling, and looking
all happy and very calm. And then the camera comes out, and whoop! He's
on his back and then his legs are going like this [Arms flailing in the air]. So
I have a series of pictures, high resolution in the background, you know
really good camera, really good developing, focus, everything, fantastic
really high over-all resolution picture. But the thing I was trying to capture,
ummm...If this [points to Remy] is like the molecule in the active site, it's
completely disordered. And so this is one thing to keep in mind. It's not the
overall resolution of the structure but it's the B factors [which is a measure
the relative mobility of the atoms] of the things you are most interested in
that you have to pay specific attention to. Because it could be the part of
the structure you care about. You know. [If it's like this (points to Remy)] it's
not very good information about where those atoms are located.'6
Diane demonstrates how molecules move like her dog, and in so doing she animates both
dog and molecule, flapping her arms around emphatically. By figuring the protein
molecule as a dog, Diane produces an account of molecular movement that goes so far as
to connote, that like her dog Remy, the molecules get all excited and perform for the
camera when you take their picture. She has storied molecules, in particular those growing
into crystalline form and exposed to high-energy radiation, as a lively, excitable media. It is
96 Just after Diane finishes, a student asks, "Do you have a new dog yet?" Diane responded: "I don't
have a new dog yet. But I've narrowed down some of the available dogs to about 6 or 7 of them.
I've decided that Remy would have wanted me to adopt a hurricane victim dog. I've heard that
there are 50,000 pets that are gong to be needing homes as a result of the hurricane. My husband is
definitely trying to convince me that one new dog would be the way to go. 50,000 would be too
many...Alright. So other things you want to pay attention to is completeness of data...." Diane got a
puppy named Jeb several months later. Like Remy, the puppy is a constant companion to her in the
lab. When Jeb is not with Diane, he's with her grad students who spend their break time walking
her, and making sure he doesn't pee on the carpet or chew the molecular models during lab
meetings.
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this narrative of liveliness, a kind of "molecular vitalism" (Kirschner, 2000) that already
animates crystallographers' imaginations about what is going on in the world of molecules
not only in crystals, but also in vitro and in vivo.
Starting with a lively substance, their visualization practice thus must find ways to fix or
freeze this movement in order to get a good, clear (unblurred) "snapshot" of the structure
of the proteins packed within each unit cell of the crystal. This movement must be
dampened; and cryofixation is a widely used technique in which the crystal is dipped in
liquid nitrogen just before it is subjected to X-ray diffraction. X-ray crystallography is thus a
kind of freeze-frame technique. What is interesting is that given the amount of movement
within the crystal at any one moment, each molecule may be frozen in a different position;
thus crystallographers must render best-estimate models by averaging out the dynamic
movements and subtle differences in conformation between all the molecules arrayed in
the crystal. This practice produces a single structure, a static snapshot of the calculated
average of all the protein molecules, frozen in time.
Edward, a crystallographer conducting his postdoctoral research in Diane Griffin's protein
crystallography lab, told me that this snapshot can be challenging to interpret for those not
trained in the structural biology. "Molecular biologists are notorious", he emphasized.
"The main criticism crystallographers have about molecular biologists is that they don't
think about the structure as a breathing entity. [For them] it's just a rigid body." For non-
experts who don't have a feel for the physics and chemistry of protein molecules, the
structures available to download from the PDB just don't convey how dynamic proteins
"really are." While he has a mechanistic understanding of protein function, the aliveness of
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his protein is a tangible concept for him: as he described the protein he was working on,
he held his hands out in front of his body, as if holding a pulsing substance. The invisible
object in his hands appeared to breathe like lungs. It is important to note here that in this
moment Edward performed a well-rehearsed gesture that has propagated widely among
structural biologists since Perutz solved the structure of hemoglobin. Hemoglobin is one of
the principal molecular structures that life science students learn, almost as a rite of
passage into studies of biochemistry, molecular form, and protein function. This is the
molecule that carries oxygen in blood, and conveniently it is often taught and remembered
as a "breathing molecule." In my interviews with biological engineering students enrolled
in biochemistry classes, they often re-enacted the hemoglobin structure that they learned in
class by making a gesture similar to Edwards,' though the students' renderings were less
articulated and nuanced. 7
His animated gesture does not necessarily suggest that he's tapping into some mysterious
vital energy in the molecule. Edward "knows" how the protein moves in part from his close
study of chemical laws and the physical properties of proteins. But he also has a tacit,
kinaesthetic knowledge of the form of molecule that he did not learn from books--a
knowledge he has gained intra-actively from having spent tremendous effort and extended
periods of time building and navigating through protein structures onscreen. It is through
the laborious work of modeling, manipulating the three-dimensional graphic space on his
97 In a video interview accessible online, Max Perutz can be seen animating the mechanism of
hemoglobin, demonstrating with delight the form and movements of the molecular structure as it
captured and released oxygen. See video interviews with Max Perutz online: "Face to Face with
Max Perutz," Vega Science Trust. See Figure 2.4.
http://www.vega.org.uk/video/programme/1.
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computer screen, that he was able to sculpt a fleshed out twin of the model, not just in his
mind, but also in his body. In the intra-active process of building crystallographic models,
working with X-ray diffraction data, and sculpting the model using interactive graphics, he
has found a way to animate hypotheses about these static structures in his embodied
imagination.
As I showed in Chapter 2, Diane, like Edward, has a multi-sensory, kinaesthetic sense of
how the protein moves. In the process of modeling the protein in silico, she cultivates an
affective, kinesthetic knowledge of the possible forms and movements of the protein in
vivo. In this way, she can get "inside" the model. In many ways, however, the model also
gets inside of her; and this is a key step if she is to use her structural intuition. Once the
details of the model are embedded in her tissues, she has a way to feel her way around
inside the protein and figure out how it works. In an interview (also recounted in Chapter
2) she described it this way:
And you know, it's really this vision that you have of the active site, and
sort of this sense of how tightly packed it is and how much flexibility there
might be and where those regions of flexibility are. To have this sort of
sense that you have. And you can think about it then moving in a way
because you sort of know something about what the density was in each
part, so that you know that that part is definitely mobile right in there, but
that this part would not be mobile.
Through expressive gestures and affects she conveys her feeling for the molecule's intra-
molecular tensions and forces, its chemical attractions, repulsions, affinities, and the
possible ranges of motion across its chemical bonds. These are forces that she feels in her
own body, to such an extent that when students present her with half-built protein models
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whose configurations defy allowable bond angles and produce clashes between the radii
of atoms, she cringes bodily and audibly. Embodied models or proteins are thus inflected
with affects, with modelers' feelings for the elastic forces and movements within and
between molecules.
Embodied animations excite structural biologists articulations of their molecular
mechanisms frequently, and in all kinds of settings. In Diane's lab, many of the advanced
graduate students and postdocs (particularly those who had successfully built
crystallographic models) were delighted to tell me all about the molecular movements they
could intuit, but couldn't otherwise see. In interviews where I asked them to explain how
they conducted their experiments and how their proteins worked, they performed the
vibrations of molecules embedded in growing protein crystals, and waved their arms about
to emulate the floppy ends of polypeptide chains that would come out blurred in
crystallographic snapshots. They also contorted their bodies into sometimes-awkward
configurations to demonstrate the conformational changes of the molecule, and to show
how it does its work mechanically and chemically in the cell.
Thus, in ways similar to cinematic forms of animation, these embodied animations
originate with snapshot images; that is, freeze-frame crystallographic snapshots of proteins.
However, these embodied animations are not mechanical reconstitutions of movement
captured and visualized at equidistant time points. Already lured by a narrative of liveliness
(see later in this chapter, and Chapter 6), these researchers tap into their stories of
excitability and their own embodied imaginations, using their bodies to conjure possible
molecular forms and movements. As renderings that conjure subvisible worlds, embodied
219
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
animations-unlike the computer graphic animations of which Jim, Joanna, and Lynn are
so wary-do not overdetermine the forms and temporalities of molecular movement. These
animations resonate with, rather than attempt to represent molecular movements. As
exploratory movements reaching towards a sensate knowing, embodied animations are
open to interpretation, and are, as I examine in later sections of this chapter, inviting for
others to try on for themselves. In this sense, embodied animations socially intra-active,
and participatory, offering an opportunity for modelers and their colleagues to learn how to
move with and be moved by molecular excitations.
Risky Affinities: Dancing Molecular Desire
Affinity: related not by blood but by choice, the appeal of
one chemical nuclear group for another, avidity
Donna Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto", 1991: 155
af-fin.i.ty (noun)
1. a natural liking for or inclination toward somebody or
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Also called avidity
7.
something, or a feeling of identification with somebody
or something
somebody to whom somebody else is attracted
a similarity or likeness that connects persons or things
a relationship by marriage rather than blood
a similarity in structure between groups that may suggest
a common origin
a measure of the likelihood of a chemical reaction
taking place between two substances.
the attraction between an antigen and an antibody
Encarta English Dictionary
Diane's affinity for her dog and dog metaphors to describe the excitability of protein
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molecules suggests that there is an underlying molecular vitalism at play among structural
biologists. Interviews with structural biologists were revealing for how lively narratives of
molecular agency were negotiated and managed in pedagogical and professional contexts.
The following is an extended excerpt from an interview I did with Joanna and Lynn, which
illuminated how this is in fact a risky practice of figuration. This is the conversation that
ensued after Joanna recounted the story of how Geoff Miller had produced the analogy of
the molecular clamp in her laboratory:
Natasha: So, analogies are so powerful they actually change the way you
manipulate a system, the way that you operate on it?
Lynn: And that's why you have to be so careful!
Natasha: Do you use analogies like molecular machines a lot? Because I
see that a lot in the biological engineering classes.
Lynn: We use ... I tend to use analogies when I explain things. But I try to
make sure that I don't go too far because if you start making things that
don't correspond ...
Joanna: ... Then they will believe the non-corresponding thing. George
tends to use them more than the two of us ... But I don't necessarily like
making too many engineering analogies. Number one: I don't know enough
about engineering. Number two: I'm always afraid that I'm going to say
something that makes them remember something inaccurately. And make
them really believe a molecule is a machine, as opposed to a molecule.
You know?
Lynn: The thing that is the number one problem with how we talk about
biology, the expert scientists, I mean by that, is that we anthropomorphize
our molecules. And when we do that we, you know, literally, "If I was a
DNA polymerize what would I want to do?" [Laughing] And that's fine
between us, because we have this underlying, deep, ingrained appreciation
of the fact that we're talking about what is energetically favorable for a
molecule to do! [laughs]
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Joanna and Lynn (in unison): As opposed to what a molecule has a desire
to do!
Joanna: That's what's so difficult about evolution.
Lynn: And our students just so don't get that. And it's just...And I try not to
ever say what the molecule wants to do, anymore. And if I catch myself, I
always stop and ask my students to tell me exactly what did I just mean.
And this year I am better at it than last year. [Laughs] I have not used it
nearly as many times.
Natasha: So you're talking about the attribution of agency?
Lynn: Yeah. But our professors do it all the time. All the time.
Joanna: Yeah. And they don't...
Lynn: ... catch themselves ...
Joanna: ...catch themselves at all. Yeah! I mean, and it's very difficult. And
it's very problematic. I was going to say, like for instance, with the sake of
evolution, it's very problematic, because then the students will really
believe that this molecule or some other thing decided that this molecule
needed to change...and it's...
Lynn: Right, in terms of evolution, it's important for them to understand that
the order isn't the environment changed and then therefore something arose
that could deal with it; but the other way around, something was there that
happened to exploit this changing environment. That's a huge, sort of huge
concept in there that they don't necessarily get and can't get, unless they
are entirely free of any illusions of the...
Joanna: [interrupts] Human characteristics of their molecule-that it's
selecting to change itself! And it's just....I mean it's a little thing. As experts
we can say, well "it's the chemistry in the molecule." But as intro to biology
students, these guys don't see that it's...
222
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
Lynn: George tells this story in class every f'ing year. Where-he likes to
make the scientists human, which is a good thing. But then he tells a story
about [a protein researcher] when he was at a conference and got asked a
question, that he was pondering right in the middle of that. He literally
stopped and said, "Well if I was this molecule, what would I want to do?"
And you know, it's funny, you know, and it's a characteristic of a person.
But it is a great disservice to an introductory biology student to hear that.
Because it doesn't even... From George, it never comes with a disclaimer.
What he actually meant to say was, "What would be evolutionarily
advantageous for an organism to have in terms of the system."
Lynn: It sounds little but it makes a huge difference.
Lynn and Joanna recognize that analogies are potent devices that can produce risky,
unwanted effects for their rather impressionable students. They don't want their students to
come away with the idea that molecules actually are miniature machines-they're not
comfortable enough with their knowledge of what machines are, never mind what
machines can do, to really develop those analogies with any level of precision. But they
also don't want students to come away with the "illusion" that molecules have "human
characteristics" and "desires." They are approaching introductory biology education as a
kind of public relations effort to produce properly aligned supporters of evolutionary
theory. As they see it, the risk in using anthropomorphisms to describe molecular behaviors
is not that they will necessary instill creationist ideas in their students' minds; equally
problematic is that by suggesting that molecules have desires-that they "want" to do
things-they may seduce their students into conceiving Lamarckian views of evolutionary
progress. 'Yet, what is so fascinating is that while they ardently police their
anthropomorphizing analogies, they do recognize that experts-those who really get it
about the affinities and energetics of chemistry-carry in them a kind of molecular
vitalism. It's as if their own desires to become molecule, to figure out the tensions, forces,
223
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
and affinities of life as a molecule might, are so strong that despite all their best efforts to
cut out their anthropomorphic animisms, they keep slipping up.
In our conversation, I told Lynn and Joanna about Diane Griffin's expression of pain when
students present her their misshapen protein models. They laughed as I told the story about
how she performed the correction of the molecule to set it right, in a way that suggested
that they really got how Diane could feel the strain of the molecule. Joanna responded,
"Yeah, absolutely." And Lynn interjected "Well, you see, Diane feels the pain of the
molecule. She anthropomorphizes it, which is fine, for her, as long as she doesn't
imply...you know." And yet, this story elicited their own accounts of how they act out
molecular in class. Joanna fessed up to her rampant "anthropomorphisms" and got right
into it, demonstrating for us what she does in class to teach about how molecules move
through a gel in an electrophoresis apparatus. She tells her class: "You know, this little
molecule needs to move through the gel. And it's a net, and it's stuck like this. And now
I'm a big long molecule," she said as she danced out the wriggling bodies of the molecules
as they move through the gel.
For them, the problematic anthropomorphisms include the body-work involved in
performing molecular movements, that endow them with human (and animal) forms and
desires. This conversation points to a number of important themes that I address in the
following chapter. Namely, how, in spite of these ardent attempts to eradicate
anthropomorphic analogies, do experts continually rely on their bodies and affects to
perform molecular behaviors? Where and when do biologists slip up and enact molecular
desires? When can't they help themselves? How might dancing molecules as if they were
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full of desires, wants, and needs, not be such a terrible thing for these scientists? How, for
experts, might this constant slippage into the practice of becoming molecule produce
effective lures that draw them and their students into rich worlds full of converging
embodied models of molecular life? I explore these questions later in the chapter, and in
the Conclusion I examine more closely the nature of the narrative form they perform
through these molecular affects. In what follows, however, I look at where embodied
expressions of molecular desire are too risky to perform.
Truncating Molecular Body-work
Most of the time, in both pedagogical and professional settings, the researchers I
interviewed and observed were uninhibited with their molecular gestures. However, in
contexts where I called attention to their bodies, and to their practice of embodied
modeling, they became visibly uncomfortable. In such situations, rather than focusing on
what it is they cared about (e.g. the protein and its mechanism), I was drawing attention to
what it was that their bodies were doing. When I asked Lynn and Joanna how they used
their bodies in teaching, they giggled, waving their arms about, performing for me some of
their most frequently used molecular gestures. But, reflecting on what it was they were
doing in class, Lynn was visibly embarrassed: "We're making fools of ourselves is what we
are doing!" During one of our interviews, just after Fernando demonstrated to me how
hinges work on doors, I started to ask him if he ever used non-mechanical metaphors to
talk about his proteins. In the midst this exchange I drew attention directly to his body. His
first response took an interesting swerve that conflated his body as animator of molecular
motions, with the animated proteins that make up his body:
Natasha: To what extent are these metaphors...more than metaphors. Do
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you think about the protein outside of...
Fernando: Of my computer? Yeah.
Natasha: Yeah. Yeah. Okay. But a couple of things [I laugh]. You are using
your body very expressively to describe the protein structure and its
movements. So in some ways the protein is being described like a body.
Fernando: Yes it is. I am moving my arm. I am moving a set of proteins.
Okay. You have a set of muscles that glide against each other and allow me
to pull my arm and extend my arm and my fingers. I am moving my body.
I'm having electrical impulses traveling at pretty much diffusion rate from
the tips of my fingers to my brain, and then out to my eye to my brain that
tell me that I am now closing my hands. So it is very physical, very
motional relationship to the world. Things are always in change. Okay.
When things reach stasis, equilibrium. They die. That's basically death. You
have reached equilibrium. Nothing comes in nothing comes out. So how
can you not describe molecules and life as a set of motions, as tensions.
Okay. Someone described this to me once as: "Life is a constant struggle
between the hydrophobic and the hydrophilic." [Natasha: A constant?]
Struggle between the hydrophobic and the hydrophilic... I mean...You
can't....It's nice to draw little cartoons with arrows, and triangles, and put
in for the substrates. And it's great for initially visualizing things. But if you
really want to think about these things, you've got to think about [pauses]
everything that's happening.
Fernando apparently didn't get where my question was coming from. However, his
response provided a stunning description of how he sees the relationship between life and
movement. His response suggested that in addition to his highly mechanical approach to
the study of living systems (note how he turns his own proteinacious body into a Cartesian
machine for perception), he has cultivated a keen sensibility for molecular movements,
and recognizes that conveying the tensions and movements that inhere in these
phenomena demands more than static diagrammatic renderings. The second time I try to
pose the question, I direct his attention to his body as a potential medium for conveying
molecular forms. This time he gets what I'm trying to say, but his initial response,
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particularly how his voice changes, suggests that what I just asked him had crossed the line
into his personal space:
Natasha: Do you think your body, your own body, is a useful resource for
thinking about these things?
Fernando: [Laughs. Voice goes up high. Pauses awkwardly.] Umm....I
think you do it unconsciously. You relate to things that you know, and most
people know their body pretty well. You know? As in my case, I've had a
lot of time to hang out with myself. [Natasha: Laughing] And you know. I
get to know myself pretty well. I know what hurts. I know what doesn't
hurt. I know about how many drinks I should have before I cross the line.
So, yeah, I think people use their bodies in a sense. You know, you are
familiar, you talk with, you express to people. I use ideas in architecture
and building because I've done it for so long. You look at the plumbing
inside of a house. You look at the electricity. You know...People cannot
talk about anything that they are not familiar with.
Andres also experienced discomfort when I drew attention to his body-work. Michael
Fischer and I were at an annual meeting for structural biologists. I was off looking at
student posters, when Mike told Andr6s that I was studying how structural biologists
"danced" their molecules. Andres confessed to Mike that he had choreographed "a little
dance" for one of the molecules that he had modeled. When I rushed up to him having just
heard the news, he told me: "I hate dancing, but there was just no other way to
communicate the mechanism. I had to dance it." I asked him to show me his dance, but
he declined, almost blushing. He had been quite comfortable enlisting my participation to
perform his model of a cell adhesion molecule when I asked him how his protein worked.
However, when I asked him to "do his dance," I apparently skipped over the part that was
crucial to him. What I should have asked was what it was about the molecule that
demanded he perform the mechanism with his body? How did this molecule work? While
he refused to show me his "secret" dance as we stood in the lobby at the scientific
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meeting, he had performed it before for a small group of colleagues. This is to say that
researchers do not perform their molecular gestures on command, as much as I wouldn't
do a pirouette if someone asked me to do one out of the blue. Structural biologists gestures
are a crucial part of their practice, but singling out their body-work as the element of
interest leaves them feeling vulnerable, as if they are standing up in front of you stark
naked.
Other scenes of social intra-action that do not support expression of embodied models
include those skewed by differential relations of gender and power. Zeynep, a protein
crystallographer conducting her postdoctoral research in a lab based at the same institute
where Andres works, recounted a story that brought these issues to the fore. We were at a
cocktail party held by a mutual friend when she told be about an incident that occurred
when she was talking with the PI of her lab, describing for him a molecular mechanism she
had hypothesized. We were standing in the corner of the kitchen, and she cleared space to
show me the elaborate choreography she had used to convey this molecular mechanism to
her professor. The mechanism involved one part of the protein making an upward,
twisting, piston-like movement into another part of the protein. She demonstrated this with
zeal, making a large upward gesture with one arm to enact the piston, while using her
other arm to show the space occupied by the rest of the protein. Apparently her professor
read her molecular dance as an overtly sexual performance, and teased her about making
such rude gestures in public! By calling attention to her body, in that moment he gendered
and sexualized her body-work, rendering it as an excessive and improper expression of
knowledge. She took this warning seriously, and told me that she'd become much more
self-conscious about how she moved when relating molecular mechanisms.
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Except where body-work is made explicit, and encouraged as a pedagogical exercise, such
as in Jim Brady's protein folding classroom, the examples of Fernando, Zeynep, and Andres
demonstrate that researchers' expressions of their molecular gestures depend on a
condition in which this body-work remains tacit. The body-work of reasoning in structural
biology seems then to operate most frequently just below the surface, as a kind of gestural
vocabulary that supports and orients both the modeler and their interlocutors in their
articulations of molecular mechanisms. As I have learned from these encounters, in order
to be propagated effectively, molecular gestures must be kept alive; and this can only
happen in social intra-actions that elicit and sustain them as tacit modes of knowledge.
Body-Experiments & the Social Intra-Actions Mimetic Modeling
I have conducted ethnographic observations in both Diane Griffin's and Brian Found's
weekly group meetings. In these meetings, I have watched graduate students, postdocs and
PI's fumble and correct the models they perform through their bodies, sometimes realizing
mid-gesture that they have the structure wrong. In these situations they are quick to correct
their own gestures as a means to correct the model that they are simultaneously figuring
out in their heads. In the process, they learn new things while they play through possible
molecular configurations and movements with their own bodies. Not so much a kind of
thought experiment, the body-work of reasoning in protein modeling could be considered
as a kind of body experiment. In this sense, I treat embodied models as tools that
researchers can use in their experimental practice. Like Andres, who ratcheted up his grip
to demonstrate the binding of cell adhesion molecules, I see embodied models as "vehicles
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for materializing questions" (Rheinberger, 1997: 28); that is, as means that can propel
scientists into new kinds of conceptual and corporeal understandings of their research
objects. As much as they are inflected with affect, I propose that these embodied models
can be thought of, in Rheinberger's terminology, as "technical objects" that are employed
in the investigation of "epistemic things." Very often structural biologists attempt to
communicate embodied models as technical objects in order to produce shared
understanding.
Members of Brian's group specialize in designing new protein structures. At one of their
meetings, Kabita, a fifth year PhD student, presented her recent progress. The protein
Kabita works on is complex: it forms a dimer, which means that it is made up of two
similar molecules bound together. It also has intracellular and extra-cellular domains, with
parts of the protein that must traverse the lipid bi-layer of the cell membrane. In the midst
of this presentation her colleagues interrupted her with a constant stream of questions,
asking her to clarify the structure of the protein she was describing. Even with intricate
computer graphic renderings of the molecule projected on the screen behind her, they
demanded more detail, and she was compelled to articulate the structure with her own
body.
To communicate this intricate structure to the group she used her body to paint a Ribbon
diagram of the molecule.98 She proceeded to lift both her hands over her head and trace
98 Ribbon diagrams, one of the most frequently used schemas for rendering protein structures, have
an instructive quality about them. Arrows in the model indicate the direction of the polypeptide
backbone (from the first amino acid in the chain to the last) as it winds through the structure. As
Kabita's performance indicates, these are not just visual guides for the eye, but are also useful for
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the winding backbones of the twinned molecules, one with each hand, following them as
they traversed extra-cellular and intra-cellular spaces. Her gestures were large and
sweeping as she brought her arms from high up, over her head, all the way down in front
of her body. Her molecular dance ended with her fully bent over, hands touching the floor.
Yet, questions still surfaced from the group, and Kabita was asked to describe the
mechanism that bound the molecules together. "I like to think of it this way", she said, and
repeatedly crossed her arms at the forearms, fists clenched, demonstrating with the tension
in her musculature the binding energy between the molecules. A visiting professor, still
confused, leaned over the table, and repeated this gesture over and over as he asked
questions, inquiring and confirming with her that this was indeed the form of the molecular
interaction she was describing. In a follow up email, Kabita told me that I had had the
"misfortune of coming to what was probably my most contentious group meeting in at
least two years. Brian still refers to it as 'that disastrous group meeting', because I didn't
succeed in conveying my concepts, apparently." What is interesting is that even amidst
such contention, she was comfortable to fully animate her hypothetical mechanisms with
her body, and moreover, others used theirs to relay back to her both their understandings
and missed understandings.
As this story suggests, researchers' bodies become animating media, both for figuring out
how molecular mechanisms work, and for relaying knowledge about their structure to
learning of forms kinesthetically. Ribbon diagrams could be compared to the tracers and tailings of a
rhythmic gymnast's ribbon if she were to trace the winding back bone of a protein as she dances.
One animation available online treats a Ribbon diagram as if it were a rollercoaster, by taking the
viewer on a rather dizzying ride along the strands of the Ribbon backbone of a protein model. See
http://streaming.wi.mit.edu/?sub=protein_rollercoaster&vid=X11 _001 220K_256x1 99.mov.
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others. Such forms of social intra-action show how bodily movement plays a role in how
researchers learn and communicate structural knowledge. In the back and forth
communication between Kabita and her interlocutors, her embodied model of the protein
(itself a mimetic model) was re-enacted in an intra-active exchange until shared
understanding (and even misunderstanding) was acknowledged. Here we can see these
researchers trying to tune their bodies in to each other's figural vocabularies and molecular
affects as a means to enable fuller communication of the forms and functions of particular
molecules. In this sense, they not only have to embody the models they build, they have to
learn how to move with and be moved by each other's mimetic gestures. This practice
demands social intra-actions for shared knowledge.
I see a kind of mimesis at play in protein modelers' entrainment to molecular movements,
and in their teaching, learning and communication. This relay of forms and gestures can be
seen as an intra-active process aimed at achieving mutual understanding. As the above
examples show, certain social intra-actions enable researchers to propagate their
embodied models. They do this by communicating to their colleagues and students
through a kind of iconic and indexical "gymnastics" (Bourdieu, 1977: 1). Pierre Bourdieu
has likened such performances to a kind of "mimesis" that is similar to a "rite or dance" in
which there is "something ineffable", something that "communicates, so to speak, from
body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words or concepts" (Bourdieu, 1977:1). It may be
through this mimetic, gestural language that biological molecules become intelligible,
manipulable and workable as objects for the researcher, their colleagues and students.
Michael Taussig's (1993) multi-sensate theory of mimesis captures some of this movement
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and participation that I see at play in the communication of molecular knowledge.99
Reading Benjamin, Taussig develops the notion of an "optical tactility", in which
movement, sensation and perception are woven together. Mimesis has two layers for
Taussig: it contains both an element of copy or imitation, as well as the "palpable,
sensuous connection between the body of the perceiver and the perceived" (Taussig, 1993:
21). This mimetic faculty nourishes and sustains shared understanding and knowledge
within a larger cultural milieu. On this, he suggests that the mimetic faculty is "the nature
that culture uses to create second nature". It is "the faculty to copy, imitate, make models,
explore difference, yield into and become Other" (Taussig, 1993: xiii). To mime is thus to
cultivate a model of another entity within one's own body-a model that can be shared
with others.
For Taussig, "[to] ponder mimesis is to become sooner or later caught in sticky webs of
copy and contact, image and bodily involvement of the perceiver in the image" (Taussig,
1993: 21). Mimesis involves perceptual and physical intra-actions between participating
bodies. It is this intimate contact between scientist and substance-a contact mediated
through prosthetic devices and visualizing machines-that helps me think through the
body-work of protein modeling, reasoning and communication. Moreover, it is through a
kind of mimesis that a researcher's body and their model can begin to fold into one
another, producing not a mirror-image reflection or representation, but a kind of
99 Lucy Suchman (2007) and I (Myers, 2006) have both combined Michael Taussig's (1993) multi-
sensate theory of mimesis and Karen Barad's (1996, 2003) theory of "intra-action" to explore
human-machine entanglements. This convergence in our readings is not just a happy coincidence. It
suggests to me that, as feminist scholars committed to exploring situated knowledges in human-
computer interactions, we are seeing very similar kinds of phenomena emerging in our respective
fields of study.
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resonance. Self and other, modeler and model are thus not so readily separable from their
relation: models and bodies become entangled in intra-active mimetic exchange. Below I
investigate modes by which such infoldings are made to propagate.
Propagating Molecular Affects through Mimetic Transductions
Transduction is a term used widely in the field of structural biology. Proteins are figured as
working machines that transduce force and energy within the cell (see for example Bourne,
1986; Harrison, 2004). The term transduction has at least three lineages in the history of
science: one in acoustics and the other two in biology. It refers both to the "action or
process of transducing a signal", such as sound through one medium to another, and "the
transfer of genetic material from one cell to another by a virus or virus-like particle"
(Oxford English Dictionary). In addition, "signal transduction" is frequently used in
molecular biology to describe the transmission of extra-cellular signals into the cell and the
propagation this signal as biophysical molecular events (see also Mackenzie, 2002). I
incorporate each of these aspects of the term in my use here. Transduction, in this latter
sense, describes a process for moving and transforming signals between molecules; in a
signaling network, molecules propagate chemical energy and mechanical forces in a kind
of contact-dance enacted between molecular bodies. The specificity of the media through
which the signal moves, in this case, the physics and chemistry of the protein and watery
cellular environment, morphs the signal into different registers as it moves between
molecules. In this sense, the signal itself is not code, but gesture. Transduction is thus, not
so much a transmission of information, but the propagation of a gesture through moving,
responsive bodies.
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I extend transduction to describe the propagation of movements and affects in between
and among scientists. Through their intra-actions with each other and with their models,
protein modelers can be seen to transduce and so propagate the molecular affects and
gestures they have cultivated in order to communicate their feeling for protein forms and
mechanisms. As I related in Chapter 3, Jim Brady demonstrated how protein models could
entangle their users in participatory intra-actions that were geared towards learning. He
showed his students how to look and learn by tracing the polypeptide backbone of a
Ribbon diagram with his whole body. As he followed the peptide, his whole body got
swept up the fold. This act of tracing is nothing like photo-copying. Tracing enables Jim to
transduce the form of the polypeptide chain through his body, not to delegate the task to a
replicating machine. The aim here is not to replicate, but to emulate. Like Kabita, who
danced the Ribbon diagram of her molecule for her colleagues, the tracer's moving body,
following the fold of the chain, renders the fold with their body, without producing a
replica or a copy. In so doing, Jim and Kabita show how one must move with and be
moved by the fold in order to learn the structure.
Coupling transduction and intra-action enables me to account for the specificity of the
modeling media, and the kinds of bodies involved in these mimetic exchanges. Protein
modelers communicate molecular forms within the range of motions available to their
bodies: their contortions never actually look like the graphic models they project onscreen.
Refusing any simple theory of representation, embodied models and animations render and
so emulate modelers' feeling for the tensions, forces, and movements of molecules. In this
sense, protein modelers' embodied animations extend and expand assumptions about what
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counts as a model or scientific visualization: as we learn to see how bodies become
models, the visual cultures of science become more and more recognizable as cultures of
performance.
Embodied animations also require that theories of representation and communication in
science account for the role of affect in the propagation of scientific knowledge. I draw on
Henri Bergson's (1991) Matter and Memory, which animates a theory of perception based
on nineteenth-century physiology. In this work he bundles perception and movement
together in the nervous tissue of the body, exploring how affect and responsive action are
produced through a "kind of motor tendency in a sensory nerve" (55-56). Diffracting
Bergson through Deleuze (1986), I've been lured to think of living bodies as fleshy
antennae whose physiologies act as a kind of resonating media that oscillates between
conduction and resistance, as tissues for gathering up the energetics and movements of the
world, and manifesting these as perception, affect, and action. Thus, as responsive and
relational bodies, we hitch rides on the movements of others' in the world. In this vein, I
treat bodies as excitable tissues with the capacity to collect up and relay these excitations
by transducing them through their flesh. In this way, bodies can be figured as responsive
and receptive entities capable of affecting and being affected, that is, bound up in affective
entanglements with other bodies in the world.
By shifting to a language of "hitching onto" and "getting caught by", I want to put some
pressure on readings of scientific visualization that build on the concept of visualization
technologies as "apparatuses of capture" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). There is a
tendency in theories of visualization to render visualization technologies as powerful tools
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that can "capture" objects, where the objects themselves are rendered as passive captives
of the apparatus. In an intra-active account of how scientists render the world, I pay
attention to scientists' capacity to be moved by the forms and movements of the entities
they attempt to draw into view. Their apparatuses of capture can never fully contain or
constrain. Indeed, it is possible to think of scientists as attempting to entrain their bodies,
imaginations, and instruments to the movements of their objects, which are never fully
captured, and which continually evade. In the realm of protein modeling, I see researchers
hitching a ride on the molecular forms they conjure, getting pulled along, and lured into
radical intra-action.
Conclusion
As I hope I have showed in this chapter, protein models are not the only phenomenon (in
Barad's sense) produced in the protein modeling laboratory. Protein models are embodied
and performed in ways that propagate more than structural information. Embodied
animations transduce affects, emotions, and feelings that inflect knowledge about protein
structure. Through their animated bodies, researchers perform their knowledge in a register
that both feeds into and exceeds the discourse of mechanism in structural biology. In spite
of their continuous attempts to police animistic language through mechanistic logic, and
indeed, in some cases to actively truncate their body-work, I detect an intra-active
excitability in structural biologists' performances of their models. Molecular mechanisms
are quickened, that is, enlivened through these intra-actions, recasting the trope of
"molecular machines" within which proteins tend to be figured. I read structural biologists'
excited gestures as performances that express their affective entanglements in knowledge
making practices.
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Going beyond Barad's call to account for the multiple agencies through which scientific
knowledge is produced, this chapter has aimed to document how such knowledge is
inflected and transformed in its very performance. I propose that the intra-actions between
participating bodies (human, nonhuman and machine) produce a second order
phenomenon that could be called intra-animacy.'" This is not some immaterial "animism"
that imbues matter with some external force, nor is it built up from a networked collection
of individual agencies modeled on liberal notions of subjectivity. Intra-animacy is a
phenomenon that is engendered through modelers' intra-actions with each other, and with
their objects and machines. In turn, it animates their imaginations and narratives about the
substances of life. I observe that intra-animacy performed as a range of affects and gestures
that make visible structural biologists' intimate sensibilities with regards to molecular
forms, their chemical affinities and physical movements.
As I have shown, these performative affects are not extra-scientific phenomena; they
appear to be intrinsic to the conceptual and material work of producing and propagating
structural knowledge. As such, the mechanical theories of protein function that researchers
produce can be seen to depend on this affective enlivening of mechanisms for the effective
production and deployment of mechanistic theories. Left to gather dust on the pages of
elementary school textbooks or reduced to dead metaphors that fail to hail bodily
participation, mechanistic models of protein function may indeed be "deanimations" of
living substances (on modes of deanimation see Haraway, 1998). If these models are
disentangled from the intra-actions that produce and sustain them, they may appear
100 Thanks to Joe Dumit for first suggesting that what I was observing was a kind of "inter-animacy."
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deadening and inert. However, if these visualizations can be drawn back into Barad's
expanded framing of experimental phenomena, and observed within the assemblages
through which they are enacted, then the "machinery of life" can be narrated in much
livelier form. Enlivened models animate imaginations, techniques, experimental strategies,
research questions and pedagogical interactions. Embodied animations are thus more than
aesthetic flourishes: they are intra-active lures that pull scientists and their colleagues into
imagined molecular worlds and so "vectorize" bodily experience to produce new forms of
knowing. I suggest that it is protein modelers' capacity and willingness to move with and
be moved by their models and animations-to conjure and mimetically transduce the
excitability of proteinacious forms-which enables lively narratives thrive inside of the
mechanistic logic life scientists avow. In the conclusion to this study that follows, I look
much more closely at how such narratives of liveliness inflect life scientists' knowledge
and practice.
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Chapter 6
Liveliness
Beyond Automation and Inscription: Body-fullness in Biology
This study has examined how contemporary structural biologists learn to "give body" to
molecules through a diverse array of media. The account I have provided highlights a
range of visualization practices that don't conform to, or confirm standard accounts of life
science practice. Two analytic schema developed in the context of social and historical
studies of molecular biology laboratories break down, I argue, in view of the practices I
have here described. These schema are 1) the reduction of laboratory work to practices of
"inscription" (e.g. Latour, 1990; Latour and Woolgar, 1986), and 2) the rendering of the
researcher as a "blind" "automat" plugged into the other machinery of the laboratory (e.g.
Knorr-Cetina, 1999).
In his essay "Drawing things together," Latour (1990) attempts to account for the massive
shift in knowledge associated with the scientific revolution. He suggests that it was the
simple tools of the printing press, paper, pencils, and other inscription technologies that
produced this transformation. These technologies generated inscriptions that were both
immutable and mobile, both unchanging and able to circulate widely, to achieve
"translation without corruption" (28). For Latour, the power embodied in two-dimensional
inscriptions or images was that they could be collected, enabling scientists to "gather up
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the world" (31) in one place at one time to generate a synoptic view over otherwise absent
or distant things.1'0 Latour emphasizes the power wielded by mobile and immutable
inscriptions that are manifest on paper. He draws attention to the flat surfaces on which
many distant and otherwise unrelated things can be drawn together in tables, charts,
graphs, texts, and images. Flat surfaces, he asserts, are much easier to dominate than the
things themselves, where "realms of reality" that appear distant become "inches apart once
flattened out on the same surface" (54).
Examining the histories of three-dimensional modeling in the sciences, Hopwood (1999)
and Francoeur (1997) take issue with Latour's "immutable mobiles." Counter to Latourian
doctrine, three-dimensional models demonstrate that the "visual worlds of science" aren't
so "flat" (Hopwood, 1999: 491).102 Significant here is that three-dimensional models of
complex forms are not legible in the same ways as flat inscriptions: building and using
three-dimensional models cannot be reduced to practices of reading and writing.
Hopwood (1999), for example, shows that anatomists valued His's waxes over flatter, more
01' The key to his theory is that, once available, these "immutable mobiles" could become
recruitment devices which proponents of a theory could use to win arguments and challenge
dissenters in the ongoing contests of knowledge and power, which, in Latour's (1990) view, are at
the heart of the history of scientific progress. "Inscriptions allow conscription" (50) through a
political process of mustering allies. Immutable mobiles therefore contribute to the stabilization of
scientific fact through competing claims to truth. Counter to intuition, stabilization in Latour's
formulation requires a kind of mobility. He draws attention to institutions that have the power of
synoptic visiion over cascades of files and records, such that the "bureau" becomes a "small
laboratory in which many elements can be connected together just because their scale and nature
has been averaged out." (54) He suggests that "in our cultures, 'paper shuffling' is the source of an
essential power, that constantly escapes attention since its materiality is ignored" (55).
102 His's waxes, for example, "did not fail to travel": in addition to their use in teaching embryology
students at Cambridge, they were so well promoted that by the 1880s many embryologists began to
make their own models, and new techniques flourished (1999: 462). And while Francoeur (1997)
documents the challenges modelers faced in the construction, design and manufacture of molecular
modeling kilts, these kits eventually became widely dispersed and commonplace tools in both
laboratories and classrooms.
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abstract means of representation because, because "they could view them from all sides,
feel their surfaces with their fingers, and cut them up. Having given three-dimensional
'body' to their representations, they could more readily work on them as though they were
bodies" (491). Model-building requires that the user engage the model physically: the
modeler must interact with, handle, and manipulate the model, in order to generate
insight.
In Latour and Woolgar's (1986) Laboratory Life, inscriptions are frequently identified as
two-dimensional markings on flat surfaces, and "inscription devices" are identified as
machines that measure, mark, and draw traces out of biological phenomena. Karin Knorr-
Cetina (1999) extends the idiom of machinic inscription in Epistemic Cultures, a
comparative study of high-energy physics and molecular biology cultures. In this major
study, she pays careful attention to researchers' sensory bodies. However her account
renders the scientists and the organisms they work with fractured along the familiar fault
lines of the Cartesian body. In her words:
By the scientist's body I mean the body without the mind. If
the mind were included, hardly anyone would deny the
presence of the body. The body, as I use the term, refers to
bodily functions and perhaps the hard wiring of intelligence
but not conscious thinking (1999: 95).
Knorr-Cetina asserts that the body is essential to laboratory practice, but the body that she
narrates is blind, silent, mind-less, and mechanical. Here she actively configures the body
as a hard-wired mechanism that underlies, and in a sense holds up, the higher faculties of
consciousness. The researcher's body reconfigured by and through the "epistemic
machinery" of the laboratory becomes an "automat," a "black-boxed" "information-
242
Modeling Proteins, Making Scientists
processing machinery" running routine manipulations in the laboratory (97). She makes
clear that while scientists do rely heavily on their senses, "if anything is irrelevant to the
conduct of research in molecular biology, it is the sensory body as a primary research tool"
(95). What is problematic here is that she perpetuates a "myth of body-lessness" (Haraway,
2001) that already saturates many scientists' and theorists' accounts of molecular biology
practice. As such, she layers her reading of corporeal practices with a set of unquestioned
Cartesian assumptions about the workings of perception, sense experience, and action.
Knorr-Cetina's ethnography of the automated protocols and practices of inscription leave
little room to account for passion, affect, and sensory engagement in laboratory life.
In this study, I have examined a range of visualization practices in molecular biology that
are not produced through machinic inscription. Renderings like three-dimensional
interactive computer graphic models of protein molecules, for example are not direct
machinic inscriptions of the signature of a substance: forms of three-dimensional modeling
explicitly involve the active input of the researcher. Modelers contribute their corporeal
knowledge and conjure a range of narrative forms to help them parse relations between
molecular form and function. A very different model of researchers' engagement in their
work is rendered through accounts of structural biologists' physical, imaginative, and
affective entanglements in multi-dimensional model-building practices. Distinct from the
reading and writing practices involved in interpreting machinic inscriptions as legible texts,
modeling practices require researchers' corporeal entanglement with their objects,
modeling media, and machines in the production of scientific facts. Rather than turn
researchers' bodies into yet another laboratory instrument, I treat the machines of the
laboratory--in this case the physical models, computing devices and graphics interfaces of
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structural biology labs-as prosthetic extensions of the researcher's sensory body. Far from
silent and mechanical, the bodies I observe in the laboratory are open systems, affectively
entangled with their objects, modeling media, and machines. The field of structural
biology demonstrates how laboratory work is itself an ongoing practice of training and
retraining the bodies and imaginations of scientists: researchers continually learn and adapt
within the experimental apparatus, and reenact what they have learned.
These models and their associated forms of knowing are mobile, yet they do not move
through a process of translation-as in the horizontal movements of flat images and texts
across paper surfaces. Rather, they propagate through a kind of transduction of forms and
movements relayed in multiple dimensions through gestures enacted between bodies and
objects. Key here is that transduction of modeling knowledge is not impervious to
"corruption," it is open to mutability: forms and gestures are diffracted through the
modeler's tissues, and so inflected and transformed as they move between bodies. Model
building thus generates local, partial knowledge; and yet, through the performance of
models in the ongoing face-to-face interactions that constitute scientific training and
communication, such forms of knowing can be made to propagate (Kaiser, 2005a). As I
demonstrated throughout this study, tracking the mobility of models and modeling
knowledge demands ethnographic attention to modes of embodiment, affect, and
performance, aspects of laboratory life that are otherwise often hidden from view (see for
example, Rose, 1983; Heath, 1997). It is the multidimensional practices of modeling in
structural biology that make these aspects of science visible, and thus serve as a site for
revising assumptions about the nature of laboratory life, and refiguring role of pedagogy
and training in scientific work.
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My aim in this study has been to produce an ethnographic account that hitches a ride on
the liveliness, passion, and creativity that I see animating life science practice. In what
follows, I take a closer look at how two distinct, and intertwined renderings of life science
practice have shaped both scientists' and theorists' accounts.
Life Science, Liveliness, and Life Itself
Life itself is the psychic, cognitive, and material terrain of
fetishism. By contrast, liveliness is open to the possibility of
situated knowledges, including technoscientific knowledges.
Haraway, 1997: 137
In On Beyond Living: Rhetorical Transformations of the Life Sciences, Rich Doyle (1997)
explores how the rise of a one-dimensional rhetoric in molecular biology in 1960s
flattened living bodies into one-dimensional code. In this period, the primary object of
biological interest, deoxyribonucleic acid, became over-coded in the rhetoric of
informatics. In Doyle's formulation, molecular biologists effectively reduced bodies to a
kind of thinness and transparency, with nothing left lurking secretly beyond or behind
DNA's codes. Doyle suggests that in this move molecular genetics evacuated "life itself"
from biology. For Doyle, once depth had been sucked out of bodies, biologically ordered
bodies became "postvital," beyond living; in other words, life had left the building. It is in
the flatness of the rhetoric of "body as code" that the enigmatic force of "life itself" was
simultaneously squeezed into a molecule, and spread out into the thinness of legible text.
In the case of the helically coiled DNA molecule, "life itself" got unraveled, unzipped. For
Doyle, the emblematic moment in this history is when one molecular geneticist could look
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down at the transparent body of a cell-fate- and genome-mapped body of a laboratory
worm (C. elegans) and shrug and say, with maps at hand, "That's all there is" (Doyle 1997:
17). Here Doyle narrates a moment in the history of molecular biology where a kind of
"boredom" settles in among scientists involved in genomics projects. Once reduced to
legible codes, "life itself" and the labour of life science turned out to be not so lively.
Evelyn Fox Keller (1995; 2002) has shown, however, that a kind of vitalism has continued
to lurk and linger just below the surface of life scientists' words. In her historical
examination of the rhetoric of genes, she describes how geneticist J.H. Muller identified
early concepts of the gene as "betraying a subconscious adherence to 'the ancient lore of
animism"' (Keller, 2002: 127). Despite attempts by Muller and his colleagues to repress the
"vital forces" with which the concept of the gene was imbued, a vitalist tendency
continued operate in the ways that the gene was figured as an agential "entity embodying
the capacity to act within its own being" (Keller, 2002: 127). As she demonstrates, such
forms of "animism" were never fully eradicated from the concept of the gene. Keller
unearths a liveliness that lingers in spite of attempts to de-animate life through mechanistic
language and models in molecular biology.
In the short excerpt above, Haraway (1997) points to what could be thought of as two
animating discourses in the history of life science practice: "liveliness," and "life itself."
"Life itself" might be best thought of as a narrative of capture that produces scientific
objects by pulling bodies out of time, while liveliness is a narrative form that keeps bodies
in time. In this sense "life itself" and "liveliness" do not reside in any given living
substance, or its representation-they are ways of storying and so, making sense of life.
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Haraway helps me to see how Doyle's and Keller's accounts are distinct, though intimately
entangled narrative forms, or kinds of story telling, that have long animated life scientists'
imaginations. In the excerpts I offer here, Doyle focuses on a prevailing narrative form
organized around the "capture" of "life itself," while Keller finds alive vestiges of a
narrative of "liveliness" in life science practice.
In Foucault's formulation, "life itself" is that nonplace inhabiting the ever-receding depths
of the modernist body, with all its associated techniques of visibility, legibility, and
speakability (see Foucault, 1971). According to Foucault, "life itself" became seeable and
say-able through new configurations that demarcated, distinguished, organized, and
arrayed living things according to the logic of the table. "Life itself" in this sense is
produced through an "apparatus of capture" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) that can catch
living things and turn them into objects available to scientific scrutiny. For Haraway, the
very notion of life itself "depends on the erasure of the apparatus of production and
articulatory relationships that make up all objects of attention" (1997: 147). Thus in their
search for life itself scientists erase their creative work, elide their apparatus, and in so
doing produce fetishes. In Chapter 4 of the present study, I have shown how structural
biologists attempt, through a kind of cryo-freezing, to capture life itself in the form of
"molecular machines," and so, in the process produce a kind of machinic fetishism that
disavows the exquisite skills they have cultivated in order to build machines inside the
bodies of cells and organisms. And yet, in spite of their best efforts, the entities that
structural biologists and biological engineers actually produce through their modeling
practices are quite unlike deterministic machines: they are undeniably lively. It is this
slippage into the realm of lively machines that clues me in that there is something out of
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the ordinary going on in this work of modeling molecular life. It is in the production of
lively machines that structural biologists and biological engineers are beginning to create
new forms of life; and in doing so they undo the very binary between machines and
organisms that initially constituted the study of biology (Haraway, personal
communication; Foucault 1971). I return to this theme below to show how lively narratives
escape the grip of this dualism.
I agree with science studies scholars that the "capture of life itself" is a pervasive narrative
form through which scientists tell conquest stories about their encounters with the living
world. The structural biologists and biological engineers that I interviewed and watched at
work talked about "busting open" and "smashing apart" living cells in order to get at the
molecular machines inside; and they described crystallographic snapshots as means of
"capturing" states of chemical change in a protein. However, if "capture" is an alluring
narrative modality for them, it is also an enticing way for theorists to tell stories about
science. Inquiring into how scientists produce narratives of life itself, STS scholars have
(re)produced an account that makes it seem as if the "capture of life itself" is the only kind
of story scientists know how to tell. I see "life itself" in this sense as a powerful lure that
has drawn both life scientists and their critics into their respective investigations. As story
told by scientists, life itself appears to promise objectivity, distance, clarity, and power. As
a story told about science by theorists standing at a distance, it serves as a device to expose
a kind of denial that bolsters critics' claims to the fallibility of objective knowledge. I argue
that there is something missing in this analysis. As Keller (2002) hints above, there is
another alluring narrative modality in life science practice. I see what Keller calls the
"vestiges of vitalism" in Muller's gene-talk as part of a narrative of liveliness that
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continues-in spite of harsh policing against its use-to animate life scientists' stories
about living bodies.
It is all too easy to produce and reproduce narratives of capture in the conventions of
scientific writing. Yet there are other narrative forms that are not so visible in the texts
scientists write. While writing is undeniably a fleshy, material-semiotic practice for
scientists, their texts are often read as end-stage representations, such that the embodied
enactments that give them form are elided in translation. With this in mind, it is necessary
to remember that narratives have both textual and gestural forms. A narrative, as mimes
and dancers remind me, can be enacted through movement; and a figure is not only a form
of speech or writing, it is also a dance.10 3 Structural biologists' figural vocabularies--their
gestural stories-convey forms and qualities (textures, tensions, and forces) of molecular
forms of life. While liveliness is most often edited out in the conventions of scientists'
textual accounts, it comes alive and is readily performed through gestural media.
Gestural figurations also communicate scientists' relationships with their objects. If there is
posture or habitus emblematic of-and I would argue co-constitutive with-the narrative
of life itself, it is the gesture of the scientist pointing at a dissected, dismembered object-at-
a-distance, and declaring, "That's all there is." On the other hand, the gestural form that
best evokes a narrative of liveliness would be the excited resonance of the modeler
performing the vibrational energy of the molecule she arduously and lovingly models. In
contrast to narratives of the "capture of life itself", narratives of liveliness operate through
103 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a figure is also "one of the evolutions or movements
of a dance or dancer; also, a set of evolutions; one of the divisions into which a set dance is
divided."
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the idioms of excitability, desire, and excess. Stories of liveliness gesture towards and so
conjure a living world that escapes capture. Through gestural media, living bodies take on
forms that look much less like deterministic machines. "Lively" stories in this sense are
those that narrate living bodies as wily, unpredictable, excitable tissues. These are also
stories that betray how passion and desire structure scientists' knowledge; telling their
stories through gestures, scientists relay their affinities for their objects. The stories they
produce in and through their bodies could be thought of as biophillic, or what, after
Haraway, Maria Puig de la Bellacasa (forthcoming) might call biological "love stories."
There are several ways to interpret the relationship between life itself and liveliness as I
parse them here. Life itself and liveliness could be understood as two ways for scientists to
render their encounters with the objects they study: one tells a story about objectivity at a
distance, a story that denies the encounter; the other situates knowledge, performing a
form of knowing that recognizes scientists' affective entanglement with their objects. And
yet, this is not to say that liveliness and life itself are necessarily two opposing poles of a
dyadic system of story telling. If I were to make this move, life itself-with its structure of
denial that produces a story of conquest-could be read as an oppressive regime that aims
to stifle, silence, or suppress liveliness in service of objectivity. The recovery or
resuscitation of lively narratives would then, as Joe Dumit (personal communication)
astutely points out, appear to be a liberatory move. And yet, that is not my aim here. By
making liveliness visible, my intention is to set this story side by side with the story of life
itself, to understand more deeply how they feed off of and into one another in the daily
practices of laboratory life.
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In this vein, this ethnography could be read as an attempt to track how structural biologists
navigate the tensions between these narrative forms, how they struggle between different,
sometimes conflicting, sometimes co-constitutive forms of knowing and communication in
order convey what they learn from building and using models. Liveliness and life itself
operate in parallel. A science that only told lively stories would not be recognizable as
science; lively stories can't survive alone. For example, sometimes modeling molecules as
bodies can lead researchers astray: though structural biologists may be skilled animators,
as Dave Kaiser (personal communication) reminds me, "proteins presumably have many
more degrees of freedom along which they can wiggle, bend, and fold than even the most
agile dancer." While it would be an undeniably lively practice, if structural biologists just
danced their molecules they wouldn't be doing science (or, for that matter, making art). At
the same time, life itself already depends on liveliness: without an underlying narrative of
liveliness, there would be nothing to capture in the story of life itself.
As I have shown in Chapter 4, narratives of molecular liveliness are constantly in play, but
often once they are performed, they are quickly disavowed. One reason for this may be
that these lively stories are risky: in the hands of naive students and lay people, narrative
forms that awaken imaginations to notions of molecular agency, or those that ascribe
intentionality and desire to molecular interactions, have to potential to mutate neo-
Darwinian evolutionary theory. And yet, experts-those who seem to have their fingers on
the pulse of what is "really going on" in proteinacious worlds-are the ones performing
lively narratives most frequently. In this way, expert structural biologists perform a kind of
secret knowledge, available only to the initiated.
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It is important to note here that liveliness is not vitalism; it is not a kind of vital force that
infuses matter with life; and it is not the opposite of mechanism. Lively narratives are not
positioned against machines. Machines, as I showed in Chapter 5, can be quite lively.
Machines are more and other than what they get reduced to in discourses that operate at
the divide between the machine and the organism. As Donna Haraway (personal
communication) helps me see, lively machines and machinic life are the cyborg forms
made possible through stories that don't get mired in the opposition between vitalism and
mechanism that has haunted biology since its inception. I would argue that liveliness is a
way of telling stories that refuses to make clean distinctions between organisms and
machines: both organisms and machines can be lively. Indeed, liveliness does not operate
within discourses made possible by the mechanism-vitalism divide; a dualism that has for
too long constrained what is possible to say about life. If lively narratives are liberating at
all, it is because they break out of this dualism, and open onto a new world in which thrive
barely recognizable forms of life for which we currently have few words. Lively stories are
open to the possibility of finding new ways to figure life and reconstitute the relations
between machines and organisms. For this reason, the current surfacing of liveliness
among the stories life scientists tell, bodes a transformational shift for the sciences of life.
As a means to situate my interpretive practices in this study, I must account for how
"liveliness" operates not only as a lure for practitioners I track; it is also a potent lure in my
own narration of life science practice. Rather than constraining my study to an account of
the constitution of "life itself," I'm hitching onto the lure of liveliness in an attempt to
provide an account of life science that would otherwise be obscured. In this ethnography I
make no attempt to mask how I move with and am moved by life scientists lively practices
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and narratives: in this sense, my work diffracts and transduces'" scientists' pleasures and
passions, their winces and cringes, along with my own."' s As Stefan Helmreich (personal
communication) reminds me, transduction does not promise complete or perfect
translation. Movements and gestures diffract through tissues, and are inflected, producing
interference patterns; signals get torqued as they are transduced. This ethnography is not
only a representation of scientific practice; it is a rendering that keeps the modeler-
ethnographer's contribution in full view. I conclude below with a meditation on Rich
Doyle's (2003) ecstatic reading of alife research, as a means to explore of how narratives of
liveliness are engendered and propagated through the kinds of intra-active practices I have
documented in this study.
The Lure of Liveliness
[A]life's power emerges not out of the barrel of a gun, but
from the gestures of mouse and pixel, signifying and
asignifying grapples with the machinic phylum. To be sure,
the familiar seductions of alife are rhetorical, but they
involve the sculpted, implicitly choreographed movements
of bodies as well as the affects provoked by the encounter
with alife creatures.
Rich Doyle, 2003:41 (emphasis added)
Doyle's (2003) Wetwares offers a lively reading of life science research that goes beyond
narratives of the capture of life itself. In the chapter "Representing Life for a Living," he
104 On transductive ethnography, see Stefan Helmreich (2007) "An Anthropologist Underwater:
Immersive Soundscapes, Submarine Cyborgs, and Transductive Ethnography," American Ethnologist
34(4).
105 In June, 2006, I collaborated with visual and movement artist Clementine Cummer to produce
"Cellular Practices and Mimetic Transductions: A Dance in Four Scores." We performed at Close
Encounters, the European meeting for the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts, in
Amsterdam. This piece built on my ethnographic work, and used text, movement and live video-
feed to tap into and propagate scientists' affects and excitability in relation to their techniques and
objects. In many ways, we attempted to transduce through our bodies the affects which we saw
animating life scientists in their work.
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looks into an area of research practitioners call "alife," in which some investigators claim
to be able to "evolve" artificial organisms and worlds through algorithms (see also
Helmreich, 1998). In light of his 1997 reading of the postvital turn in contemporary life
sciences, Doyle is puzzled. He asks: "If life seems to have disappeared as a sovereign
entity and joined the ranks of all those other relational attributes ... then it seems odd that
it should reappear, so visibly on my screen" (23). It should be reasonable to ask where
"life" has gone as in silico practices in the life sciences propagate and expand.'0 6 Biological
laboratories are increasingly populated, not with the techniques and apparatuses of the wet
lab and its visceral substances, but with the clean lines, codes, and colours of computer
graphic models and simulations. Even in protein crystallography, the fleshy materiality of
proteins eventually gets crystallized and diffracted and digitally rendered in stylized folds
and flashy colours. The fleshy bodies and lively substances of organisms are indeed
becoming rare. Rendered in silico, the stuff of life in the life sciences might start to appear a
little aseptic, inert; even a bit cold. Yet, as Helmreich (1998: 134) shows in Silicon Second
Nature, something life-like does appear on the screen, particularly when alife creatures
perform behaviours culturally legible as "cute" or "primitive." For Helmreich:
The cuteness of Artificial Life creatures is produced by and
produces a sense that they are primitive entities, a sense that
they are capable of miming-perhaps even parodying or
burlesquing-advanced behaviour, a sign taken to
demonstrate not that they are alive but only that they are
simpler forms of life. The laughter at Artificial Life is the
spark of life for these simulated creatures (134).
106 Organisms are being replaced by algorithms in new research arenas such as "computational
physiology" (which aims to engender whole experimental organ systems on screen, see for example,
http://pizza.cs.ucl.ac.uk/grid/ biobeacon/php/index.php), projects such as "BioSpice" (which
promises quantitative analytic tools to parse life's "circuitry" with computational approaches to
systems biology, http://biospice.lbl.gov/), and simulating technologies built to analyze protein
folding and dynamics (see for example D.T. Jones' simulator, http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/D.lones/).
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The animator, the one who breathes life into these creatures, is for Helmreich, the one who
laughs, who recognizes life in alife. And yet, Helmreich leaves the aliveness of these
artificial organisms as an open question: "Is it alive, or is it mimesis?" Doyle goes a little
further. He asserts that alife creatures not only seem alive, they are alive.
There are important differences between alife organisms and the interactive computer
models and animations of proteins. In structural biology and biological engineering the
question is not whether the protein animations are alive, but rather if the renderings are
lively; that is, whether they resemble deterministic mechanisms, or wily, animal-like
bodies inflected with intentions, desires, and affects. So, while I'm not concerned with
whether life, as such, appears on structural biologists' computer screens, I am interested in
how liveliness gets generated and propagated through their computer interfaces. With
Doyle, I suggest that there are three key features of in silico models and animations that
enable liveliness to thrive onscreen: 1) the fluid and malleable capacity of computer
graphics media to render temporality and movement; 2) the intra-activity of the interface;
3) and the capacity of animations to interpellate viewers into narratives of liveliness
through their interactivity and movement.
One key quality of something lively is that it moves. In the history of the concept, life has
long been associated with movement. In Chapter 4, I showed how Fernando, a structural
biologist whose habitus had been inflected by his engineering expertise, performed a
"motional" well-rehearsed reading of "life as movement":
Things are always in change. Okay. When things reach
stasis, equilibrium. They die. That's basically death. You
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have reached equilibrium. Nothing comes in nothing comes
out. So how can you not describe molecules and life as a
set of motions, as tensions. Okay. Someone described this to
me once as: "Life is a constant struggle between the
hydrophobic and the hydrophilic."
Life, for Fernando, inheres in the affinities and desires of molecules; in this, he conjures an
alchemical notion of life. In his reading, bodies have an affinity for movement: it keeps
them alive; and so to stop moving is to stop living. As he demonstrates, movement calls
into play our stories about life (which are themselves narratives that lure us in through their
play with time). And yet, any demarcation between the animate and the inanimate, the
lively and the inert, already performs a narrative fold informed by one's predilections for
what can count as alive (see also Helmreich, 1998). This of course depends on who
participates in the interaction; not every party gets a chance to give name to this effect. ' o7
Life gets recognized as such, for Doyle, "only through the complex of translation
mechanisms that render it articulable as something 'lively'" (23). Doyle draws on Peirce's
notion of "abduction," which is a kind of reasoning through which a prediction is made in
the absence of an assurance that it will succeed; abduction is the formation of a hypothesis
that moves out into an unknown future. Doyle uses abduction to think about the ways that
alife creatures propose (and so lure their users and viewers into notions of) other possible
lives as kinds of hypothetical life. Indeed it is in the Austinian pronouncement "It's alive!"
that "life" gets "corporealized," to use Haraway's term (1997: 141). As Doyle emphasizes
in the passage above, the life effect of liveliness operates also at a nondiscursive level. That
is, at the tissue level, as a kind of affect in the intra-acting, narrating perceiver, which could
107 As I emphasized in Chapter 5, a feminist model of accountability (such as Barad's "intra-action")
recognizes such asymmetrical power relations, and never forgets the scientists' responsibilities for
modeling, naming, or narrating, and circumscribing the forms of their intra-actions with their
objects.
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be understood in terms of Haraway's (1997) "material semiosis."
In this vein, Doyle insists that "the success of alife organisms in their virtual ecology is tied
to their success in an actual interactive visual ecology, an ecology also populated by
humans" (29): "Allowing oneself to be solicited by a screen entails a seduction in which
humans interact with, rather than act on, an entire bramble of technological infrastructure"
(59). What Doyle names as the "radical interactivity" and "complicity" of human-computer
grapplings, is for me a both a carefully choreographed and improvisational contact-dance
between humans and their machines, substances and models. Alife creatures produce "the
life effect" by interpellating their viewers; and they do this through their capacity for intra-
action. Lured into affective entanglements, and so "unable to look away," those
interpellated by alife creatures are in some senses "abducted by silicon" (Doyle, 2003: 24-
25).
My hypothesis is that if a model (imagined, computer graphic, or embodied) moves and
can be interacted with, then its users and makers can move with and be moved by it.'o1 In
a Deleuzian-Bergsonian (1986) model of perception, affect, and action, living bodies are
readily entrained to the movements (imagined, embodied, and otherwise) of others: bodies
are porous and have capacity to be moved by movement; we are hailed by each other; and
hitch rides on the movements of others. I suggest that life and liveliness are effected (and
inflected) because of a kind of responsiveness in our tissues. It is through their excitable
108 I draw this phrase from my master's thesis "Body-fullness in Biology," in which I examined an
ethic of seeing with feeling in life science imaging techniques that move through time with
developing organisms. For this I drew on Haraway's (1991) situated knowledges, Barad's (1996)
intra-action and Merleau-Ponty's (1968) phenomenology of the flesh. See Myers (2005).
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tissues that scientists are pulled into responsive relation with other moving bodies. It is in
such entanglements with others that we find ourselves able to move with and be moved by
other bodies. Excitability, it would appear, is the grounds for, or condition of possibility for
intra-action. This is the excitability, that when enacted in lively stories, betrays scientists'
affective entanglements with their objects, machines, and modeling media.
If laughter, for Helmreich, is the spark that gives life to alife creatures, I would step back to
suggest that it is the capacity to be moved to laughter, and to produce a laugh that moves,
or animates, is what makes possible this recognition of life onscreen. There is an excited
contact-dance between the user and the screen; and this contact-dance hails an affective
response-ability in participating bodies. That we are able to pronounce, "It's alive!", or "It's
lively!" is related to our response-abilities, our ability to be moved by others. The "event"
that we name "life happening now" is thus a material-semotic production: it does not just
play out before our eyes: it is a participatory encounter, one that requires intra-activity and
responsiveness between bodies. Thus, an ethic of responsibility comes into play precisely
because of the power invested in the performative act of so naming this human-machine
entanglement, this very relation, "life".
My sense is that structural biologists are viscerally abducted by intra-active movements and
lively stories. It is through their computer graphic and social intra-actions that they become
entrained to protein forms and movements; and it is through their bodies and language that
they conjure and hitch themselves on to the movements of subvisible bodies, and catch the
ride. Like alife, structural biology also "thrives on" a "complex ecology of brains, flesh,
code, and electric grids," (23) and it is in this "bramble" of such intra-acting human-
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machine ecologies that these scientists get drawn in (despite serious risk of censure) by the
lure of liveliness.
In this study I have attended to the material-semiotic modes through which structural
biologists interact with, incorporate, and perform their models and animations. These
human-computer-substance intra-actions produce excitations in excess of the speech and
writing, at the same time, entail a range of modeling practices demand more than an
analysis of representation in scientific practice. Though proteins, the "principal substances
of life," have been compressed, coded, and diffracted into digital form, there appears to be
space in the human-computer assemblages of structural biology laboratories for a narrative
other than the capture of life itself. As excitable tissues, these scientists are lured into intra-
actions with their digital objects, and in so doing sustain and nourish narratives of
liveliness. Where the search for "life itself" might just be the lure that gets scientists deep
into such entanglements with molecules, cells and organisms in the first place, it is the
intra-actions between scientists, their substances, and machines that sustains and nourishes
lively stories, and animates biological imaginaries. Liveliness becomes a story scientists
perform through their ecstatic interactions with other moving bodies. This is the liveliness
that becomes visible and tangible in the expressive performances of life scientists and their
models, and which calls this ethnographer's attention to the subtleties of body-machine
practices and the layers of affect and expression so vital to life science research.
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